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Foreword 
 
This book is a collection of studies on the integration paths of those ten Central and Eastern European member 
states of the European Union, that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively (i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, as well as Bulgaria and Romania). Their experiences are 
analysed from different angles. 
This region has a common historical and cultural heritage and is often considered as a separate or homogeneous 
group. Furthermore these countries have been called “new member states” following the Eastern enlargement of 
the EU. In our opinion, enough time has passed already to abandon this expression, and the novelty of the 
enlargement has faded. Therefore in this book we refer to this region as the “EU10”. 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 was a historical step because of the large number of countries acceding at 
one time, and because of the entry conditions being different from the previous enlargements. It is difficult to 
evaluate the effects of EU membership during the past decade due to the fact that the global crisis broke out just 
in the middle of this period, and exerted a serious impact on the economic development of all the member states 
including the EU10. In this volume we provide a kind of snapshot on the present situation and a description of the 
trends leading here. The overall picture underpins the fact that this region is far from being homogeneous. At the 
same time, beyond heterogeneity, there are also converging trends of certain macroeconomic indicators (such as 
growth rates, inflation, current account balances or public finance trends) in the post-crisis period. The region also 
faces many shared challenges (e.g. emigration of labour, integration into the common agricultural policy or the 
development of human resources) that are extensively treated by the authors too. 
The first introductory pages by Margit Rácz elaborate some thoughts on the adhesion circumstances, the crisis 
and their consequences for the region. The study by Krisztina Vida starts with the legal and institutional aspects 
of integration and then goes on analysing the development of the most important macroeconomic trends including 
GDP growth, catching up, competitiveness and public finances. Her paper sheds light on the clear differences 
between the more divergent post-accession and pre-crisis developments of the EU10 and highlights an unfolding 
convergence of many key macroeconomic indicators in the past few years. In the following pages, written by 
Norbert Szijártó, especially the monetary policy features and financial integration of the EU10 are in focus. The 
choice of appropriate exchange rate regime, as well as the introduction of inflation targeting in larger EU10 
countries contributed to successful disinflationary process in the region. Even though transition has passed and 
foreign participation is higher in EU10 banking system than in other emerging regions, financial markets are still 
less integrated than those in old euro area countries. 
The study of Andrea Éltető concentrates on the changes in the dynamics and structure of foreign trade of the 
EU10. Geographical orientation, concentration and most traded products are analysed providing evidence for the 
different inclusion patterns of these countries into the global value chains. Miklós Somai writes about the 
agricultural sector in the EU10 region and states that the heterogeneous development since the accession is 
partly due to the general social and economic framework in the given country that can help or hamper the 
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development and modernisation of agriculture. Another selected sector that determines economic development in 
several EU10 members is the automotive industry. Gábor Túry shows the structural characteristics of this industry 
and highlights the differences between production patterns in EU10 countries. 
The availability of qualified human capital has been traditionally an important value of the EU10 region. 
Employment trends and labour market developments are monitored by the study of Annamária Artner. It is shown 
that labour market and social improvements in the region were broken by the crisis in 2008, nevertheless, a 
tangible wage convergence took place among the most and least developed members of the EU. In his paper 
István Kőrösi illustrates that the utilization of human capital is far from being satisfactory; research and 
development expenditures are still low and in most cases the educational system suffers from lack of resources 
and proper development strategy. Free movement of labour within the EU opens up new opportunities, but 
emigration from the EU10 countries has not always contributed to a more efficient utilization of the available 
human capital of these countries. The study of Klára Fóti focuses on this topic and analyses the consequences of 
intra-EU mobility for the labour force and the sending countries. 
The virtue of this book is that all the ten countries are evaluated in every chapter, thereby providing an overall 
comparative view. We recommend this volume for all researchers, professors, students, as well as for policy-
makers who are interested in the development of the Central and Eastern European economies as members of 
the European Union. 
 
Andrea Éltető 
editor 
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Thoughts about the first decade of membership 
Margit Rácz 
New accession criteria 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 was different in many ways from the previous ones. Ten countries joined the 
EU, such a large number of countries never accessed together to the Community before. This accession was all 
the more extraordinary since the candidate countries wanted it much more than the EU-15 countries. In the case 
of this enlargement not only the ordinary law harmonization, but the Copenhagen criteria were to be implemented 
by the candidates, so the EU set further conditions for the countries wishing to enter. 
The EU10 countries are characterized by their common history in geopolitical sense. They were members of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Warsaw Pact, they had strong relations with the Soviet Union, and 
with the Soviet political and economic system for a long time. The three Baltic States were even members of the 
Soviet Union, their autonomy came into existence after the fall of the Soviet system. After the political changes it 
was a natural need for these countries to join the European Union. However, the EU-15 states felt certain distrust 
for the candidates, that was the reason for settling the Copenhagen criteria. The European Council has decided 
about the five accession criteria in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit. The European Commission had to take into 
consideration these points by the time of publishing the provisional opinion about the candidate countries. Four 
from these criteria is prescribed for the candidates and one for the EU.1
During the accession process certain issues came into force that stemmed from the actual situation of the 
European Union. One of these issues was the free movement of workers, which is a fundamental one of the “four 
 These criteria express a wish that the 
new countries will be able to function according to the rule of law and market economy. From today’s perspective, 
it is understandable that the integration maturity of the candidates was tested in this way. At the same time we 
must emphasize that neither in 1993 nor later has there been any measure taken to clarify the criteria of “rule of 
law and market economy”. At the time of the Barcelona Summit the criteria had been completed with a sixth one, 
resulting from the fear and suspicion of the “mega enlargement” process. The new rule obliged candidate 
countries to strengthen their administrative capacity. In June 2000 – as an attempt for homogenization - the Feira 
Summit of the European Council emphasized that the speed of negotiation processes depends on the effective 
national adoption and implementation of the legal achievements of the EU, the “acquis communautaire”. During 
the accession negotiations, the candidates were examined by the European Commission regarding the adoption 
of the rules of the internal market. If the countries have active market economy, than the accession to the 
common market would have to function properly. After joining the EU, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
of all the new member states were asked to indicate to the Commission if any discrimination happens against a 
company on the internal market. 
                                                 
1 Copenhagen criteria: 1/ political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; 2/ economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. 3/ acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, 4/ ability to take 
on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union 5/ the Union's capacity to 
absorb new members. 
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freedoms”: here a temporary derogation came into force. The EU-15 countries could decide in a time framework 
of seven years whether open their employee market or not. A transitive regulation was also that the derogation in 
agricultural finances, the entitlement for direct payments had been extended during 10 years gradually. 
Before the accession, partners signed association agreements resulting in customs unions between the 
signatories. During the two period of customs reduction, the EU decreased customs earlier than the candidates. 
In this respect the market accession took place gradually. 
Except for the monetary policy, all the other common policies were adopted. The accession to the Economic and 
Monetary Union is also part of the accession protocol, without precise accession date. The new member states 
had to respect the convergence criteria of Maastricht Treaty regarding their fiscal policy. Since the 2004 
accession, only three countries joined the EU: in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania, that are not part of the Schengen 
Agreement yet and in 2013 Croatia. There is a widespread debate whether the Community suffers from 
“enlargement fatigue” after the mega enlargement of 2004. Ten years of membership gives the opportunity to 
analyze and judge this period from EU-15 and also from EU-10 point of view at the same time. 
 
International economic environment during the first ten years 
The new member countries suffered the effects of the world economic crisis since 2008. This has been a 
sovereign debt crises, it differs from the other crises after World War II in its character and content. Keeping the 
eurozone together has become a problem, many new rules have come into force. Crisis management is a 
challenge to the Community, member countries have not managed to reach consensus on how to solve the 
problems. 
Already seven new member states have joined the euro area, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria are still outside. The crisis of the eurozone did not originate from the new EU10 countries, 
the real problems that required new forms of finance came from Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. (In 2013, 
Cyprus had sovereign debt crisis as well, and received support from the EU). Thus, the economic situation in the 
eurozone’s Southern member states gave more reason to worry, than the ones that joined in 2004 and were 
relatively poor compared to the EU average. 
Due to the debt crisis, new regulations were applied, that forced EU member states to carry out a stricter fiscal 
policy than before. At the same time, the EU had to face serious employment and growth problems and country 
specific problems emerged. The crisis has increased differences between member state performances. 
If we judge the period of the EU10 countries after enlargement, we cannot disregard the fact, that after the first 
three years, the agenda of the following seven years was determined by the fight against crisis and against 
problems generated by the crisis. Therefore, the difficult situation of the EU countries was caused by the illiquid 
international capital market and not by the internal relations of the EU. 
The lobby power of the European Union at international level at crisis times depends on how can the EU enforce 
its supranational rules on the member states. As for this crisis began as a worldwide subprime crisis, the world 
should have changed the rules of the international capital markets in order to avoid similar crises in the future. But 
this did not really take place. The new member states had to accommodate in such an EU that was not able to 
orientate itself properly. This caused further problems, and opened new lobby channels at national levels. 
Margit Rácz: Thoughts about the first decade of membership 
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After the crisis, in the core EU15 the unemployment rate jumped high, the growth was low, and this period is 
characterized by frequent elections and personal changes in financial minister positions. It is evident that the new 
European institutions managing the EU from 2014 on have to find a way out from this situation. 
 
The EU10: similar initial conditions, diverging performances 
The lack of market economy and rule of law, and their creation sustainability resulted in different development 
paths. The EU10 do not form a homogeneous group. (Of course this homogeneity did not exist before joining the 
EU either.) The differences of starting conditions reflected the extent of dictatorship in the given country before 
the collapse of the political system. There were notable differences for example in the degree of private 
ownership. After the changes, a significant private ownership developed in these countries. 
Evaluation of the post accession years is difficult, because the crisis breaks the period from 2008. All similarities 
and differences have a role in the success of a country that is defined by the degree of economic recovery and 
convergence. 
 
Table 1: Variation of GDP per capita,  
EU10, percent 
 1995-1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
European Union - 1.9 0.5 1.7 1.5 -0.7 -0.1 1.3 1.7 
Euro area 2.2 1.4 0.2 1.7 1.3 -0.9 -0.6 1.0 1.5 
Estonia 7.1 7.8 1.3 2.6 9.5 4.0 0.8 2.3 3.4 
Latvia 5.3 8.4 2.6 0.8 7.3 6.5 5.1 4.6 4.9 
Lithuania 5.4 7.9 3.6 3.7 8.5 5.1 4.3 4.1 3.9 
Slovenia 4.4 3.5 1.9 0.9 0.5 -2.7 -1.2 0.6 1.2 
Slovakia 4.1 3.9 5.0 4.2 3.6 1.6 0.8 1.9 2.7 
Czech Republic 2.3 3.7 3.0 2.2 2.0 -1.1 -1.0 2.0 2.3 
Hungary 2.6 4.5 0.5 1.3 1.9 -1.2 1.4 2.4 2.3 
Poland 5.9 3.3 4.7 2.9 4.5 2.0 1.6 3.3 3.5 
Bulgaria 0.2 6.5 4.4 1.1 4.4 1.2 1.4 5.4 5.7 
Romania 0.7 6.3 4.8 -0.6 2.8 0.8 3.8 2.7 2.9 
Source: European Economic Forecast, 2014/3. 
 
If we compare the EU10 on the basis of a five years average, we discover that only the three Baltic countries and 
Poland reached data above 5% between 1995 and 1999 (Table 1). If we analyze the next five years, only Baltic 
countries, and the two newcomer countries from 2007 reached that level. If we consider the 2005-2009 period, 
Slovakia was the only country reaching 5%. However, some countries realized unbroken economic development. 
Between 2011 and 2013 the GDP in the EU and in the euro area was shrinking. On the other hand, among the 
EU10 there were also countries having slowing growth. In Slovenia and the Czech Republic, GDP shrank in the 
last two years of the period. Compared to the EU or to the eurozone average, EU10 had better performance. It is 
noteworthy that GDP has not decreased in the Baltic States, Poland and Bulgaria. 
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The first ten years and the catch-up 
The development of the European integration so far did not create such a long-term successful catch-up model, 
upon which the EU10 countries can build. The results of the crisis can still be seen in 2014: in the Southern 
member states that joined in the 1980s, there had been no sustainable growth model, which could have provided 
stabile catching up process. Probably the crisis effects will influence the regional division of labour model, which 
was the result of globalization. In 2014, the EU has to face several types of growth challenges, without universally 
accepted solutions. 
During the European Parliament’s hearing, Bienkowska, the new Polish Commissioner in charge of the internal 
market pointed out that there will not be growth without stabile industrial basis. She named one of her priorities to 
improve the industrial competitiveness of the EU. If Europe wants to be a prosperous, competitive and 
environmentally sustainable, the share of industry has to increase to 20% in the EU’s GDP until 2020. She also 
stated that internationally the energy prices are the highest in the EU. Regarding industrial production, she 
declared that the biggest problem is the dramatic fall of investments. She would like to take special care of 
leading European industries like the car industry, chemical industry and also defense industry.2.The Commission 
creates an EUR 300 billion growth package to boost growth, investment and employment.3
The IMF is also concerned about sustainable growth. However, their proposed solutions to these problems are 
totally different from those of the Commission. Christine Lagarde, the chief executive of IMF highlighted three 
main areas, where IMF has to react. The first is growth and employment: for example the properly prepared and 
implemented infrastructural investments could help. The second is the analysis of financial stability and risk – the 
task of the organization is to draw attention to the global dangers. The third is the area of labor market and social 
security reforms. Capital should be reallocated for infrastructure and employment creation investment to launch 
economic growth. This could negatively effect on the financial balances of the countries, however, in short-term, 
the creation of demand is so important, that the IMF itself considers the balance of national public finances 
secondary in the short run.
 If growth and 
employment problems are not treated, that could cause even a new recession period from 2015. 
4
 
 
Catching up is a long-term task. In the short run, countries must always face current challenges. It cannot be 
judged whether the short-term solutions could lead to stable convergence in the long run. Still, the EU10 
countries do not seem to have a strategy for a middle class-based market economy that is stable and 
competitive. It might be that such strategy cannot even be created. In any case, the European Union should 
recognize that the cohesion policy solutions established so far might not decrease economic heterogeneity. A 
good example for that is the crisis in the Southern EU member states, its adequate and deep analysis could 
contribute to recognize similar problems EU10 countries might face decades later. 
                                                 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/2014-ep-hearings-reply-bienkowska_en.pdf 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/priorities/01/index_en.htm 
4 http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/101014.htm 
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Comparative analysis of integration developments in the 
EU10 countries: Trends of adaptation and catching up 
Krisztina Vida 
Institutional integration, application of single market law, use of EU funds 
When acceding to the European Union, the new member states joined a legal community with the obligation of 
timely and accurate implementation of EU law. The European Commission closely monitors the member states’ 
performance with special regard to transposition of single market directives. In this respect5 the newcomer 
countries had an extremely heterogeneous performance in the year of accession (2004) followed by a quick 
adaptation process (see Figure 1). As a result, in terms of transposition deficit, these countries are at around 1% 
level (close to the EU average) which shows a high degree of discipline. Regarding infringement cases (see 
Figure 2) they were usually on the rise a few years after accession, followed by an improving trend in general. In 
this field the overall performance of the EU10 has been very good, almost constantly remaining under the EU 
average – with the sole exception of Poland. The latter country has been struggling with EU law especially on 
transport, environment (emissions) as well as health and consumer issues. For the whole group in general, the 
most problematic dossiers seem to be environment-related directives, but taxation or agriculture could also be 
mentioned. All in all however, it must be emphasized that currently (in 2014) the EU10 countries have just a few 
contentious cases (ranging between some 10 and 49) which should be compared to the around 1,200 single 
market directives in force.6
 
Source: European Commission(2014a) (for Romania and Bulgaria data only since 2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Transposition deficit of single market directives 
percent of total 
 
                                                 
5 European Commission (2014a) 
6 European Commission (2014b), p. 4. 
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Figure 2: Number of infringement cases 
 
Source: European Commission (2014a) (for Romania and Bulgaria data only since 2007) 
 
With regard to institutional integration, the newcomers have been efficient and successful. First of all, filling up the 
positions in the European administration was a rather smooth process, although finding well trained people, really 
fit for the tasks at the EU institutions was not easy in the beginning (mainly regarding interpreters/translators).7
Furthermore, five of the ten countries have already assumed successful Council presidencies – Slovenia in 2008, 
the Czech Republic in 2009, Hungary and Poland in 2011 and Lithuania in 2013 – enabling their administrations 
to gain a deep knowledge and understanding of EU-level decision-making mechanisms.
 
8 These countries' 
politicians proved to be active in the European Parliament too. In March 2014, there were five representatives 
from the EU10 region from among the 15 MEPs of the year (this time nominated also of the whole term).9 It 
should also be mentioned that seven of ten capital cities – namely Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Ljubljana, Tallinn, 
Riga and Vilnius – are hosting a European agency or independent body out of 40 such institutions.10
Another indicator of “institutional maturity” is the use of EU funds by the beneficiary countries. Here the EU10 
countries could be characterised by a long learning process. Even though the Eastern enlargement was the first 
where the applicant countries had – via the pre-accession funds – the opportunity to prepare for the absorption of 
greater amounts of non-reimbursable assistance, the use of those funds has still been relatively slow and not 
without problems in several new member states. While – thanks to the n+2 rule
 
Last but not least, as a general observation, it should also be highlighted that the EU10 never formed a blocking 
minority that would put a break on further integration. On the other hand, they were able to represent common 
interests and ideas, especially in the field of preserving cohesion assistance in the 2014-2020 period, energy 
policy cooperation or promoting Eastern Partnership. 
11
                                                 
7 Bruxinfo (2004) 
8 The remaining five countries will hold the presidency of the Council in the following order: Latvia (2015), Slovakia (2016), Estonia and 
Bulgaria (2018) and Romania (2019). 
9 Ms Roza Thun from Poland, working on internet policy and digital market, Mr Jan Olbrycht also from Poland, responsible for sustainable 
built environment, Ms Kinga Gál from Hungary, fighting for minority rights and linguistic diversity, Mr AlojzPeterle from Slovenia responsible 
for health issues, and finally Mr Marian J. Marinescu from Romania promoting research and innovation. 
(http://www.mepawards.eu/winners) 
10 http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm 
11 According to the n+2 rule, the recipient countries can prolong the implementation of EU cohesion assistance by two years after the end 
of the financial framework, i.e. until the end of 2015. 
 – by 2014 the contract ratios 
have improved tremendously everywhere, the actual payments are still lagging behind (see Table 1). In this 
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respect the worst performer is Romania and the best one is Estonia (being at 37% and 77% respectively). Given 
that the contracted money has to be spent by the end of 2015, recently an “absorption boom” can be witnessed in 
many of the EU10 which has a very positive impact on economic recovery. 
 
Table 1: Absorption of EU funds (2007-2013) by the EU10, 2014 
Country Contracted grants % of total 
Paid grants 
% of total 
Bulgaria 100 54 
Czech Republic 92 64 
Estonia 96 77 
Latvia 96 70 
Lithuania 99 74 
Hungary 100 62 
Poland 95 64 
Romania 94 37 
Slovenia 93 62 
Slovakia 98 53 
Average 97 63 
Source: KPMG12 
 
The overall absorption performance has been more heterogeneous than the sectoral distribution of EU 
assistance: nine out of the EU10 have been overwhelmingly investing into infrastructure (between ca. 60-80% of 
the total grants), followed to a more modest extent by human capital and research activities. The only exception 
was Slovenia, where, most of the money went into R&D as well as information technology and communication, 
thanks to high quality infrastructure and due to a different policy approach.13
As a result of these trends, the gap among the EU10 countries has narrowed significantly by 2013 compared to 
2004 (from 35-87% to 47-83% of EU28 average) and the whole group got closer to the Union average too. The 
 
 
Catching up 
One of the main reasons for joining the European Union by the Central and Eastern European countries was the 
ultimate objective of gradual convergence of living standards to the EU average. Catching up can be measured 
with several indicators. In this study three basic series are used. The first index is the development of GDP per 
capita. Figure 3 illustrates well that none of the EU10 countries could reach the EU average in the past ten years 
but some closing up has been taking place, even if at different paces. This was due to two parallel phenomena at 
the same time. The two best performers, Slovenia and the Czech Republic recorded since 2009 a slight decline 
and stagnation respectively, both suffering from a longer economic recession than the rest of the group. On the 
other hand, an especially spectacular catching up (reaching of around 20 percentage points between 2004 and 
2013) took place in the case of Poland, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and Romania, and a modest one in the case of 
Bulgaria and Hungary. 
                                                 
12 KPMG (2014), p. 12. 
13 KPMG (2013), p. 16. 
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main question in the post-crisis period is, whether a more dynamic growth in the coming years would trigger a 
faster convergence to the EU average or whether this process will be a protracted one. Another question is, 
whether the gap within the EU10 would continue narrowing, or would they take a more diverse path of catching 
up. 
 
Figure 3: GDP per capita 
PPS, EU28=100 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The second indicator is regional convergence. The available regional data show a significant heterogeneity of the 
EU10 countries. First of all, it must be mentioned that from the ten analysed countries, only six have more than 
two NUTS2 regions (the Baltic states being one single region each and Slovenia having two regions: the Western 
one being at the EU level and the Eastern one being still under 75% of EU average). A common feature in all of 
them is the significant development of their central regions embracing the capitals. Moreover, from 2014 onwards, 
the central regions of Poland, the Czech Republic (where the capital city itself is a region), Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Romania are all categorised as more developed regions (i.e. above 90% of EU average, not eligible 
for the Cohesion Fund), while only Bulgaria and the three Baltic states remain entirely under the less developed 
(below 75%) status. 
Another similar feature across the mentioned six bigger countries is that most of them are struggling with 
considerable regional gaps between the central regions and the rest of the country, which did not diminish in the 
past years (on the contrary, it rather widened in the case of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria). Those six countries 
also had a very different regional convergence record in general. As Figures 4-9 show, most of the regions did 
register tangible improvement by 201114 compared to 2003, starting from very different levels. A clear exception 
to this trend could be witnessed in Hungary with virtually no regional convergence at all, and the Czech Republic 
where the regions – starting on a significantly higher level – showed a very modest increase of GDP per capita. 
The discrepancies among those six countries’ non-central regions is quite significant: according to the 2011 
Eurostat data, roughly the half of those regions were below 50% while the other half could be found between 50 
and 75% of EU average.15
                                                 
14The 2011 data were the latest available in the Eurostat database in October 2014. 
15 For more details see: European Commission (2014c) 
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Figures 4-9: Regional development in the six bigger EU10 countries (2003-2011) 
NUTS2 regions 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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The third indicator is wage convergence. In this respect a lot remains to be done to reach levels comparable to 
Western European standards. While prices of many commodities and services have become similar in the new 
member states to those in the old ones, average earnings are still lagging well behind. Figure 10 demonstrates 
the rather striking gap, while it also indicates a slow catching up in this respect too. Namely, the average income 
of the EU10 citizens was less than one fifth of EU average in 2004, which actually went up to nearly one third of it 
by 2012. Within the EU10 the discrepancies are also high: in harmony with national development levels, Slovenia 
is leading the group with nearly four times the sums earned by Bulgarians. In the middle range can be found the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia, followed by Poland, Hungary, the other two Baltic states and Romania. 
 
Figure 10: Net annual earnings 
euro 
 
Source: Eurostat (data missing for Estonia in 2004-06 and 2009, for Slovenia and Slovakia in 2004-06) 
 
Trends of growth and competitiveness 
The early 2000s could be characterised by high growth rates in the Central and Eastern European region, and the 
accession to the European Union just reinforced them in most of the EU10 countries (Figure 11). From the eight 
countries that joined in 2004, only Hungary took a sharp downward trend while – after some slowing in 2005 – 
Poland and Slovenia continued to enjoy dynamic growth, similarly to all the other newcomers. In Hungary this 
failure was due to internal factors (the mismanagement of public finances and the lack of a coherent economic 
policy) while the European and global environment continued to be a favourable one. According to Eurostat data 
series,16
The region was severely hit by the financial and economic crisis, with very different recession rates however. 
While after overheated growth rates, the Baltic states suffered from a dramatic, double-digit shrinkage of their 
economies in 2009,
 growth in the EU10 in the first years of membership was driven by all three components of it: 
consumption, investments and exports; even if to different extents in each country. 
17
                                                 
16 Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables 
17 About the specificities of the Baltic developments in the past ten years see: Meisel (2014). 
 the others were between -7.9% (Slovenia) and -4.5% (Czech Republic). The only country to 
avoid negative growth was Poland, thanks to its robust internal market and lower exposure to external effects. 
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Getting out of the crisis and resuming economic growth has been happening at a different pace across the region. 
At the same time, Figure 11 shows a steady convergence of growth rates for 2014-2015, with an unprecedented 
narrowing of the gaps among the members of the EU10. In general, economic expansion is mainly due to 
exports, while sluggish investments are boosted by accelerated absorption of EU funds. At the same time, private 
consumption recovers only slowly in most of the EU10.18
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Real GDP growth rate 
percent 
The trends of the current account balances demonstrate well the economic performance and external 
competitiveness of the EU10 countries. Figure 12 clearly shows a split of the EU10 into two groups between 
accession and the crisis: the better performer four Visegrad countries and Slovenia on the one hand, and Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (accumulating huge deficits) on the other. While the former group 
benefited from better economic structures coupled with higher added value of their exports,19
                                                 
18 Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables 
19 IMF (2014), p. 36. 
 the latter group 
suffered from structural weaknesses and a greater import dependency to satisfy consumption. 
The crisis, however, put an end to those sharp differences as – thanks to shrinking domestic demand – imports of 
goods and services fell considerably across the region, resulting even in current account surpluses or just small 
deficits. According to the figures for the past few years, the EU10 countries seem to have more harmonious and 
well manageable current account positions than ever before since 2004. It remains to be seen however, whether 
these favourable trends will remain in place in the post-crisis period. Namely, the challenge is not only the 
potentially strengthening demand for imports, coupled with the lack of dynamism on the EU10’s traditional export 
markets, but also – as a side effect of economic recovery – the increased profit repatriation of foreign companies 
(which is usually the biggest in Poland and the Czech Republic). 
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Figure 12: Balance of the current account 
percent of GDP 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Another important indicator of competitiveness is labour productivity (see Figure 13). In this respect, the 
performance of the EU10 countries reflects their development levels and trends. 
 
Figure 13: Labour productivity per person employed 
EU27=100 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
While Slovenia and the Czech Republic used to have the highest productivity levels in the first years of 
membership, in the past few years their performance has been stagnating or even declining respectively. At the 
same time, the Baltic states exhibited a spectacular catching up of over 20 percentage points between 2004 and 
2013 as compared to the EU average. All the other EU10 countries showed a considerable – over 10 percentage 
points – improvement too, with the exception of Hungary which advanced only modestly. As a result of those 
developments, the initial gap among the eight countries that joined in 2004 has narrowed significantly, with a 
clear catching up by them to the EU average (being roughly at around 75% of it in 2013). At the same time, the 
productivity levels of Romania and Bulgaria are still lagging well behind the rest of the group, hardly reaching half 
of the EU average. 
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Finally, from the point of view of competitiveness it is also relevant to evoke the innovation performance of the 
EU10. The European Commission publishes each year the complex index (composed of 25 indicators) of the EU 
countries’ performances (including among others the gross expenditure on research and development, the 
contribution to innovation by the enterprise sector, the number of patent applications or that of new doctorate 
graduates).20 Based on the results the countries can be grouped into four categories. None of the EU10 can be 
found in the group of the so-called innovation leaders, but the innovation followers already embraced two 
countries of the EU10 in the past few years, namely Estonia and Slovenia. To the third group of moderate 
innovators belong the four Visegrad countries and Lithuania, while the fourth category of modest innovators had 
Latvia as well as the two Balkan countries. Behind the absolute figures, however, it is also important to take into 
account the pace of development, and in this respect, besides the outstanding improvement of the three Baltic 
states and Slovenia, the Bulgarian and Hungarian performance can be praised too. Romania, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia had just a modest improvement, while Poland reached the lowest growth rate in this field in the past 
eight years. 
 
Table 2: Innovation index 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Growth rate 
Bulgaria 0.158 0.168 0.189 0.198 0.232 0.234 0.191 0.188 2.49 
Czech Republic 0.374 0.390 0.369 0.374 0.411 0.416 0.405 0.422 1.72 
Estonia 0.388 0.382 0.411 0.452 0.453 0.474 0.488 0.502 3.74 
Latvia 0.174 0.188 0.195 0.208 0.216 0.228 0.234 0.221 3.51 
Lithuania 0.241 0.254 0.233 0.239 0.24 0.260 0.271 0.289 2.58 
Hungary 0.298 0.303 0.314 0.315 0.341 0.344 0.335 0.351 2.36 
Poland 0.263 0.275 0.265 0.276 0.272 0.282 0.268 0.279 0.88 
Romania 0.208 0.219 0.242 0.257 0.240 0.258 0.229 0.237 1.90 
Slovenia 0.427 0.431 0.458 0.474 0.481 0.508 0.495 0.513 2.66 
Slovakia 0.296 0.302 0.304 0.312 0.299 0.304 0.35 0.328 1.49 
Source: European Commission (2014d) 
 
Public finance and monetary trends 
Concerning the fiscal position of general governments, it can be established that between 2004 and 2008 most of 
the EU10 made considerable efforts to consolidate their public budgets and bring the deficit below 3% of GDP 
(while Estonia and Bulgaria continued to run budget surpluses each year). Only two countries had a deteriorating 
trend prior to the crisis: Romania which, however, still remained below -3% until 2007, and Hungary. The latter 
country was (together with Poland in the first few years of membership) under excessive deficit procedure from 
the outset. Hungary actually accumulated a huge public deficit of over 9% by 2006 (see Table 3), which then had 
to be rectified just on the eve and then in the middle of the financial and economic crisis. This meant for Hungary 
a “straightjacket” and, due to an IMF-EU loan package, almost no room of manoeuvre to conduct a loser 
budgetary policy coupled with increased public debt – as was the case for all other EU10 countries. 
                                                 
20 The European Commission’s “Innovation Union Scoreboards” can be retrieved here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/innovation-scoreboard/index_en.htm 
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The years of 2008, and especially 2009-2010 have been the worst for the group: a period when only Estonia 
could avoid the excessive deficit procedure. In parallel with the improvement of the economic situation across the 
EU10 from 2010 onwards (which was however not linear in any of them) their budgetary positions seemed to 
follow suit too. Thanks to serious consolidation programmes, in 2013 only Poland and Slovenia had a bigger-than 
3% budget deficit: the former having a 4.3% level, while the latter – due to a one-off bank recapitalisation 
package21 – accumulated an unprecedented deficit of nearly 15% of GDP. With these figures eight of the EU10 
had a better performance than the Union average of -3.3% public budget position of that year. The years 2014 
and 2015 seem to bring about overall public finance stability in the region, in both years only Slovenia breaching 
the Maastricht limit but with a sharply improving trend. 
 
Table 3: General government deficit/surplus  
percent of GDP 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU28 -2.9 -2.5 -1.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.5 -4.4 -3.9 -3.3 -2.6 -2.5 
Bulgaria 1.9 1.0 1.9 1.2 1.7 -4.3 -3.1 -2 -0.8 -1.5 -1.9 -1.8 
Czech Republic -2.8 -3.2 -2.4 -0.7 -2.2 -5.8 -4.7 -3.2 -4.2 -1.5 -1.9 -2.4 
Estonia 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.4 -3.0 -2.0 0.2 1.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 
Latvia -1.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -4.4 -9.2 -8.2 -3.5 -1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 
Lithuania -1.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.0 -3.3 -9.4 -7.2 -5.5 -3.2 -2.2 -2.1 -1.6 
Hungary -6.5 -7.9 -9.4 -5.1 -3.7 -4.6 -4.3 4.3 -2.1 -2.2 -2.9 -2.8 
Poland -5.4 -4.1 -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.5 -7.8 -5.1 -3.9 -4.3 5.7 -2.9 
Romania -1.2 -1.2 -2.2 -2.9 -5.7 -9.0 -6.8 -5.5 -3.0 -2.3 -2.2 -1.9 
Slovenia -2.3 -1.5 -1.4 0.0 -1.9 -6.3 -5.9 -6.4 -4.0 -14.7 -4.3 -3.1 
Slovakia -2.4 -2.8 -3.2 -1.8 -2.1 -8.0 -7.5 -4.8 -4.5 -2.8 -2.9 -2.8 
Source: Eurostat (forecast for 2014, 2015) 
 
Analysing the national measures taken to restore public finance stability, we can find – on the basis of the EU10 
governments’ Stability/Convergence Programmes between 2011 and 201422
                                                 
21 The biggest part of the banking sector’s recapitalisation was done in 2013, exceeding 10% of GDP in that year, while the operation 
stretched over to 2014 with a remaining nearly 1%/GDP.Stability Programme of Slovenia, 2014 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/sp2014_slovenia_en.pdf, p. 21. 
22 Those documents can be retrieved here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/convergence/index_en.htm 
– a range of similar steps on both the 
revenue and expenditure side. Starting with the revenue side, among the most typical measures were rising VAT 
rates coupled with the abolishment of some types of VAT deductibility. Secondly, there was a significant increase 
of excise duties in all of the EU10. A third common element in the region has been the fight against tax evasion 
and fraud, combating the grey economy and improving the efficiency of tax collection. On the expenditure side, 
the most typical measures included a freeze and/or cuts of public sector wages (the Romanian case being the 
severest with a 25% reduction) coupled with downsizing (or hiring freeze) and reduced government consumption. 
Many governments have also revised the national system of pensions and social transfers too. In the field of 
pensions the general trend has been to gradually increase the retirement age (also linked to demography and 
longer life expectancy) together with thorough revisions and restrictions of early retirement schemes. Pension 
indexation freeze took place in some countries too, but only temporarily, for the worst years of the crisis. In one 
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way or another, social benefit cuts (including unemployment benefit revision, sickness or family-related 
allowances) were also undertaken in the region. At the same time, the differences must be highlighted too, as 
they reflect some country-specific approaches and solutions to the problems. In a simplified way Table 4 
summarises the most important measures that were taken by the individual governments in the past five years 
including the conventional/similar and the non-conventional/dissimilar steps. 
 
Table 4: Main anti-crisis fiscal measures in the EU10 (2011-2014) 
Revenue side BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK 
VAT hike (or at least revised deductibility)  ●    ● ● ● ● ● 
Excise duty hike ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Combating tax-evasion/improving tax collection ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Increase in social security contributions ●     ●    ● 
New energy-related fee ● ●       ● ● 
Broadened base for personal income tax          ● 
Crisis personal income tax         ●  
Rising corporate income tax          ● 
New or higher real estate type tax  ●  ● ●   ● ●  
Special measures on lottery or gambling  ●  ●     ●  
Full/partial elimination of the private pension pillar23       ● ●   ● 
Bank levy and/or financial transaction duty      ●   ● ● 
Sale of carbon emission rights   ● ● ●     ● 
Sale of frequencies      ●    ● 
Sale of emergency oil stocks          ● 
Privatisation        ●    
Special sectoral taxes      ● ●  ● ● 
           
Expenditure side BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK 
Freeze/cuts in public sector wages ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Freeze/cuts in social benefits  ●  ● ● ●  ● ●  
Freezing/lower indexation of pensions ● ●  ● ●    ●  
Increasing of retirement age ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Cuts in government consumption ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Cuts in government investment  ●   ●  ● ● ● ● 
Cuts is subsidies to public companies/agriculture    ●   ● ●  ● 
Debt assumption of local governments      ●     
Recapitalisation of banks         ●  
Capital injection into a development bank      ●     
Wage increase in some public services      ● ●   ● 
Source: Stability/Convergence Programmes of EU10, 2011-2014 
 
When looking at the public debt figures of the EU10 (Table 5) it is obvious that they all entered the Union with 
levels below the Maastricht threshold. In fact, up until the crisis the only problematic new member state in this 
                                                 
23 Several EU10 countries introduced the mandatory private pension pillar. Of them Poland and Slovakia decided to eliminate it partially, 
while Hungary opted for its full abolishment, and – based on a decision in autumn 2014 – the Czech Republic will do the same by 2016. 
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respect has been Hungary where indebtedness took an alarming trend after accession, in parallel with the 
accumulation of an unprecedented public deficit by 2006. The other country with a growing and the second 
highest debt was Poland, which despite the crisis, never reached the 60% limit. The remaining eight new 
members had really low and well manageable debt levels in EU comparison (e.g. below 30% of GDP in all of 
them in 2008). The reasons for those positive results were partly historic (e.g. the Baltic states did not inherit any 
debts from soviet times, or Romania not taking up any during the communist era) and partly reflected lasting 
prudential fiscal policies (e.g. again Estonia or also Bulgaria running budgetary surpluses). 
The crisis however had a devastating impact on the gross debts of many EU10 governments. The debt-to-GDP 
ratio rose between 2008 and 2014 by about 10 percentage points in Bulgaria, 15 in the Czech Republic, 20 in 
Latvia, more than 25 in Lithuania and Romania, nearly 30 in Slovakia and nearly 60 (!) in the case of Slovenia 
(see Table 5). Even though these trends are disquieting, the EU10 group still remains well below the EU average 
under this indicator; with only Hungary and Slovenia having a ca. 80% level, which in the former is expected to 
decline again from 2015, while in the latter from 2016 onwards.24 
 
Table 5: General government gross debt 
percent of GDP 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU28 62.1 62.6 61.4 58.8 62 74.4 79.9 82.4 85.2 88.9 89.5 89.2 
Bulgaria 37.0 27.5 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 16.3 18.4 18.9 23.1 22.7 
Czech Republic 28.9 28.4 28.3 27.9 28.7 34.6 38.4 41.4 46.2 46.0 44.4 45.8 
Estonia 5.0 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 7.1 6.7 6.1 9.8 10.0 9.8 9.6 
Latvia 15.0 12.5 10.7 9.0 19.8 36.9 44.5 42.0 40.8 38.1 39.5 33.4 
Lithuania 19.3 18.3 17.9 16.8 15.5 29.3 37.8 38.3 40.5 39.4 41.8 41.4 
Hungary 59.5 61.7 65.9 67.0 73.0 79.8 82.2 82.1 79.8 79.2 80.3 79.5 
Poland 45.7 47.1 47.7 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.9 56.2 55.6 57 49.2 50.0 
Romania 18.7 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.4 23.6 30.5 34.7 38.0 38.4 39.9 40.1 
Slovenia 27.3 26.7 26.4 23.1 22.0 35.2 38.7 47.1 54.4 71.7 80.4 81.3 
Slovakia 41.5 34.2 30.5 29.6 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.6 52.7 55.4 56.3 57.8 
Source: Eurostat (forecast for 2014, 2015) 
 
In line with the new rules on sound public finances, and especially the Fiscal Compact25 – to which nine of the 
EU10 are signatory parties26
Public indebtedness can be linked to at least two risk factors. The share of foreign currency denominated debt in 
total debt
 – budgetary stability and fight against public debts gradually become part of the 
national legal framework too. 
27
                                                 
24 Stability Programme of Slovenia, 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/sp2014_slovenia_en.pdf 
25 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) – an intergovernmental treaty focusing 
on the balanced budget rule with a maximum 0.5% structural deficit, on the systematic cutting back of public debts and on the introduction 
of the debt brake rule into national constitutions (or high level laws). 
26 In spring 2014, the new Czech government also expressed its willingness to join soon, but the parliament did not endorse it yet by 
October 2014. 
27 Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Central_government_gross_debt_by_currency_of_issuance,_2013.png 
 is the highest in Lithuania (80%), followed by Bulgaria (70%), Romania (55%), Hungary (40%), 
Poland (30%), and the Czech Republic (20%). This problem is minimal in Slovakia and practically non-existent in 
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Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia. It must also be added, that from these six countries only those four are exposed to 
exchange rate volatility which – having most of their debts in euros – are not acceding to the eurozone (like 
Lithuania in 2015) or do not have a fixed exchange rate system (like Bulgaria having the currency board system). 
Thus, devaluation and a mechanic increase of debt payments is a threat in a diminishing order in Romania, 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 14: EMU interest rates  
percent 
 
Source: Eurostat (no data for Estonia, missing data for Romania in 2004-05) 
 
Besides the exchange rate uncertainties another burden on governments’ debt service is the price of borrowing. 
The EU10 are overwhelmingly reliant on government bonds and securities (with the exception of Estonia and also 
Latvia where loans are predominant or at least above 50% respectively).28
                                                 
28 Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Structure_of_government_debt 
 In this respect, an important indicator 
is the rate of the 10-year maturity bonds, whose convergence to the average of the lowest-inflation countries is 
one of the pre-conditions for joining the euro area. As Figure 14 shows, prior to the crisis, most of the EU10 
countries have been close to the roughly 4% of EU average, with the exception of Romania and Hungary which 
used to have much higher rates. The crisis had an extremely negative impact on the interest levels of those non-
eurozone countries which suffered the deepest economic recession in 2009, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria. In the following years however a gradual convergence back to lower levels has been 
taking place (but Hungary, Romania and recently also Slovenia are still leading the group being at the double of 
the EU average in 2013). 
Interest rates are of course closely linked to money supply and price developments in general. As Figure 15 
clearly demonstrates, the EU10 countries could be characterised as a high-inflation region between 2004 and the 
crisis, mainly due to their dynamic – in many cases overheated – post-accession growth rates. As one of the few 
benign effects of the crisis (shrinking demand) however, the harmonised indices of consumer prices have been 
declining and are forecasted to remain at around 2% in 2015 for the whole group. 
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Figure 15: HICP inflation rate 
percent 
 
Source: Eurostat (forecast for 2014, 2015) 
 
Conclusions 
After a long pre-accession process marked by systematic alignment of national law to EU law, the EU10 countries 
showed a relatively smooth legal adaptation process as full member states. Their record of transposition of EU 
directives, as well as the number of their infringement cases is in general in line with the EU average. These 
countries also managed to integrate quickly and without major problems into the institutional system of the EU, 
and – after a longer learning period – their capacities for using EU assistance has also been improving. 
Regarding catching up, a gradual convergence in terms of per capita GDP can be detected. As a result of 
differing performances, the gap among the EU10 narrowed by 2013 compared to 2004 and the whole group got 
somewhat closer to the EU average too. The picture is more heterogeneous in terms of regional convergence 
which has been slower in most of the EU10 in the first five or eight years of membership (with an overwhelming 
majority of NUTS2 regions still remaining in the category of less developed areas). Finally, concerning the still low 
level of wages, a gradual catching up process has been unfolding across the EU10 since accession. 
The post-accession and pre-crisis years of most of the EU10 countries were characterised by very dynamic 
economic development, although the gaps among their growth rates were considerable. The crisis hit the region 
very severely, followed by a gradual recovery, again at different paces. At the same time, the figures for 2014 and 
2015 indicate more harmonious growth rates than ever before. The Central and Eastern European region seems 
to become again the most dynamic one in the EU, but this time more balanced development paths can be 
expected accompanied by a gradual improvement of competitiveness. 
On the basis of the described Maastricht-related performance of the EU10, important conclusions on their euro-
maturity can also be drawn. In fact, four countries have already joined the euro area and by 2015 there will be five 
of them. In a chronological order these are: Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and 
Lithuania (2015). Those countries are the smaller ones in the region with either a high initial development level 
(Slovenia) or a very dynamic catching up process since EU membership. In the post-crisis period (since 2012) the 
three Baltic states and also Slovakia performed well against the Maastricht criteria while Slovenia seemed to be 
the most problematic country suffering from a prolonged recovery and belated structural reforms. 
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Regarding the other five bigger countries from the group, currently none of them has an official target date for 
euro entry. In terms of nominal convergence, however, Bulgaria could easily be the next candidate as it complies 
with all the criteria, with the exception of formal ERM2 membership. Nevertheless, the latter should in no way be 
an obstacle for the leva which is kept uninterruptedly (without any de- or revaluation) in a currency board ever 
since 1997.29In terms of public finances, the remaining four countries have somewhat different figures and trends 
but their data are generally good, remaining under the Maastricht benchmark for both public deficit and debt (with 
the sole exception of the Hungarian debt figure). Inflation is at well manageable levels in all of them, coupled with 
gradual interest rate convergence (with low or declining base rates30
                                                 
29 First pegged to the German mark, later to the euro. 
30 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/reference_rates.html 
). Finally, none of them joined the ERM2 
system yet, which allows them to conduct a more flexible exchange rate policy, with all the advantages and 
disadvantages of it. 
In any case, due to their close economic ties (especially among the immediate neighbours) it would be desirable 
for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to harmonise their accession to the eurozone. 
At the same time, beyond nominal convergence the requirement of a tangible real convergence is coming up on 
the political agenda; with good reason in most of them. While this process will last longer, the unfolding balanced 
and low-inflationary growth perspectives accompanied by improving competitiveness and sustained public 
finance stability across the region may facilitate a steadier real convergence leading up to the introduction of the 
single currency by the outsider countries too. 
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Monetary and financial integration in EU10 countries 
Norbert Szijártó 
Introductory remarks 
This study analyses two different but interconnected aspects of late transition process in EU10 countries. With the 
collapse of the Council for Mutual Economical Assistance (CMEA), former satellite states in Central and Eastern 
Europe immediately swapped economic and political relations from the mouldering Soviet Union to the Germany 
leaded West. Convergence lies in the heart of EU policies, the developments in the functioning of monetary 
policies in EU10 countries can also be understood as an institutional catching up process. Efficient functioning of 
the financial markets plays a vital role in the integration process but financial markets in transition countries have 
been severely constrained by the lack of knowledge about cross-country risk-sharing and institutional deficiencies 
and lack of acquaintance of financial instruments. Moreover, the absence of adequate government support and 
regulatory back-up can also hinder the growth of fundamental financial market institutions. 
 
Monetary policy in EU10 countries 
After the regime change monetary policy has played an important role in the EU10 countries with inevitable policy 
and institutional changes, including the construction of independent central banks. Centrally planned economies 
often used substantial price distortions that were an established custom among CMEA members before. 
Regarding the monetary system of EU10 countries an essential question emerged whether to use monetary 
aggregates of fixed exchange rates as the basis for monetary policy and especially for stabilization. In several 
countries the technical assistance of the IMF was used to adopt and revise central bank laws because on the one 
hand central bank autonomy and accountability required strong legislation, and on the other hand establishing the 
credibility of monetary policy was a crucial issue. According to the IMF (2014) report the choice of the nominal 
anchor played a vital role in determining stabilization paths. The commitment to introduce fixed exchange rates 
was obvious and technically easy to implement. The exchange rate peg was able to break down hyperinflationary 
spirals and helped implementing fiscal adjustments and it was also useful when countries faced vulnerable 
external positions. The alternative could have been money-based stabilization; a monetary aggregate target could 
have also helped maintaining decreasing inflationary paths. Furthermore, given the flexible exchange rates, 
money-based approaches are better solutions than flexible exchange rates to absorb external and real shocks. 
 
Exchange rate regimes in EU10 countries 
From a theoretical point of view several factors can determine exchange rate regime choices. Markiewicz (2006) 
differentiates three main approaches: the traditional approach is based on the optimum currency area theory and 
its extension, the concept of the “impossible trinity” (see later). The second one is the currency crisis approach, 
and finally – as a third option - the choice of exchange rate regimes can be analysed through a political economy 
view. The optimum currency area theory pioneered by Mundell’s, Kenen’s and McKinnon’s work compares the 
fixed and flexible exchange rates in terms of trade and welfare gains, and states that fixed exchange rates are 
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more suitable for countries characterized by high degree of trade openness because of increasing trade gains. 
Moreover, geographical proximity usually determines a country’s trade relations and therefore favours pegging its 
currency to the largest trading partner. The impossible trinity holds that it is impossible to have all three of the 
following at the same time – fixed exchange rate, free capital movement and independent monetary policy. Since 
free capital movement can be considered as a given option due to growing importance of capital movement 
among countries at global and especially at regional level, furthermore the European Union’s notion of four 
freedoms is committed to diminish constrains on intra-European capital movements, for the EU10 countries only 
two policy combination options remained. First, fixed exchange rates and the loss of conducting independent 
monetary policy, second, flexible exchange rates and independent monetary policy. 
The importance of the second, currency crisis approach appears when a country applies fixed exchange rates 
with chronic balance of payments deficits. The vital question in this situation is whether a country’s central bank 
owns enough foreign exchange reserves to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime. Krugman (1979) 
emphasized that currency crises – first generation currency crises – are the consequence of weak economic 
fundamentals, in a fixed exchange rate regime monetary expansion or fiscal expansion leads to a persistent loss 
of international reserves, and to a speculative attack on the currency, and finally to the abandonment of the fixed 
exchange rate. Schardax (2002) analysed the exchange rate crises of the 1990s in Central European countries 
and concluded that Krugman’s theorem of first generation currency crises described properly the developments in 
these countries. According to second generation models of currency crises, expectations – sometimes of self-
fulfilling kind – of monetary policy or economic policy can lead to currency crisis. For instance, increase in the 
public deficit, public gross debt and other deteriorating economic variables are able to negatively influence 
investors. In this way sovereign default risks start rising and on the one hand investors withdraw capital from the 
country, on the other hand speculative attacks twill try to enforce abandoning the parity. Finally, the country 
chooses flexible exchange rates.  EU10 countries aimed to join the euro area, so at the same time they had to 
comply with the convergence criteria, one of which implies participation in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) 
for two consecutive years. This means that applicant countries should not devalue the currency for two years, and 
cope with temporary speculative attacks on their currencies. 
The mentioned third approach takes a political economy view into account: the credibility gains associated with 
fixed exchange rate regimes. Imported price stability as a consequence of the peg seemed to be a useful 
instrument to convince domestic citizens of the economic successes. Thus weak governments may choose to 
use fixed exchange rates to eliminate pressures. 
Regarding the credible exchange rate system, Farkas (2010) points out that there were only two alternatives, 
hard peg and the import of low-level inflation rate, or flexible exchange rate. Therefore mixed exchange rate 
regimes were ruled out. Initially, several countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania introduced fixed exchange rate regimes, choosing an external anchor to break down high inflation 
rates. Latvia and Lithuania at an early stage used flexible exchange rates. However, Slovakia and Slovenia opted 
for a mixed exchange rate regime – crawling peg or band. Estonia successfully applied a fixed regime, namely 
the currency board which is a credible monetary authority where the governments cannot print money, the 
currency board can only earn interest on foreign reserves, and the central bank does not act as a lender of last 
resort. In sight of the currency board in Estonia, Lithuania also changed its exchange rate regime from floating to 
currency board, and the third Baltic state, Latvia introduced a peg. Bulgaria had sustained the fixed regime for a 
year then tried to apply flexible regimes – float and managed float – but in 1997 introduced a currency board (see 
Figure 1). At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s several larger Central European states moved 
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to flexible exchange rates from fixed ones through mixed regimes: the Czech Republic started floating in 1996, 
Poland in 1998, Romania in 2003, and finally, Hungary in 2008. In 2008, Slovenia, joined the Eurozone, and 
delegated the conduct of monetary policy to the community level. Following Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia and 
Latvia also joined the euro system, and the accession of Lithuania will take place in January2015. 
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate regimes in transition countries 
 
Source: 25 Years of transition (IMF) 
 
Nominal and real exchange rate in EU10 countries 
Before analysing exchange rate regimes it is useful to clear certain definitions first. By definition the nominal 
exchange rate is the number of units of the domestic currency that can purchase a unit of a given foreign 
currency. A decrease in this variable is called nominal appreciation of the currency. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime, a downward adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is a revaluation. An increase in this variable is the 
nominal depreciation of the currency. And under a fixed exchange rate regime, an upward adjustment of the 
nominal exchange rate is called devaluation.31
                                                 
31 Source: Czech National Bank, https://www.cnb.cz/en/faq/what_is_the_nominal_and_real_exchange_rate.html 
 
Concerning the nominal exchange rate movements in EU10 countries, we can see a really mixed picture. First, 
among the euro area members we cannot define similar trends in nominal exchange rates, more or less as a 
consequence of pursuing different monetary and economic policies regarding entering the euro zone. The 
essential question here is whether to enter the euro area in an undervalued or overvalued exchange rate. Both of 
them are associated with advantages and disadvantages. An overvalued exchange rate can be useful to raise the 
purchasing power of real wages but it may worsen the competitiveness of traded goods and reduce the export 
and GDP growth, therefore it has substantial negative effects on real convergence process. An undervalued 
exchange rate obviously eases the purchasing power of real wages, thus inflationary forces come into operation. 
But joining the euro area in an undervalued exchange rate has a positive effect on the competitiveness of 
exported goods, which is especially important in a small open economy so the gains from growing trade balance 
surpluses may raise the output and the process of convergence accelerates. 
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Looking at the nominal exchange rate developments of EU10 countries, we can identify undervalued and 
overvalued nominal exchange rates. By the year 2015, all of the Baltic countries will be members of the euro 
area, but they have had different nominal exchange rate developments since 2000. Estonia has had a constant 
nominal exchange rate, Latvia had a nominal depreciation in early 2000s and Lithuania had a nominal 
appreciation till 2003. After the middle of the 2000s, both Latvia and Lithuania have had a flat nominal exchange 
rate, that did not altered during the global financial crisis. The Baltic countries pursued a more or less optimal 
monetary policy regarding entering the eurozone, that was a consequence of the strictly pegged exchange rate – 
currency board. The post-Yugoslavian country, Slovenia joined the eurozone first in 2007, due to its relative high 
degree of development. In Slovenia we can identify a relative appreciation of the nominal exchange rate lasting 
until 2004, and after that the nominal exchange rate was almost unchanged. Between 2000 and 2009, there was 
a steady appreciation of the currency in Slovakia and before joining the euro area the appreciation accelerated 
because the Slovak Government was interested in entering the eurozone at a highly overvalued nominal 
exchange rate. Since then, the Slovak nominal exchange rate has been constant, thus the purchasing power of 
the wages is still highly overvalued comparing the regional competitors. (Slovak residents usually do shopping in 
neighbouring countries such as in Hungary). The remaining five countries which are not participating in the euro 
area show us a mixed picture. Hungary and Romania have been applying a firmly undervalued currency in order 
to maximise benefits from net exports. The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in Hungary started in 2007 
after a moderate appreciation (see Figure 2). In Romania, there was an enormous devaluation of the currency 
during the early 2000s until 2004, which was succeeded by a mild appreciation due to the introduction of the new 
currency (new lei) in 2005. In 2007 the nominal exchange rate started again depreciating. Bulgaria and Poland 
have had a constant nominal exchange rate with small deviations as a consequence of the global financial crises. 
Finally, in the Czech Republic we can see a continuous appreciation of the currency till 2007, since then the 
nominal exchange rate is constant but significantly overvalued. 
 
Figure 2: Nominal exchange rates in EU10 countries 
37 trading partners, 2005 = 100 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the price level abroad and the domestic price level, where the 
foreign price level is converted into domestic currency units via the current nominal exchange rate. An increase in 
real exchange rate is called appreciation of the real exchange rate, a decrease is called depreciation. The real 
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rate tells us how many times more goods and services can be purchased abroad (after conversion into a foreign 
currency) than in the domestic market for a given amount. In practice, changes of the real exchange rate rather 
than its absolute level are important. In contrast to the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate is always 
floating, since even in the regime of a fixed nominal exchange rate, real exchange rate can move via price-level 
changes. Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is a measure of the trade-weighted average exchange rate of a 
currency against a basket of currencies after adjusting for inflation differentials with regard to the countries 
concerned and expressed as an index number relative to a base year.32
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Academics usually analyse two different kind of real exchange rate. The first one is the consumer price index 
based real exchange rate, and the second one is the unit labour cost based real exchange rate. The former is 
computed as a weighted average of bilateral exchange rates vis-á-vis key trading partners’ currencies, adjusted 
for relative inflation differentials, the latter is adjusted for relative unit labour costs. Both variables can be used as 
a competitiveness indicator and as an indicator to define real effective exchange rate appreciation or 
depreciation. 
The consumer price indices based real effective exchange rates of EU10 countries show overvaluation in each 
country but to varying degrees (see Figure 3). Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have had a slightly 
overvalued trend in the consumer price indices based real effective exchange rates since the global financial 
crisis. The remaining EU10 countries except for Slovakia have had a moderate overvaluation that started during 
the global financial crisis. The consumer price indices based real effective exchange rate in Slovakia went 
through a long lasted appreciation trend till 2009, when the country joined the euro area, and after that there were 
no deviations from the constant level. 
 
Figure 3: Real effective exchange rates of EU10 countries 
deflator: consumer price indices – 37 trading partners, 2005 = 100 
The unit labour costs based real effective exchange rates of EU10 countries depict a robust overvaluation in 
almost each EU10 countries with the exception of Hungary and Poland. In several countries the convergence 
                                                 
32 REER is also defined as the average of the bilateral Real Exchange Rates (RER) between the country and each of its trading partners, 
weighted by the respective trade shares of each partner. Being an average, the REER of a country can be said to be in equilibrium if it is 
found overvalued in relation to one or more trading partners whilst also being undervalued to the others. 
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process took place in an economically unhealthy manner, thus unit labour cost (wages) have been increasing in a 
faster pace than the output (GDP). Therefore the productivity and competitiveness of these countries have 
deteriorated significantly since they joined the European Union. Hungary and Poland have undervalued currency 
in terms of unit labour costs based real effective exchange rate that is why both of them are more competitive 
than the other EU10 countries. 
 
Figure 4: Real effective exchange rates of EU10 countries  
deflator: unit labour costs in the total economy – 37 trading partners, 2005 = 100 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As a consequence of the global financial crisis unit labour costs based real effective exchange rates in Baltic 
states, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech republic turned to a downward trend (see Figure 4) but this trend was 
not accompanied by robust internal devaluation which is necessary to restore competitiveness. External 
devaluation is only possible in countries that apply floating exchange rate regimes, therefore the Baltic states, 
Slovenia and Slovakia in the euro area and Bulgaria with its currency board cannot achieve higher 
competitiveness without internal devaluation. The euro is globally overvalued against main currencies but the 
European Central Bank is reluctant to devaluate it safeguarding the peripheral euro zone countries. Bulgaria 
pegged its domestic currency to the euro thus external devaluation is impossible without abandoning the fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
 
Inflation and inflation targeting in EU10 countries 
After the collapse of the CMEA, most countries faced high or hyperinflation as prices moved to market levels and 
as governments used monetary financing for rebalancing fiscal deficits. One of the most important tasks was to 
break down inflation and during the 1990s these countries were successful in controlling inflation dynamics. By 
the beginnings of the 2000s EU10 countries reached one-digit inflation rates except for Romania where in 2000 a 
45.7% inflation rate was registered and inflationary pressure eased only by mid-2000s. The primordial task was to 
maintain or decrease the formerly reached inflation levels because they had to meet the convergence criterion 
regarding the inflation rate too. Therefore several countries introduced an inflation targeting framework to anchor 
inflationary expectations at a low level. Novak (2011) and De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) also express that the 
introduction of the inflation targeting in some EU10 countries proved to be a right choice. Five countries 
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introduced inflation targeting, the first was the Czech Republic in 1997, defining a low-inflationary path, and since 
2002 the Czech Republic has been pursuing a relatively low inflation target of 1-3% band. Poland planned to 
apply inflation targeting also in the 1990s but between 1998 and 2003 there was no defined target rate thus the 
explicit inflation targeting became effective in 2004 with 2.5% ± 1 percentage point. Hungary introduced the 
regime in 2001, but several times it was impossible to keep inflation within the band. (Although the average 
annual inflation rate was 1.7% in 2013 and the predicted rate for 2014 appears to be zero, the government of the 
National Bank of Hungary have been reluctant to lower the target inflation). Explicit inflation targeting came to 
effect in 2005 in Slovakia, however after introducing the euro Slovakia delegated the conduct of monetary policy 
to community level. And last but not least Romania introduced the regime in 2005 (see Table1). 
 
Table1: Inflation targeting regime in five Central and Eastern European countries 
Country Introduction of the regime Percentage rate 
Czech Republic 1997: introduction of the regime 
1998: 5.5-6.5% 
1999: 4-5% 
2000: 3.5-4.5% 
2001: 2-4% 
2002: 1-3% 
Hungary 2001: introduction of the regime 
2002: 4,5%+/-1 
2003: 3,5% +/-1 
2004: 3,5% +/-1 
2005: 4% +/-1 
2006: 3% +/-1 
2007: 3% +/-1 
Poland 
1998: introduction of the regime 2004: 2,5% +/- 1% 
1998-2003: reducing the rate of inflation annual CPI should be as close as  
2003: targeting inflation possible to 2,5% 
Romania 2005: introduction of the regime 
2005: 7,5% +/-1 
2006: 5% +/-1 
2007: 4% +/-1 
2008: 3,8% +/-1 
2009: 3,5% +/-1 
2010: 3,5% +/-1 
2011: 3% +/-1 
2013: 2,5% +/-1 
Slovakia 
1998-2005: implicit inflation targeting 2005: 3,5% +/-0,5 
2005: explicit inflation targeting 2006: 2,5% 
2009: Economic and Monetary Union membership 2007-2008: 2% 
Source: Own compilation, based on national bank data (CNB, MNB, NBP, BNR and NBS) 
 
In 2008, the reaction of EU10 countries to the global financial crisis was a sudden increase in inflation rates 
except in Hungary where the harmonized indices consumer prices decreased to 6% from 7.9%. Inflation rates 
ranged from 3.9% in Slovakia to 15.3% in Estonia. The volatility of inflation rates and other economic variables 
such as the GDP growth rate was the highest in the Baltic countries with a sharp decrease and fast rebound. 
Inflation rates during the global financial crisis were 10.6%, 15.3% and 11.1% respectively in Estonia, Latvia and 
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Lithuania. The fourth country with a double-digit annual inflation rate was Bulgaria with a peak value of 12%. The 
(arithmetic) average inflation rate in the EU10 countries was 8.3% in 2008 and only one year later it dropped to a 
tolerable level of 2.6%. A mild price acceleration was registered in 2011 and 2012 due to the statistical effects of 
eurocrisis, and then a deflationary period started in corresponding with the overall European Union movements. 
In Latvia the inflation rate reached zero, and in other seven countries lower than 2% even though the inflation 
targets of individual countries are higher. In 2013 the (arithmetic) annual average inflation was only 1.5% in the 
region (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Harmonized indices of consumer prices  
average rate of change, all items 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Financial integration in EU10 countries 
In the communist era, financial system did not have an active role; banks financed centrally-planned tasks and 
projects of state-owned companies. During the transition period to market economy, one of the most important 
task was to establish a two-tier banking sector in order to allocate capital to productive use. “The creation of 
central banks, and modern financial systems was an unprecedented challenge, involving building a number of 
pillars from scratch, to underpin a functioning system. These included prudential regulation, supervision, and an 
appropriate framework for competition.” (IMF, 2014, pp. 41.) All countries adopted a model based on sound bank 
supervision, but incomplete reforms led to banking crises in all countries; the sequence of crises started in 1990 
in Romania, and finished in 1998 in Slovakia. Thus modern banking systems in EU10 countries were created in 
the early 2000s after a second phase of reforms. 
The banking systems of EU10 countries have been turned into one of the most dynamic sectors of the economies 
due to continuously rising penetration of foreign bank ownership. From 2004, the foreign banks have been 
holding majority shares in all EU10 countries (Caporale et al., 2009) and according to the IMF (2014) review on 
transition in Central and Eastern European countries, banking became the sector with the highest private and 
foreign participation, and as mentioned, foreign bank ownership was comparatively high. 
According to Baele et al. (2004) the definition of integrated financial markets is the following: “The market for a 
given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all potential market participants with the 
same relevant characteristics: 
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(1) face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; 
(2) have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and 
(3) are treated equally when they are active in the market (Baele et al. (2004, pp. 6.). 
The concept of financial integration or financial market integration goes back to the 1960s, when as part of the 
optimum currency area theory, Ingram (1962) pointed to the fact that financial integration can reduce the need for 
exchange rate adjustments regarding a country or a group of countries planning to adopt a single currency or to 
irrevocably peg their exchange rates. Through capital flows they can prevent temporary or permanent distortions 
in the economy. The degree of financial integration is of substantial interest to both academics and policymakers 
because of its implications on financial markets – money, stock and bond – efficiency, risk-sharing and financial 
institutions. Financial markets are totally integrated when the law of one price holds (Adam et al., 2002).33
• monetary integration, either through currency unions or through dollarization as well as euroization; 
 The 
consequence of the law of one price is that assets generate the same return, regardless of the location of the 
issuer and of the asset holder. Financial integration is not only the integration of financial markets and services it 
can take other forms as well. Liebscher et al. (2006) suggest that integration can take many forms and various 
aspects: 
• liberalization of the capital account; 
• subcontracting abroad of financial services or infrastructure, such as in the case of listing of securities on 
foreign stock exchanges; 
• foreign entry, and 
• regulatory or institutional convergence and harmonization. 
 
The benefits of financial integration 
Financial integration is usually associated with financial development and countries with properly functioning 
financial markets (or banking systems) enjoy positive effects on economic growth. Several empirical studies 
analysed the relationship between financial development and economic growth concluding that effective banking 
systems accelerate economic growth. Baele et al. (2004) consider three interrelated benefits of financial 
integration: more opportunities for risk sharing and risk diversification, better allocation of capital among 
investment opportunities, and finally, financial development. Financial integration provides an access to a larger 
market and additional opportunities for firms and households to share financial risk and to smooth consumption 
with purchasing international assets (stocks and bonds), investing in international funds and so on. Regional (and 
global) risk-sharing opportunities make it possible to finance risky projects with potentially higher returns and 
financial integration also allows investors to hedge against negative shocks because financial markets and 
institutions can tackle risk better. Better allocation of capital materializes by removing all forms of impediments to 
trade financial assets and flow of capital, thus investors want to and will find the most productive investment 
opportunities. 
                                                 
33 The law of one price indicates that “once prices are converted to a common currency, the same good should sell for the same price in 
different countries” (Rogoff, 1996). Simply put, a good must sell for the same price all locations. 
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These benefits lead to higher economic growth. Levine (2005) points out that financial institutions and markets 
can promote economic growth through five different channels: 
1) easing the exchange of goods and services through the provision of payment services; 
2) mobilising and pooling savings from a large number of investors; 
3) acquiring and processing information about enterprises and possible investment projects, thus allocating 
savings to their most productive use; 
4) monitoring investment and carrying out corporate governance, and 
5) diversifying and increasing liquidity and reducing intertemporal risk. 
 
Measuring financial integration 
There are no standard measures in the literature for assessing the level of financial integration, various methods 
exist. Regarding developing countries, Park (1999) stresses that international financial integration may have 
destabilizing effect on economies with premature financial infrastructure. Park suggests three indicators to 
measure the degree of international financial integration: 
(1) banks international activities ratio (%) = banks’ total foreign assets and liabilities / banks’ total assets and 
liabilities; 
(2) inward foreign direct investment to GDP ratio (%) = annual stock of inward foreign direct investments / 
GDP; 
(3) private capital flows to GNP ratio (%) = net inward private capital flows / GNP 
 
The first comprehensive study on financial integration was carried out by Adam et al. (2002). They report four 
categories for indicators of financial integration: 
1) indicators of credit and bond market integration – for interbank market, bond market, mortgage market 
and for corporate loan market; 
2) indicators of stock market integration with alternative indicators of investment fund industry, pension 
funds and insurance companies; 
3) indicators of integration based on economic decisions of household and firms, and 
4) indicators of institutional differences that may induce financial market segmentation. 
 
Regarding these four groups of indicators we can differentiate price-based and quantity-based indicators. From a 
methodological point of view one can analyse financial market integration in terms of β-convergence and σ-
convergence. The former measures the speed of integration of countries to the benchmark value, and the latter 
measures the deviations from the benchmark value, (if it is possible to address an applicable benchmark value). 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) investigate the growth of foreign asset and liability positions and the rates of 
return on external assets and liabilities. They apply a volume-based indicator, the stock of aggregate foreign 
assets and liabilities respectively to the GDP, and an equity based measure, the sum of portfolio assets and 
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liabilities and FDI assets (and liabilities). Running panel regressions they suggest that external liberalization, 
trade openness, stock market capitalization and privatization have positive effects on international financial 
integrations but financial depth in terms of liquid liabilities to GDP, corporate tax rate and insider-trading laws 
have no significant effects on international financial integration. Returns on external assets and liabilities do not 
signal common patterns due to unavailability of precise information on cross-border investments. 
In the early 2000s, the European Central Bank started to emphasise financial integration due to its growing 
relevance in the euro zone because financial integration had become a tool of adjustment and risk-sharing 
mechanism. With the publication of Baele et al. (2004) the European Central Bank started a series of publications 
in the field of financial integration. They suggest that there are three kinds of measures of financial integrations; 
price-based measures, news-based measures and quantity-based measure. 
 
Financial integration in EU10 countries 
Even though the measurement of financial integration has become increasingly important especially during the 
global financial crisis that shed light on globally interconnected financial markets, only few studies focused on the 
transition economies. Baltzer et al. (2008) analyse the financial integration in new European Union member 
states and they drew five conclusions: 
1) financial markets in the new European Union member states are less integrated than those in the euro 
area; 
2) the process of integration is under way and after the accession to the European Union accelerated; 
3) money and banking markets are becoming increasingly integrated; 
4) international financial integration in the bond markets has not yet started; 
5) equity markets are less integrated. 
 
Caporale et al. (2009) examine the relation between financial development and economic growth of EU10 
countries by estimating a dynamic panel model between 1994 and 2007 and they point out that stock and credit 
markets are still underdeveloped in these countries. Albulescu (2011) stresses that financial instability created by 
the global financial crisis negatively affected the EU10 countries economic and financial integration. Boubarki, 
Couharde and Guillaumin (2012) assess the degree of financial integration in EU10 countries by testing the 
Feldstein-Horioka regression. And they conclude that financial integration process of the EU10 countries with 
euro area is not yet complete. According to the existing measures of financial integration, in this study I carry out 
analyses on the developments of EU10 financial markets through selective measures namely FDI stock per GDP 
and the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient34
FDI stock per GDP can be a proxy to assess financial integration (Park, 1999, Edison et al. 2002, and Friedrich, 
Schnabel and Zettelmeyer, 2010). During the last ten years foreign multinational companies invested billions of 
euros in EU10 countries. In each country the inward FDI stock per GDP exceeds 30 % except for Slovenia where 
we can identify a decreasing tendency of inward FDI stock since 2010 due to prolonged economic disturbances 
(see Table 2.). In 2004, Estonia joined the EU with the highest proportion of inward FDI stock in terms of annual 
 to determine the degree of financial integration in EU10 countries. 
                                                 
34 Feldstein and Horioka (1980), see definition later. 
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GDP exceeding 75 %, while Slovenia had the lowest proportion with only 20.1 %. Slovenia, as the most 
developed former Yugoslavian country, has pursued a completely different kind of economic policy regarding the 
attraction of foreign capital than some other EU10 economies. In several countries such as in Poland, the Czech 
Republic or Slovakia, the privatization or brownfield investments was almost the only source of foreign capital in 
the 1990s, however in Slovenia large number of companies remained in domestic property. In 2004, the average 
inward FDI stock to GDP was 38.5 % in the region, after ten years we can identify a modest accumulation of 
foreign capital in EU10 countries, the inward FDI stock per GDP ratio has increased to 57.8 %. In 2004, the top 
three countries with the highest ratio of inward FDI stock per GDP were Estonia (76%), Hungary (54.3 %) and 
Slovakia (46.2 %). To the year of 2013 the proportion of foreign investments in Bulgaria has sharply increased to 
93.3 %, due to enormous capital inflow in the middle of the 2000s and due to comparatively low GDP level. 
Estonia (81.2 %) and Hungary (80.2 %) are the following in the rank. From its initial third position, Slovakia lagged 
behind the top countries with only 58 % of inward FDI stock per GDP. 
 
Table 2: Inward FDI stock in EU10 countries 
percent of the GDP 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Bulgaria 26.9 35.5 49.9 66.5 80.8 86.9 94.7 96.1 91.3 91.5 93.3 
Czech Republic 40.8 43.8 47.0 49.0 55.3 50.5 58.9 61.5 57.0 64.3 62.7 
Estonia 63.8 76.0 84.9 71.3 70.1 71.3 82.5 85.0 79.9 83.2 81.2 
Hungary 51.1 54.3 57.4 66.9 64.2 58.3 73.5 69.5 65.9 79.5 80.2 
Latvia 25.1 28.3 30.3 33.1 33.0 33.3 42.9 45.4 46.3 46.2 49.7 
Lithuania 23.9 25.7 33.0 34.8 35.4 28.1 34.2 35.8 35.3 36.3 35.5 
Poland 23.9 30.9 30.7 33.3 37.0 30.4 38.6 42.5 39.0 44.2 45.6 
Romania 18.3 24.5 27.3 35.1 34.1 34.3 41.5 41.5 41.4 44.2 42.4 
Slovakia 41.9 46.2 50.8 56.2 51.8 55.2 57.2 56.0 57.3 58.6 58.0 
Slovenia 19.2 20.1 21.0 21.6 27.8 29.8 29.4 30.2 31.8 32.6 29.7 
Average 33.5 38.5 43.2 46.8 49.0 47.8 55.3 56.4 54.5 58.1 57.8 
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economics, database 
 
Following Boubarki, Couharde and Guillaumin (2012) a simple method is applied here assessing the degree of 
financial integration of EU10 countries. To determine Feldstein-Horioka coefficient in Central and Eastern 
European countries this equation is used: 
 
(I/Y) = α + β(S/Y), 
 
where I/Y denotes the ratio of investments over GDP and S/Y represents the ratio of savings over GDP. 
According to Feldstein and Horioka (1980), financial markets are perfectly integrated into global or regional 
capital market, if Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. In this case domestic 
investments do not depend on domestic savings, since domestic investments can completely be financed by the 
global or regional pool of capital. To put in other words the lower the correlation between domestic investments 
and domestic savings the higher the financial integration. I calculated correlation coefficients between gross 
domestic investments and gross savings for EU10 countries and the results show that average financial 
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integration into the global capital market is low in Central and Eastern European countries.35 Data were collected 
from Eurostat database of national accounts from 2000 to 2003, and gross domestic investments were replaced 
by gross capital formation due to data availability.36
 
Source: Own compilation, based on Eurostat data 
 
The total correlation of EU10 countries represents the relationship between gross domestic investments and 
gross savings (see Figure 7.). The correlation coefficient, R2=0.8348 shows strong relationship which means low 
financial market integration for EU10 countries. The consequence of low financial market integration is to firms 
and households in EU10 countries do not employ regional and intertemporal risk-sharing. 
 
Figure 7: The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient of the whole dataset* 
 According to our calculations financial integration is high in 
Hungary and relatively high in Bulgaria and Latvia but in other cases is substantially low (see Figure 6.). 
 
Figure 6: The Feldstein-Horioka coefficient of given EU10 countries 
correlations 
 
* y = 0.972x + 403.2; R² = 0.834 
Source: Own compilation, based on Eurostat data 
                                                 
35 Average correlation is the simple mean of national correlations. 
36 From a methodological point of view there is a little difference between the two measures. Gross capital formation is measured by the 
total value of gross fixed capital formation changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for unit or sector. Gross 
domestic investment is the sum of fixed non-residential and residential investments and changes in inventories. 
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According to our calculations financial integration measured by Feldstein-Horioka coefficients of given EU 
countries and of the whole dataset illustrates low degree of integration into global financial markets. Even though 
foreign bank participation in EU10 countries is especially high, there stock and bond markets are less integrated. 
This can be explained by several factors for instance low financial literacy, lower risk-taking behaviour and saving 
decisions of households. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Between 2004 and 2007, ten Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union. Since the 
accession of the EU10 countries, these states have expressed their wish to quickly integrate into the euro area. 
The enlargement of the eurozone started in 2007 with the accession of Slovenia, and then Slovakia, Estonia and 
Latvia already belong to the euro area since, respectively, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Lithuania joins the eurozone in 
2015. However, by 2008-09 the global financial crisis and 2010-11 the debt crisis in the eurozone caused 
reluctant interest in joining the euro area regarding the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
In this study, monetary integration analysed by exchange rate regimes, exchange rate policy and inflation 
convergence that show significant catch-up. By the year of accessing the EU a mixed picture can be seen 
regarding the exchange rate regimes. The Baltic states and Bulgaria adopted a peg, other countries floating. 
Smaller countries tend to ha fixed exchange rates but the determination of exchange rates does not really explain 
the success in accessing the euro area even though only smaller countries have achieved this. Exchange rates 
are usually subject to overall economic goals, the undervalued rate is good for boost gains from export and the 
overvalued is considered to be fit to enlarge purchasing power of domestic currency. Therefore no common 
patterns can be found in EU10 countries regarding nominal and real effective exchange rates. Due to the global 
financial crisis inflation rates are close to zero in all EU10 countries. 
The second part of this study deals with financial integration in the region. On the one hand, inward stock FDI 
was more than one and a half times bigger in 2013 comparing the 2004 level, which represents a substantial 
inward capital flow. On the other hand, inward capital flow can be explained by increased international 
fragmentation of production due to outsourcing and offshoring of companies located in old EU members to low-
wage new member states which is facilitated the international competitiveness of EU companies. Financial 
integration in EU10 countries according to a simple method (Feldstein-Horioka coefficient) depicts low degree of 
integration into global (or regional) financial markets. 
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Foreign trade trends in the EU10 countries 
Andrea Éltető 
Introduction 
The international crisis had serious effects on the economy of the European Union. The Central and Eastern 
European members (EU10) experienced the crisis effects to a different extent, but most of them were coping with 
high debt and decreasing GDP. Domestic consumption and investment activity fell, thus export remained the 
major possible source of growth. Although in 2009, exports shrank drastically (this was the year of the general 
international trade collapse) but in the next year, it already gained momentum. In this paper the characteristics of 
the export patterns in the EU10 member states are analysed.37
EU10 countries differ regarding the economic role of the tradable sector and its development. As we can see in 
Table 1, already as early as 1995, the share of export of goods and services compared to GDP was higher than 
the EU average in almost all EU10 countries but this increased to extremely high levels in 2013, reaching almost 
100% in Slovakia and Hungary. Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic also had rather high levels of 
“openness”
 
In the first part, the foreign trade dynamics of the two regions are described. The second part analyses the 
product structure of exports and its changes. The third part deals with the inclusion of the observed countries into 
global value chains. The last part forms groups within EU10 and concludes. 
 
General trends in foreign trade  
38
During the past decade the share of EU10-trade increased not only in their GDP but in world trade too. Table 2 
shows that their share in world exports is similar to their share in world imports. The table also demonstrates that 
since accession to the EU (and even before), the share of exports in world total exports has grown significantly 
and continuously for almost all countries. Even in 2009 when trade generally collapsed, these countries 
maintained (or even increased) their share in world trade. However, after the crisis, in 2012-2013, their share 
decreased, but in general still to a somewhat lesser extent than the market share of the whole EU. Certain 
countries have lost competitiveness after the crisis. The decrease of world export market share was most 
pronounced for Hungary with almost 20% loss
. The values of Poland are similar to the EU-average and those of Romania are slightly below. Trade 
per capita data also show the importance of trade in a given country. All economies have higher figures than the 
EU-average. In this respect again Bulgaria and Romania have the lowest figure. Thus, in general the vast 
majority of EU10 countries are heavily dependent on exports. 
39
                                                 
37 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania 
38 Of course if we take the total trade into consideration – including imports – then figures compared to GDP are approximately double. 
39 Data from Eurostat, Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) 
. Slovenia has also shown a considerable decrease, while 
Lithuania, Latvia and Romania a high increase.  
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Table 1: Export of goods and services compared to GDP, percent 
 1995 2000 2004 2009 2013 Trade per capita (USD) 
European Union (27 countries) 29.49 35.79 35.71 36.87 44.83 11341 
Czech Republic 48.08 60.93 62.98 58.95 78.60 22608 
Poland 23.20 27.12 37.49 39.44 47.80 27600 
Hungary 45.21 74.60 63.35 77.58 96.05 29572 
Slovenia 49.59 53.70 57.81 59.35 78.15 11594 
Slovakia 57.76 70.45 74.54 70.59 97.64 32570 
Estonia 68.07 84.60 73.07 63.86 87.99 29022 
Lithuania 41.78 41.95 44.04 43.93 59.67 20216 
Latvia 47.46 44.51 51.85 54.23 86.90 15123 
Bulgaria 51.92 50.46 51.93 47.51 70.22 8845 
Romania 25.50 32.83 35.84 30.60 42.15 6653 
Note: Trade per capita is estimated as an economy's total trade of goods and commercial services (exports + imports, balance of 
payments basis) divided by the population. It is calculated on the basis of data for 2010-2012 (WTO). 
Source: Eurostat, WTO 
 
Table 2: Market shares of the EU10 countries 
 Share in world total Exports 
Change 5 
years* 
Share in world total 
Imports 
 2005 2007 2009 2012 2009-2013 2005 2007 2009 2012 
EU27 countries 17.50 16.44 16.20 14.67 na 18.58 18.38 17.39 15.37 
Czech Republic 0.75 0.88 0.91 0.85 -7.4 0.71 0.83 0.83 0.76 
Poland 0.86 1.0 1.08 1.01 -0.4 0.94 1.14 1.16 1.07 
Hungary 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.56 -19.0 0.61 0.67 0.62 0.51 
Slovenia 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.17 -16.6 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.17 
Slovakia 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.44 -2.2 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.42 
Estonia 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 7.3 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Lithuania 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 20.8 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.17 
Latvia 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 11.4 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Bulgaria 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 5.7 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.18 
Romania 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.31 10.5 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.38 
EU10 countries 3.35 3.88 4.04 3.82 na 3.63 4.06 3.84 3.53 
* Eurostat data (MIP) 
Source: WTO Trade Profiles, (merchandise trade) 
 
When analysing world market shares we should not forget that data include cross-border movements of parts and 
components, thus are influenced by the activity of global value chains (that are important in EU10 trade, see 
later). Exports of final goods are often composed of imports of intermediate goods (Beltramello et al. 2012), 
therefore export market shares and competitiveness largely depend on imports. 
Poland, as the largest country is also the largest trader within the examined country-group. This has already been 
shown by its share in world exports and imports and also by the largest value numbers (Table 3). The second 
largest trade value belongs to the Czech Republic. Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have rather similar figures at 
the middle level and the trade of other countries is lower. 
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Table 3: Trade with and outside the European Union 
2013 
 Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export 
Extra-EU 
Import Intra-EU import 
 mn euro mn euro share in total mn euro mn euro 
Share in 
total 
Hungary 19163 62206 76.45 21747 53602 71.14 
Czech Republic 23380 98209 80.77 25381 82640 76.50 
Slovakia 11264 53491 82.61 15912 45764 74.20 
Poland 38677 113457 74.58 48595 105842 68.53 
Slovenia 7998 17696 68.87 8722 16489 65.40 
Estonia 3564 8705 70.95 2500 11169 81.71 
Lithuania 10940 13604 55.43 10404 15804 60.30 
Latvia 3661 7231 66.39 2694 10760 79.97 
Bulgaria 8923 13306 59.86 10465 15381 59.51 
Romania 15181 34392 69.38 13498 41781 75.58 
Source: Eurostat Comext 
 
Table 3 also provides the share of the EU in exports and imports. The EU is the least “important” in Lithuanian 
and Bulgarian trade, with 55-60% share. However, more than 80% of Slovakian and Czech exports is directed to 
and around 80% of Estonian and Latvian imports come from the EU. An important feature of Baltic foreign trade 
is the significant trade with each other, which was promoted by EU accession. In the exports of Latvia, the two 
other Baltic States have a 28% share, in Estonian exports this is 16.2% and in Lithuanian exports 15.6%. In 
imports, the respective figures are 27.7%, 17.8% and 9%. Thus, Latvia is the most “Baltic-oriented” trader. 
Trading with the EU shows a surplus for the Central-European economies and a deficit for the Baltic and 
Bulgaria, Romania. Regarding the past decade, trade balance in general deteriorated considerably as a 
consequence of the international crisis. Figure 1 shows that with the small exception of Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, all observed countries had negative balances in 2008. For 2013, significant adjustment took place in all 
countries. Adjustment was especially large in the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (this latter had 
the highest trade surplus in the group surpassing 8% of GDP in 2013.)40
                                                 
40 The Hungarian trade surplus is mainly due to the marked decline in imports as a consequence of the crisis. Import growth remained 
moderate even afterwards due to low domestic demand (Bodnár et al., 2013). Halpern-Oblath (2014) also emphasize the poor 
performance of the economy (strong decrease of private investments, consumption) - partly explained by deleveraging in the private sector 
– underlying low import necessity and export surplus. Apart from goods, trade balance in services has always been positive since 2000. 
. Trade balance improvement in several 
cases was due to the decline and slowdown of imports and to the positive role of the service sector. 
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Figure 1a: Trade balance in percentage of GDP, 2008 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 1b: Trade balance in percentage of GDP, 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The role of the European Union as the most important trade partner for the EU10 area is unquestionable. The 
share of imports coming from the EU remained relatively constant, mainly between 60-80% for the EU10 during 
the observed period. In the case of exports it is perhaps surprising that we can observe a general constant 
decrease of the weight of EU in exports (see Figure 2a and b). 
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Figure 2a.: Development of intra-EU export shares 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 2b: Development of intra-EU import shares 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Regarding the export dynamics, they also reflect the above described trend: in the past decade exports to non-
EU areas have increased at a much higher rate than exports to the EU (Figure 3a and b). The outward increase 
has been the strongest in the case of the Baltic countries and Slovakia throughout the period. 
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Figure 3a.: Increase of Extra-EU exports 
 
 
Figure 3b.: Increase of Intra-EU exports 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
Figure 3a shows that this dynamic increase of extra-EU exports is not only a consequence of the crisis, it has 
begun long before, since around 2004-2005.  Regarding Estonia, the most important non-EU market is Russia 
with a 11.4% share of total exports in 2013 (in 2004 this share was 5.6%) and Norway and USA have around 3-
4% share constantly. In the case of Lithuania, the share of Russia was 19.8% in total exports, being the most 
important export market (in 2004 this share was 9.3%). Belarus (5.2%), Ukraine (3.4%) and Norway (2.8%) are 
important non-EU markets too. In the exports of Latvia, Russia is also the leading market since 2010, it had a 
share of 16.1% in 2013 (in 2004 this figure was 6.4%). 
Slovakia mainly exports to Germany and to neighbouring countries but the share of Russia (4%), China (2.5%) 
and Turkey (1.5%)41
                                                 
41 Data for 2013. 
 increased between 2009 and 2013. Similar process has been going on regarding Czech 
exports, Russia increased its share (to 3.7%) and to a lesser extent China (1.2%) and Turkey (1.4%). Germany is 
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also the main market for Hungary just like neighbouring EU countries, but here too the share of Russia (3.1%), 
Ukraine (2.4), China (1.76%) and Turkey (1.65%) increased after the crisis. Slovenia’s main export markets are 
also EU members but Russia increased its share – even before the crisis - and became the 6th most important 
destination with 4.6% share in 2013. The share of Serbia also increased. In Polish exports, Germany’s weight 
was still 25% in 2013, but Russia ranked fifth with 5.3% share and Ukraine and Turkey also increased their 
weight (to 2.8 and 1.5% respectively). For Bulgaria and for Romania, Turkey is the most important non-EU 
partner with 9% and 5% shares of total exports. 
In sum, data show on one hand that regarding foreign trade, the ten new member countries are integrated in the 
European Union. Trade has been intensive with the EU, because it increased already after the systemic changes 
during the nineties and because after the adhesion, mutual trade among the new members intensified. On the 
other hand, the share of the EU in exports has decreased constantly, or stagnated even after adhesion, because 
exports to non-EU regions have increased more dynamically than to the EU. The markets of Russia, China and 
Turkey (to different degrees) are more and more important for EU10 countries. 
 
Export structure and changes 
The export of a given country consists of export of goods and export of services. In certain cases for developing 
countries, service export can be very significant.  As Brenton et al (2009) remark, articles on trade usually focus 
on merchandises and do not involve services, which can be difficult to quantify. Table 4 shows the development 
of the export share of services in the EU10 countries. The most important exported services are from the travel 
and commercial services sector.  Developments in EU10 countries show a decreasing share of services in export, 
which is opposite to general EU trends. While in 1995, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary had more than 
20% share of services in exports (above EU average then), by 2013 this weight decreased radically. However, 
this is only a relative decrease: service export of EU10 in absolute numbers increased to a larger extent between 
2000 and 2013 than the EU–average (see last column). The reason is that service exports of EU10 increased to 
a lesser extent (around three times more) than the export of goods (6-9 times more) during the observed period. 
 
Table 4: Share of services export in total export 
percent 
 1995 2000 2004 2009 2013 Export ratio 2013/2000 
European Union (27 countries) 21.10 22.49 23.65 26.79 25.16 2.0 
Poland 14.41 22.62 14.13 17.06 16.25 2.7 
Czech Republic 24.82 18.93 13.48 16.41 14.50 2.3 
Hungary 28.53 17.93 14.34 19.08 17.50 2.4 
Slovenia 19.86 17.72 17.89 21.10 19.90 2.7 
Slovakia 22.12 15.88 11.52 10.07 8.39 2.4 
Estonia 34.09 31.17 32.69 36.43 27.05 2.7 
Lithuania 15.28 20.88 20.96 18.38 17.89 4.7 
Latvia 34.16 36.24 30.29 35.42 27.55 3.0 
Bulgaria 21.05 33.50 30.93 29.50 20.75 2.5 
Romania 16.88 14.85 13.37 19.57 17.30 5.2 
Source: Eurostat 
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Kandilov – Grennes (2010) indicate that Central and Eastern European countries have different advantages over 
other low-cost Asian and South American rivals for different types of service exports. For those service exports 
that greatly benefit from geographical proximity or office hour synchronization, it is the smaller distance that gives 
CEE exporters a competitive edge. For other types of service exports that benefit from better law enforcement, it 
is the relatively good quality of legal institutions that provides an advantage for these countries. 
Service export is the most important for Baltic countries. Based on the available maritime ports, transport is the 
most significant service sector. In the case of Estonia, “other services” (mostly business services) have also high 
share in service export (see Table 5). 
The share of “other business services” is the highest in Hungary, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Hungary has by far the highest export of “personal, recreational, cultural” services and royalties, licence fees. 
Romania had in 2013 the highest share of computer, information service exports (in 2004 this share was rather 
low).  The business and informatics service export is due to the increased activity of multinational outsourcing, 
shared service centres. Romania is among the top ten global outsourcing locations,42 has information technology 
clusters and keeps attracting large telecommunication and informatics companies.43 
 
Table 5: Distribution of exported services 
percent 
 BG RO CZ HU PL SK SI EE LV LT 
  Transport 20.15 34.98 23.53 23.39 30.50 28.13 25.48 37.72 45.18 61.16 
  Travel 53.42 10.04 32.46 23.80 28.44 33.65 38.75 23.43 17.63 20.59 
  Other services 26.42 54.98 44.01 52.81 41.06 37.65 35.77 38.85 37.20 18.24 
    Communications 1.25 4.82 2.47 1.37 1.36 1.90 5.94 4.03 2.88 1.52 
    Construction 1.00 3.87 2.78 1.81 3.80 4.25 5.15 5.01 3.29 2.63 
    Insurance 2.29 0.87 1.27 0.18 0.51 0.66 1.28 0.11 0.54 0.00 
    Financial services 0.69 2.03 0.15 0.89 1.25 0.75 0.46 1.63 6.99 0.92 
    Computer, information 8.83 13.75 9.54 6.49 7.36 7.47 2.52 5.67 5.20 1.71 
    Royalties, licence fees 0.35 0.86 1.14 5.61 0.79 0.06 0.79 0.19 0.39 0.34 
    Other business services 11.16 27.67 25.39 28.48 25.04 21.84 18.58 20.68 16.59 9.78 
    Personal, cultural, 
     recreational services 0.79 0.29 1.11 7.43 0.94 0.61 0.95 0.71 0.52 0.50 
    Government services 
     n.i.e. 0.06 0.82 0.16 0.55 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.81 0.80 0.85 
Source: UNCTAD: Data on Trade in Services44 
                                                 
42 http://www.outsourcing-journal.org/cee-2/915-romania-among-top-10-outsourcing-locations-globally 
43 http://business-review.eu/featured/vodafone-opens-new-shared-services-center-in-romania-receives-state-aid-66715 
44“Personal, cultural, recreational services”: Audio-visual and related services cover the production of motion pictures, video and radio 
programmes, musical recordings, (and similar) including fees paid to personnel involved. Related limited distribution rights are also 
covered. Fees paid for sporting, theatrical and similar events belong to this category as well. Services associated with museums, libraries, 
archives, and other cultural and sporting activities and education and health services are also covered under this category. 
“Computer and information” services consist of hardware and software-related services and data-processing. New agency services include 
the provision of news, photographs and feature articles to the media. Other information services cover database services: database 
conception, data storage and dissemination of data. Direct non-bulk subscriptions to periodicals regardless of means of information 
transmission also belong to this service category. 
“Other business services” include merchanting and other trade-related services; operational leasing services; and miscellaneous business, 
professional and technical services (legal, advertising, consulting, accounting, R&D, etc.) 
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Merchandise export concentration 
Focusing on the export of goods, an important structural feature can be concentration or diversification.  
According to one viewpoint, concentration increases vulnerability, while diversified trade can mitigate crisis 
effects. However this statement should be refined: a lot depends on the type of products the country is 
concentrated on (primary and homogeneous products or not). Bacchetta et al. (2009) show that export 
diversification (both product and geographic type) increases with the level of development of a country. Cadot et 
al. (2011) show that this increase of export diversification lasts to a certain point and for highly developed 
countries concentration is increasing again.  Across countries and time, there is a hump-shaped relationship 
between export diversification and level of income, with a turning point for reconcentration around 25 000 dollars 
per capita GDP (PPP). The reason is that richer countries close old export lines far from their endowments (Cadot 
et al., 2011). 
The level of export concentration varies among EU10 countries. Gurgul-Lach (2013) examine the economic 
growth effects of export diversification in the case of CEE countries using data from 1995-2011. According to their 
results, export concentration correlated with economic growth before the crisis but afterwards the situation 
changed. Countries with more concentrated export structures (like Slovakia, Lithuania) experienced stronger 
growth decrease than those with more diversified exports (like Poland and the Czech Republic). These latter 
economies experienced smaller shocks. 
Let us examine the recent characteristics of EU10 export concentration. Based on SITC 3 digit data45 the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (Hirschman, 1945) was calculated for the exports of countries towards 
the EU and non-EU areas. 
 
HHI = (∑isi)1/2 
 
where „i””is the given product group, „si” is its share in total exports. If HHI is 100 we speak about total 
concentration, the smaller the index the more diversified the export structure is. 
 
Table 6: Concentration indices, 2004-2013 
 Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export 
 2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013 
Hungary 22.98 29.34 19.31 19.77 17.04 15.31 
Czech Republic 13.76 14.65 17.52 14.87 15.02 15.94 
Slovakia 44.58 33.56 38.95 17.87 20.70 20.36 
Poland 14.17 13.17 13.65 14.81 14.18 12.76 
Slovenia 18.50 17.00 19.81 17.51 18.69 16.13 
Estonia 15.75 25.00 17.09 22.47 14.16 18.21 
Lithuania 29.24 22.87 19.95 23.53 27.53 28.36 
Latvia 17.16 15.26 19.15 21.80 13.75 14.09 
Bulgaria 20.45 29.97 30.28 17.97 16.89 14.96 
Romania 22.82 22.70 18.97 19.74 15.33 15.90 
Source: author’s calculation from Eurostat data 
                                                 
45 The 3 digit product list is here: 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/UnctadStatMetadata/Classifications/UnctadStat.SitcRev3Products.Official.Classification_En.pdf 
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As Table 6 shows, the values of concentration indices are quite similar for the ten economies, except for 
Slovakian export, Bulgarian extra-EU and Lithuanian intra-EU export, these are much more concentrated than the 
other flows. 
In general terms, extra-EU exports are more concentrated than intra-EU ones. However, regarding a longer 
period, we observe increases and decreases in export concentration. Concentration towards extra-EU markets 
increased somewhat in the case of Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Hungary and Poland has 
diversified their exports a little to both areas. Slovakia and Lithuania have decreased concentration to the extra-
EU region but increased it to EU areas. 
What are the main exported products from these countries? Table 7 enumerates the most important five product 
groups (in order of importance, among 280 items in the SITC 3 digit list) in extra-EU and intra-EU exports. Their 
aggregate share in total exports is given in brackets. 
 
Table 7: Main export products and structural similarity between intra- and extra-EU relations 
 Extra-EU Intra- EU Similarity index 2004 
Similarity index 
2013 
Hungary 
Telecom. euipments, 
medicaments, motor cars and 
parts, autom. data processing 
machines, electrical app. (35%) 
Piston engines, motor cars and 
parts, telecom.equipments, 
electrical app.(27%) 
64.8 71.5 
Czech Republic 
Motor cars and parts, autom. 
data processing 
machines,telecom.equipments, 
electrical app.(31%) 
Motor cars and parts, autom. 
data processing 
machines,telecom.equipments, 
manuf.of base metal (28%) 
70.1 73.3 
Slovakia 
Motor cars, their parts telecom 
equipments, monitors, pumps 
and compressors (59%) 
Motor cars, monitors, telecom 
equipments,petroleum + oils 
(40%) 
53.9 62.3 
Poland 
Ships, boats, telecom 
equipments, furniture, motor 
vehicle parts, petroleum oils 
(19%) 
Furniture and parts, motor cars 
and parts, monitors, engines 
(20%) 
68.0 69.0 
Slovenia 
Medicaments, motor cars, wood, 
paper, household electrical 
equipm.(32%) 
Motor cars, medicaments, 
electr.machinery, petroleum oils, 
furniture (27%) 
66.2 63.7 
Estonia 
Petroleum oils, civil 
engine.plants,telecom.equipm.,al
coholic beverages,paints  (30.0) 
Telecom.equipments,petroleum 
oils, furniture,electric 
current,manuf.of base metal 
(29.2) 
38.7 58.5 
Lithuania 
Petroleum oils, motor 
cars,vegetables,wheats, 
fruits,nuts  (31.6) 
Petroleum oils, 
furniture,fertilisers, polyacetals, 
articles of plastic (42.8) 
48.3 57.2 
Latvia 
Alcoholic beverages,wheat, 
medicaments,wood,ferrous 
waste (31.1) 
Petroleum oils, wood, 
telecom.equipm., 
wood products (23.3) 
60.4 50.4 
Bulgaria Petroleum oils, copper and ores, medicaments,wheat (47.5) 
Copper, oil seeds, petroleum 
oils,electrical app.for 
switching,wheat (24.9) 
57.60 56.9 
Romania 
Petroleum oils,motor vehicles 
and parts, wheat, ships,boats  
(34.9) 
Equipm.for destrib.electricity, 
motor cars and parts, furniture, 
footwear (27.8) 
58.4 52.1 
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Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia export mainly automotive and telecommunication, electrical products. 
These are mainly produced by affiliates of multinational companies. In Polish exports ships and furniture and in 
Slovenia medicaments are rather significant. The percentage numbers in brackets reinforce the above described 
concentration patterns: Slovakian extra-EU exports are strongly concentrated, the first five product groups 
represent more than half of all exports. Slovak export is concentrated on personal cars.  
Regarding Baltic countries and Bulgaria, Romania, the pattern is different. They export more raw and base 
material, agricultural and wood products. Petroleum oil products lead the exports in most cases. In Estonia, it is 
Russian oil exported to other countries through Estonia’s ports. Transit volumes of oil products are large, but 
added value in this sector is small.46 Transit of Russian cargo and oil is important in other Baltic ports too. In 
Lithuania oil refinery is also important, PKN Orlen Lietuva is the most significant supplier of petrol and diesel fuel 
in the Baltic countries, its products are also exported to Western Europe, USA, Ukraine, and other countries47. In 
Bulgaria (Burgas) and in Romania (Ploiesti) there are two big refineries of Lukoil that export around half of their 
products abroad.48
Based on the above shown pattern of main products, it is no wonder that the share of high-tech products in 
exports is by far the highest in Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia (see table  8, the list of high-
technology products is given by the Eurostat
 
In order to measure to what extent the export structures are similar to EU and to non-EU areas, the Finger-
Kreinin similarity index was calculated (Finger-Kreinin, 1979): 
 
S(ab,c)= {SUM_min[Xi(ac),Xi(bc)]}*100 
 
where Xi(ac) is the share of „i” product in total exports to the EU (country “a”), Xi(bc) is the share of „i” product in 
total extra-EU exports (country “b”). 
 
Table 7 shows the values of the index for 2004 and 2013. The Czech Republic and Hungary export in the most 
similar structure to the EU and to non-EU regions. In the majority of countries, intra-extra-EU similarity increased 
between 2004 and 2013, except for Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. In general, Central-European export to EU 
and non-EU markets are more similar and the export of Baltic countries and Bulgaria, Romania differs more in the 
case of EU and non-EU markets. 
 
Technology intensity 
49
 
 based on the OECD definition.). 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 http://www.swedbank.lt/lt/previews/get/4259/rss 
47 http://www.orlenlietuva.lt/EN/Company/Pages/default.aspx 
48 http://www.lukoil.com/static_6_5id_257_.html 
49 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an5.pdf. 
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Table 8: Share of high-tech products in exports  
percent 
 Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export 
 2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013 
Hungary 23.9 31.1 19.5 17.9 14.5 12.8 
Czech Republic 18.1 16.9 18.3 12.4 12.2 12.4 
Slovakia 3.9 5.2 10.1 2.5 4.9 9.3 
Poland 3.9 5.0 8.4 2 3.9 5.9 
Slovenia 8.5 8.1 8.6 3.2 3.7 3.9 
Estonia 6.6 4.5 10.5 10.7 8.7 16.6 
Lithuania 3.1 6.8 4.6 2.0 6.1 6.5 
Latvia 6.5 6.0 6.8 1.9 3.7 8.4 
Bulgaria 3.0 3.4 3.8 2.1 3.6 3.8 
Romania 2.8 4.4 3.1 3.1 5.6 6.6 
Source:author’s calculations from Eurostat Comext database 
 
Table 5: Share of high-tech products in imports  
percent 
 Extra-EU export. Intra-EU export 
 2004 2008 2013 2004 2008 2013 
Hungary 33.1 26.2 26.4 12.5 11.4 11.1 
Czech Republic 23.6 21.3 24.9 12.2 10.9 11.6 
Slovakia 12.3 8.7 19.8 8.5 9.8 14.9 
Poland 10.7 8.9 10.4 8.5 9.5 10.2 
Slovenia 8.4 5.8 5.9 7.3 7.2 6.4 
Estonia 18.4 8.2 16.4 10.2 7.6 12.8 
Lithuania 4.8 2.8 2.2 8.3 6.3 7.1 
Latvia 6.1 5.7 13.3 6.6 6.9 6.7 
Bulgaria 7.0 3.4 3.9 5.9 8.1 8.7 
Romania 12.3 7.8 8.8 6.8 8.6 10.1 
Source: author’s calculations from Eurostat Comext database 
 
In Estonia, the massive high-tech export of telecommunication equipment is due to the Swedish Ericsson 
affiliate50
                                                 
50 http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/article/2012/8/21/ericsson-eesti-becomes-estonia-s-largest-manufacturing-corporation 
 (that bought the local Elcoteq affiliate in 2009). Like other EU10 countries, Estonia does not possess a 
highly R&D intensive ICT and electronics industry. Foreign investment enterprises have located only relatively 
less demanding production functions here (Tiits-Kalvet, 2012). 
The share of high-tech products in imports is also high and even higher in several cases than in exports. 
Generally, in 2013, there were three EU10 countries that had more or less equal weight of high tech products in 
export and import: Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. They import several high tech products from non-EU 
countries as well, for example from Asia. The Central Europe-Asia trade is especially high-tech intensive (Éltető-
Toporowski, 2013). 
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Certainly, as Damijan et al. (2013) states, an increased share of high-technology products in exports is not per se 
an indicator of higher export competitiveness. They explain that traditional export items have been substantially 
upgraded or differentiated in the CE countries. Secondly, export restructuring has been accompanied by quality 
upgrading as indicated by increased value added per employee, increased unit values and more engagement in 
medium and high quality segments of industries. Thirdly, the share of vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade 
with the EU has increased as a consequence of multinational production networks. Of course, structural change 
in itself does not necessarily lead to increase of competitiveness, quality of changes matter.  Benkovskis and 
Wörz (2012), analysing export competitiveness of EU10 in 2004-2007, show that these economies experienced a 
loss in price competitiveness and a larger increase of unit values of their exports than their competitors. 
Furthermore, the average quality of their goods increased more than their export prices, indicating improvements 
in non-price competitiveness. 
Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania have relatively low share of high-technology exports to both EU and non-
EU areas. The majority of Lithuanian manufacturing value-added is produced in low-tech industries (Laskiene-
Venckuviene, 2014) and Lithuanian export is specialised on food, drinks, tobacco and chemical products 
(Bernatonyte et al., 2013). Bulgaria’s low share of high-tech-intensive export is attributed among other factors to 
the limited and constantly decreasing R&D expenditures. As Zhelev-Tzanov (2012) concludes EU integration of 
Bulgaria has not yet accelerated structural transformation and technological upgrading as in other EU10 
countries, the process has already started but it is rather slow. In Romania, the automotive multinational affiliates 
induce certain high-tech export (Platis-Hagiu 2012) but the general level is low.  
Concerning the high-tech-intensity of trade, the heavy weight of high-tech import beside export and the identity of 
the trading companies lead us to conclude that the traded high tech products are mainly those automotive and 
electronic ones that are produced in the networks of global value chains. 
 
Global value chains and EU10 countries 
The increasing role of global value chains (GVCs) was already apparent in the beginning of the 2000s51
                                                 
51 Baldwin (2012) analyses the development and role of GVCs in world trade in detail. The development of ICT technologies from the 
second half of the 80 years made it possible to coordinate production from a long distance and wage differences between developed and 
developing countries made outsourcing of production profitable for companies. Thus the second global unbundling of production took 
place. (The first unbundling took place after industrial revolution and railway network creation in the late 1800s.) 
. 
Fragmentation of production increased to a considerable extent in the last decade, especially in the electronic, 
clothing and automotive industry (Lall et al. 2004, Kimura et al. 2005, Srholec 2006). Regarding trading 
companies, export activity in general is quite concentrated in Europe. This means that in most countries, the top 
five percent of the companies account for 70% or more of the total manufacturing exports (Mayer-Ottaviano, 
2007). In developing countries large exporters are in several cases foreign owned multinationals. 
Having perceived the decisive role of multinational networks, several developing countries seek to join GVCs to 
assemble goods or make specialised inputs. This is easier and faster than building own supply chains but “less 
meaningful” (Gereffi 2013). Simply participating in GVCs does not necessarily develop domestic innovation, 
institutions, linkages and labour conditions. The challenge for companies in developing countries is how to 
upgrade in a beneficial way within the supply chains. 
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International trade in global production networks increased much faster than “normal” trade. According to the 
report of UNCTAD (2013) 80 per cent of global trade (gross exports) is linked to the production network of 
multinational companies. Because of international fragmentation, countries rely also on foreign resources to 
produce and export goods. Exports not only reflect the embodied technology and relative domestic endowments, 
but also the technology and factor endowments of countries from which the country imports intermediate goods 
(Beltramello et al., 2012). Thus, imports of intermediates increasingly determine the export competitiveness of 
countries and simply looking at the evolution of exports may be misleading for defining the competitive position of 
a country (see Box 1). 
The foreign value added content of exports is a kind of measure of vertical specialisation and GVC inclusion. 
Foster-Stehrer (2013) analysed countries in this respect, based on world input-output table data.  Between 1995-
2011 this foreign value added increased in almost all countries and within the EU, Central European countries 
have very high levels (Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4: Share of foreign value added in exports, 2011 
percent 
 
Source: compilation from Foster-McGregor and Stehrer, 2013, p.356. 
 
Among the EU10, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are especially strongly linked to GVCs, and Latvia, 
Romania are linked the least. As we have seen, the effect of foreign multinational companies on export is the 
highest in the first three countries. The old EU member states, mainly Germany involved these economies into 
their production networks already before legal accession to the EU. There had been different stages of this kind 
of integration process, as the example of automotive industry shows: first the regional market was attractive, than 
the Central European countries became hosts of export-oriented assembly and component parts factories. 
Foreign suppliers themselves relocated their production to the CE region (Fortwengel, 2011) and some R&D 
intensive functions were also relocated to this region.  
Non-EU multinationals “discovered” the advantages of the CE region too. Ando and Kimura (2013) even argue 
that Central Europe connects Asia and Europe together within the global production networks. Due to the 
dominance of East Asia in electronics industry, European multinationals have been importing electronic parts and 
components from their affiliates and other Asian firms to use them for their production in CE. The automotive 
industry agglomerations in CE import machinery parts and components from Asia. Furthermore, certain Asian 
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firms themselves have invested in the CE countries and intensified sourcing from Asia. These all have resulted in 
tight production links between East Asia and CE to serve the European market. The strong inclusion into 
multinational networks shaped the revealed comparative advantages and export competitiveness of CE countries 
in the past decade (see Box 1). 
 
  
Box 1. Competitiveness and comparative advantages in Central Europe 
 
Export performance of countries is often bound to their competitiveness. Competitiveness is usually also a highly 
debated concept. There are several ways to measure and define the competitiveness of a country. However, 
according to well-known authors (Porter, 1990, Krugman,1996) it does not make sense to talk about competitiveness 
of countries. Porter (1990) in his book enumerates several concepts of competitiveness and their factors but argues 
against generalisation. He argues that instead of competitiveness of nations, productivity is more important and even 
productivity is difficult to interpret on national level. Productivity makes sense only at the level of industrial branches. 
Krugman (1996) does not favour the concept of national competitiveness either. He states that countries are not like 
two competing factories; international trade is not a “zero sum game”. Living standard in a given country depends on 
its own domestic economic achievements and not on the comparison with other countries.  
An often used measure concerning competitiveness is the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), or rather 
various types of RCAs . RCA measures for final export goods indicate if a country has a comparative advantage in the 
production in an industry, while RCA measures for imported intermediates show whether a country has a comparative 
advantage in the assembly in a given industry. However, the role of GVCs questions this; countries can import 
intermediates for the production of other intermediates.  Cross-border movement of parts and products within the 
same production network increases the trade of developing countries, “artificially” generating international trade with 
each crossing (Athukorala et al, 2006 - Mani, 2000). 
As a consequence, the competitiveness of countries can be overestimated based on gross export data and on indices 
(such as revealed comparative advantage) calculated from gross exports. This is especially true for open countries 
that rely heavily on imported intermediates. Based on world input-output table data, Timmer et al (2012) show that the 
use of imported intermediate inputs and the inclusion in global value chains have increased radically between 1995 
and 2008 in the case of CE countries. Similarly, using world input-output tables, Grodzicki (2014) calculates RCAs 
based on GVC income. The results show that between 1995 and 2011, Central European economies lost their 
previous comparative advantages in traditional industries and formed new RCAs in different types of industries. The 
Czech Republic and Slovakia managed to maintain some of their previous advantages in resourced-based 
manufacturing and Hungary in chemicals but at the same time they developed new, strong industries in modern types 
of activities like transport equipment, machinery and electrical products. Poland, on the contrary, did not undergo such 
a structural change – its RCAs are still mainly in resource-based industries (Grodzicki, 2014). 
 
 
 
The international crisis in 2008 and its effects had negative effects on GVCs too. The trade collapse in 2009 was 
deep and was worsened by the general credit crisis. According to literature, global value chains can be a channel 
for the rapid transmission of both real and financial shocks. Demand drop for final goods and credit problems can 
immediately affect flows of intermediates, especially when supplier contracts are short-term. (Milberg & Winkler, 
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2010).As a kind of opposite opinion others (eg. Altomonte & Ottaviano, 2009) point out that supply chains could 
also have been a factor of resilience in the crisis, as existing supply chains are difficult and undesirable to abolish 
because of contractual arrangements and high initial sunk costs.  This drop and quick recovery can be caused by 
the effect of crisis on GVC trade that is mentioned by several authors as the “bullwhip effect” (Escaith et al. 2010, 
Altomonte et al. 2012, Zavacka 2012). This means that low demand expectations force lead firms to adjust by 
their inventories. After the crisis, if demand for the product is recovered, sold out inventories can be accumulated 
again, so trade increase can also be magnified by GVCs.  Sass – Szalavetz (2014) review and sum up the 
empirical literature on the role of GVCs in the crisis and conclude that the results depend on different approaches 
and different methodologies, datasets and time period. They also reinforce the twofold effects of GVCs: on the 
one hand transmitting and amplifying the crisis contributing to the decrease of international trade; on the other 
hand producing a stabilizing effect. This latter took place in a slightly longer run, attributed to the bullwhip effect 
and to the fact that companies inside the value chain helped each other by financing or network rebuilding. 
In the EU10 and worldwide, the crisis resulted in reorganisations, relocations of firms. Trade flows largely 
controlled by multinational companies have also been affected by these relocation decisions. Companies 
relocated mostly for improving their competitiveness and this had both negative and positive effects on the trading 
of EU10 countries. Hunya – Sass (2014) found increasing relocation activity to Hungary in the post-crisis years 
until 2011 and found evidence of re-shoring or back-shoring as well. Relocation took place also from Hungary, 
decreasing the Hungarian export capacity significantly in 2012-1452
                                                 
52 In 2012 Nokia downgraded its affiliate in Hungary, switched assembly to Nokia’s plants in South Korea and in Beijing. Therefore, in 2012 
the before huge export of cellular phones from Hungary decreased. In 2014 Microsoft (the owner of Nokia Komárom company announced 
the closure of the firm.  
. On the other hand, some additional 
investments have been relocated from Western Europe to the EU10 (like Poland) due to low cost seeking of 
multinationals (Éltető-Toporowski, 2013). 
Besides relocation, the crisis probably could induce other positive effects on GVCs in the CE and Southern 
countries. Sass – Szalavetz (2013) analysed the effects of crisis on GVC integrated Hungarian automotive and 
electronic industry based on interviews. According to their results, firms had functional upgrading effects induced 
by the crisis and reorganisation of multinationals. 
 
Conclusion 
The recent international crisis accentuated the importance of exports for several EU member countries. The 
EU10 group is not an exception in this respect, most of them are strongly foreign trade – dependent economies. 
The crisis had significant effects on the foreign trade of the EU10 countries, partly in volume (drop and increase), 
partly geographically (increase of non-EU areas). These effects can largely be bound to the international activity 
of multinational companies.  
The foreign trade of the EU10 had been directed towards the European Union already well before the official 
accession. The EU-integration had a major enhancing impact on mutual trade among these countries. Despite 
this trade intensification the share of the EU in exports shows a decrease. Based on the trade performance of 
EU10 described in this study we can conclude that the foreign trade patterns have not been similar for these 
economies. We can form two broad country-groups in this respect. 
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The first group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia. The role of export in these small 
countries is very important for growth, these are extremely open economies, the share of exports in GDP and 
trade per capita are very high. These economies became strongly integrated in the global value chains that shape 
their trade structure, dynamics and volume. Their exports are relatively high-tech intensive. The most vulnerable 
among these economies is Slovakia, because its trade pattern is extremely concentrated on motor vehicle 
exports. 
The rest of EU10 countries consist a second group, where integration into multinational networks, high-tech 
export is lower, and mainly lower-technology products are exported. This group is even more heterogeneous than 
the previous one, there are larger and smaller countries within. 
The inclusion of the EU10 region into the global value chain activity is a fact. The future of these economies 
depends on how they can use this integration, on what level their firms can participate in the worldwide 
production tasks. Fruitful participation in the global value chains depends largely on the local capacities to absorb 
foreign technology, thus on the quality of human capital. In the Baltic countries (but to lesser extent also in other 
EU10 economies) emigration of well qualified people is a severe problem, because it reduces human resources, 
the level of education and has become a long-term mass-phenomenon (Kirch et al. 2011, Staehr, 2013). In all 
EU10 economies the efficient development of human capital and education system would be essential to provide 
a long-term base for good export performance and growth. 
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The new member states and the Common agricultural 
policy: Expectations, preparation and results 
Miklós Somai 
Introduction 
The year 2014 offers good opportunity to look back on the history of the first waves of Eastern enlargement. 
Thus, it is fully packed with expert meetings and conferences aimed at taking stock of the experiences of first 7-
year (in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) or 10-year (for the others) membership within the European Union 
(EU). The introduction of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the gradual application of its main support 
schemes for farmers are emerging as key issues of interest at the above-mentioned events. 
Apart from giving a short explanation about the exceptional character of the Eastern enlargement, the purpose of 
this study is to highlight some lessons learned from agricultural accession, by displaying how production and 
trade evolved in EU’s new member states (EU10).53
Before 1993, it was appropriate to apply a transition period to the acceding countries while duties, quotas and 
other barriers to trade between the old and the new members had been dismantled parallel to the process of 
extending the CAP and its subsidies to the new entrants. However, since 1993, with the launch of the European 
single market, border controls between member states were eliminated. Hence, it was natural that the EFTA 
enlargement (Austria, Finland and Sweden) in 1995 was already carried out under a “Big Bang” scenario; as of 
the first day of their membership, the three new EU countries became fully integrated into the single market. Their 
products of both industrial and agricultural origin gained free access to the old member states’ markets and vice 
versa, while their farmers obtained all CAP subsidies available in the same way as did their counterparts in the 
 Based on data of development dynamics – and with some 
focus on Hungary – I will attempt to present differences in development paths and consider some reasons lying 
behind such differences. In addition, I will devote particular attention to the opportunities and challenges the new 
multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020) may bring to EU-10 farmers through the reformed CAP. 
 
Exceptional enlargement – starting conditions 
For some of its important features, the EU 2004 enlargement maybe regarded as exceptional. First, never before 
so many countries could join the EU at the same time; second, never before democratizing states had been kept 
waiting for so long to enter the integration; third – and focusing on the practical implementation of the CAP 
instruments in the new member states – never before had there been so much deviation from EU’s own rules. If 
one puts together these three features of the 2004 enlargement, it is clear that never before had newcomers been 
treated on such an unequal footing to those already inside. 
                                                 
53 EU10 covers the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the two countries of the Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria), the 
Visegrád countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and Slovenia. As a methodological remark, it should be noted that 
due to lack of sufficient comparable data for EU10 countries, I sorted the new member states based on some other criteria, too. 
Accordingly, countries of the 2004 enlargement are named NMS or NMS (2004). NMS without Malta, Cyprus are named EU8, and EU8 
without Hungary are named EU7. The old member states are called EU15. Finally, the label V4 (or Visegrád countries) covers Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
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old member states. From a point of view of effective competition policy, it was completely natural and necessary 
that after the mutual and immediate market opening, the agricultural producers of the new members got into a 
regulatory and subsidisation environment identical to that faced by their homologues in the old member states. 
Having all the above in mind, it was very disappointing watching from Eastern Europe the debate on the 
agricultural aspects of the 2004 enlargement carried out during the 1990s and early 2000s. In these preparatory 
negotiations, experts called upon by the Commission had for long years been arguing about whether it would be 
wise, beneficial or necessary to extend CAP direct payments, i.e. the main part of the farm subsidies, to the new 
entrants. They did so as if such double standards between farmers of old and new member states were not 
prohibited by EU competition law to persist. Unfortunately, during the long negotiation period before accession, 
the theory according to which cheap, abundant and underutilised agricultural labour and land in EU10 would 
represent comparative advantages for their farmers became widely accepted in the old member states (EU15).54 
This approach, however, badly underestimated the capital intensity per worker of the principal technical functions 
of modern agricultural production.55
                                                 
54 See the papers of Buckwell, Josling, Mahé, Tangermann and Tarditi referred to in Somai (2002). 
55 Pouliquen (2001) p.15 
 According to the then widespread professional perception, candidates from 
Central and Eastern Europe were less in need of price and income (i.e. CAP first pillar) support – as they 
produced ‘cheaply enough’ – than that of structural aid, to be financed from the second (i.e. rural development) 
pillar of the CAP. 
By December 2002, when enlargement negotiations were reaching their final stage, the East European 
negotiating politico-economic elite had already got accustomed to their Western colleagues’ increasingly 
entrenched position described above. Finally, they came to the conclusion that in order to realize accession within 
a reasonable timeframe, they would have to accept a scenario of full membership only at the end of a long 
transition period. The result is well known: the transition period for agricultural accession was set at ten years, 
only at the end of which (i.e. in 2013) gradually introduced direct payments reached the normal EU level. In 
addition, production levels used to determine per hectare direct payments in NMS, unlike in EU15 (i.e. ensuing 
from normative EU laws), were not set out based on the late 1980s, but on a period much closer to the 
enlargement. For countries (e.g. Hungary) where the negative effects of the systemic transition had been felt 
longer than elsewhere (e.g. Poland) and agricultural production remained under the pre-transition level, or at best 
fluctuated heavily, this arrangement limited the subsidies available under the CAP regime even further. Overall, 
Brussels was more inclined to circumvent their own established rules and regulations of both agricultural and 
competition policies than to treat the new Central and Eastern members as equal partners by ensuring them full 
rights under the acquis communautaire. 
Ultimately, this unprecedented discrimination of the new entrants – exposing their farmers to uneven competition 
stemming from a combination of compulsory immediate full opening of their markets and a temporarily unequal 
support system – became a precedent for subsequent enlargements of the EU towards Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007, and Croatia in 2013. 
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Main trends 
Despite the significant increase in agricultural output, the accession to the EU itself could not reverse the long-
term trend of decreasing primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing) in the economies of the NMS. It was 
clearly so because from the accession until 2008, growth in the other two main (i.e. secondary and tertiary) 
sectors of the economy happened to be even faster. From 2011 onwards, however, as a delayed reaction to 
global financial and economic crisis, which caused deeper recession in manufacturing and services than in 
primary sectors, the above-mentioned trend seems to be broken – at least the available data provide such a 
picture. Between 2011 and 2013, the share of primary sector in total gross value added (GVA) of the NMS 
stabilized at around 3.5 per cent, a level somewhat higher than that reached in the years of 2009 and 2010, and 
close to what it was in 2006/2007.56
We can observe a similar phenomenon in employment as well, with the difference that the declining trend of the 
primary sector in NMS has only flattened since the outbreak of the crisis – at around 9 percent of the total 
employment, so circa three times the level in the EU15
 It should be noted that there was a similar break in the EU15, although, at a 
much lower level than in the NMS; the primary sector share stayed at around 1.5 of total GVA. 
57. Of course, this does not mean that there would not 
have been any halt or reversal of the trend in the cases of some individual member states. For example, between 
2009 and 2011, the share of agriculture in total employment rose from 4.2 to 4.7 per cent in Estonia and from 6.9 
to 7.3 per cent in Hungary. This role of the agriculture, however, which consists of absorbing temporarily a part of 
the redundant workforce released by the other sectors in times of crisis, is evident in some old member states 
too, especially those in trouble. Between 2009 and 2012, the above share rose from 4.5 to 5.7 per cent in Ireland 
and from 11.6 to 12.9 per cent in Greece.58
If there is anything like a trend in post-accession development of NMS agriculture, it is the concentration of 
production in ever fewer hands, i.e. the considerable decrease in the number and a parallel increase in the size of 
farms. However, as the follow-up of these developments is closely dependent on agricultural surveys and 
censuses undertaken only every five to ten years, data are available only until 2010. Based on this data, land 
concentration in the EU10 accelerated between 2005 and 2010. But, as the same thing took place in the EU15, 
the difference in economic size of average farms between the old and the new member states measured in 
standard output (SO) – a currently used indicator to determine the scale of production – still increased in absolute 
terms and remained approximately of the same magnitude in relative terms (see Table 1). Aggregates, however, 
hide huge differences between countries: average holdings in Slovakia and the Czech Republic are much bigger 
than in EU15, and Estonian farms are already comparable in size to those in Ireland or Italy; holdings of the other 
new members are far smaller, especially in Romania. In relative terms, first compared to themselves, in six 
countries out of the EU10, the economic size of average farms increased at a very high speed (the SO growing 
by between 1.6 and 3.7 times); among the laggards there were Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Lithuania. Now, 
compared to the EU15, almost the same findings could be established, with one more remark: a lot depended on 
the starting point. Bulgaria, for example, who made a big step towards a more concentrated farm structure, could 
not reduce its handicap vis-à-vis the EU15 considerably. Hungary advanced very slowly, much more slowly than 
most of the EU7 on average or its Visegrád partners, countries most suitable for comparison.
 
59
                                                 
56 The estimated share for Bulgaria and Romania is a bit higher, around 5-6% of their GVA. (Source: Eurostat) 
57 European Commission (2014) p. 2 –  Bulgaria 
58 European Commission (web) 
59 It is to be added that behind the data showing huge concentration in some of the NMS from 2005 to 2010, there is a sharp reduction in 
the number of farms, which in turn is at least partly due to methodological changes in the Farm Structure Survey. (Source: European 
Commission 2014, p. 3) 
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Table 1: Dynamics of standard outputs in agriculture of the new member states and their relative 
size compared to those of the EU15’s 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 Change in the handicap vis-à-vis EU15 (2005-2010) 
 euro/holding percent 
EU15 42 158 50 075 100.0 100.0   
CzechRepublic 88 711 170 603 210.4 340.7 -118.0  
Estonia 17 431 30 554 41.3 61.0 -33.5  
Latvia 4 565 9 356 10.8 18.7 -8.8  
Lithuania 6 131 7 645 14.5 15.3 -0.9  
Poland 6 523 12 669 15.5 25.3 -11.6  
Slovenia 10 809 12 264 25.6 24.5 1.5  
Slovakia 19 910 72 977 47.2 145.7 -186.7  
NMS (2004) 7 976 13 637 18.9 27.2 -10.3  
EU7 8 012 14 770 19.0 29.5 -13.0  
Hungary 7 431 9 814 17.6 19.6 -2.4  
EU8 7 909 13 692 18.8 27.3 -10.6  
Romania 2 552 2 798 6.1 5.6 0.5  
Bulgaria 4 459 7 099 10.6 14.2 -4.0  
EU10 5 054 7 125 12.0 14.2 -2.6  
Source: Eurostat 
 
Production 
When it comes to measuring the EU10 performance in agricultural production, there are two methods; it is 
possible to adopt an “in-kind” or a value approach. As for the first option – because taking into account the 
differences stemming from cultural, climatic and other factors – would require far too much time and space, this 
study will mainly use the second one. Out of the indices of production, temporal changes of two of them 
(agricultural output and gross value added) are shown in Table 2 and 3. 
In preparing the tables, the period of 2002-2013 was divided into four sections of equal length, and then the 
second, third and fourth three-year sub-periods were compared with the first one, that of 2002-2004. The latter 
can be seen as representing the last couple of years when the EU accession (and CAP subsidies) could not have 
a significant impact yet. Considering the weather exposure of the agriculture and trying to avoid distortions arising 
from comparing single years with each other, the use of 3-year averages seemed to be a reasonable solution.60
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Data for Romania and Bulgaria – and thus also for EU10 – are for reference purposes only, as their accession came 3 years later (in 
2007). Naturally, one could compare the first six years (i.e. the first and the second three-year cycles) of their membership with that of the 
other countries entering the EU in 2004. This would show that their production grew slower than that of the Baltics and Poland, but faster 
than that of the rest of the NMS, and that their performance in crop production was much better than in animal husbandry. However, such 
comparison would not be adequate, as agricultural production – in contrast to the industrial production – is highly dependent on external 
factors, like weather. Thus, differences in speed of development stem not only from differences in performances but also from differences 
in weather conditions of the subsequent years. 
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Table 2: Changes in agricultural output and GVA based on 3-year averages (2002-2004 = 100%) 
 Output Gross value added 
 2005-07/ 2002-04 
2008-10/ 
2002-04 
2011-13/ 
2002-04 
2011-13 
average  
2005-07/ 
2002-04 
2008-10/ 
2002-04 
2011-13/ 
2002-04 
2011-13 
average 
 percent m. euro percent m. euro 
EU15 115.2 127.0 147.6 4 866 104.7 95.4 134.7 1 377 
CzechRepublic 134.2 141.1 191.7 863 138.7 115.3 178.7 326 
Estonia 143.7 154.2 196.0 848 128.8 102.4 112.3 193 
Latvia 140.2 163.8 225.6 2 852 147.8 152.2 247.4 1 075 
Lithuania 130.5 150.1 175.1 22 970 139.9 149.4 181.3 9 036 
Poland 104.2 107.1 113.6 1 185 99.8 87.6 91.0 418 
Slovenia 106.1 118.1 134.4 2 313 98.6 86.1 109.0 547 
Slovakia 98.3 103.3 115.8 337 213 89.6 85.1 92.8 133 664 
NMS (2004) 120.2 134.1 157.5 44 348 123.5 124.3 156.5 16 103 
EU7 115.7 137.6 163.9 35 895 130.4 132.9 167.2 12 972 
Hungary 103.2 108.6 125.5 7 632 105.4 100.2 129.6 2 735 
EU8 120.8 135.0 158.8 43 527 125.1 125.9 159.2 15 707 
Romania 120.3 138.0 146.6 16 873 107.8 118.3 122.6 7 376 
Bulgaria 97.7 116.9 122.4 4 233 89.9 96.0 100.1 1 578 
EU10 118.8 134.3 152.6 64 634 115.9 120.6 141.3 24 661 
Note: Output of the agricultural industry is made up of the sum of the output of agricultural products, agricultural services and of the 
goods and services produced in inseparable non-agricultural secondary activities. Gross value added corresponds to the value of 
output less the value of intermediate consumption. The basic price is defined as the price received by the producer, after deduction of 
all taxes on products but including all subsidies on products. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As for Table 2, let me make some general remarks – true for most of the examined period – regarding both of the 
indices (output and GVA). First, the EU10 as a group, and each of its constituent countries grew faster than the 
average of the EU15. The best performance was recorded by Poland and the Baltic states (except for Latvia for 
the GVA). They were followed by a sort of middle of the rank, with the only “rule” being that Romania and the 
Czech Republic appeared mainly in the upper section, while Slovakia and Bulgaria in the lower one. Hungary’s 
performance has been mixed: by its output in general and its performance during the first six years in particular, it 
clearly ranked among the worst performing countries; but, by its GVA, especially for the last three-year sub-
period, it managed to climb the ladder higher up. 
Of course, at least part of the above phenomena may be explained by some quite banal reasons. For example, 
the less developed a country is, the faster it can grow and vice versa. Indeed, measured in GDP per capita in 
PPS, the Baltics (but also Poland) started their development within the EU from a very low level (from between 
44-55% of the EU28 average), at least from a much lower level than e.g. Slovenia (84%), the Czech Republic 
(77%) or Hungary (63%) did.61
                                                 
61 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114 
 Also, their agricultural sector especially that of the Baltics, provided very low yields 
before accession. So, the least one can say is that they had room for improvement. At the other end of the 
ranking, one can find the small but very developed Slovenia, the only one in the EU10 whose agricultural 
performance in the last nine years was even worse than that of the EU15 on average. As a matter of fact, its 
agriculture, at the moment of EU accession, was undoubtedly at the highest level among candidate countries. 
The amount of its per hectare direct payments, a mirror of historical production patterns, is not only above both 
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new and old member states’ average, but also above that of France and Germany.62 Also Slovenia is the only 
one to have adopted the SPS (or Single Payment Scheme) regime in 2007 – a compulsory system for distributing 
direct payments in EU15 introduced with CAP reform 2003. So, regarding this element of the CAP, it is Slovene 
farmers – alone in EU10 – who since 2007 have been getting access to direct payments on entirely equal footing 
with their colleagues from EU15.63 
 
Table 3: Changes in crop and animal output based on 3-year averages (2002-2004 = 100%) 
 Crop output Animal output 
 2005-07/ 2002-04 
2008-10/ 
2002-04 
2011-13/ 
2002-04 
2011-13 
average 
2005-07/ 
2002-04 
2008-10/ 
2002-04 
2011-13/ 
2002-04 
2011-13 
average 
 percent m. euro percent m. euro 
CzechRepublic 116.1 133.6 171.8 2 868 111.0 116.8 117.1 1 779 
Estonia 145.8 145.8 219.4 377 125.6 135.5 172.3 400 
Latvia 151.3 173.3 231.8 451 137.2 148.4 177.2 317 
Lithuania 133.2 166.6 255.1 1 687 140.5 142.1 168.1 946 
Poland 130.4 154.7 181.8 11 821 132.9 148.1 172.5 10 512 
Slovenia 107.1 113.0 122.4 627 100.9 100.5 104.5 537 
Slovakia 111.3 126.0 159.4 1 192 102.7 112.0 112.9 893 
EU15 95.3 100.1 109.6 169 558 100.4 104.4 120.7 141 119 
NMS (2004) 122.7 140.9 171.6 23 927 118.6 128.5 145.2 17 486 
EU7 126.4 148.2 181.9 19 024 125.8 137.3 155.5 15 384 
Hungary 112.1 120.5 143.6 4 502 92.5 95.8 108.0 2 584 
EU8 123.1 141.8 173.0 23 526 119.3 129.2 146.3 17 969 
Romania 114.2 141.1 154.7 11 392 111.9 106.1 105.2 4 006 
Bulgaria 97.9 131.6 149.3 2 518 105.8 109.9 107.0 1 175 
EU10 118.3 140.8 165.3 37 437 116.8 122.9 134.7 23 150 
Source: Eurostat 
 
From Table 3, where data for agricultural output are split into two parts distinguishing between crop and animal 
husbandry, one can reach similar conclusions to those drawn from Table 2. Here too, the best performers are 
Poland and the Baltics, but their advantage over the others is much less pronounced in crop than in animal 
products. Another similarity with Table 2 is that EU15’s development is slower than that of the new members on 
average, no matter what their composition is (i.e. NMS, EU7, EU8, EU10 or else). Finally, Hungary is again 
among the worst performers: even in its best period (i.e. the years of 2011-2013), the pace of its development is 
half of the EU7’s for the crop and only one-seventh of it for the animal output. Nevertheless, there is an important 
trend which can be discerned from the data of Table 3: although the speed of development is relatively slower in 
the EU15, this latter is the only group of countries where the growth of animal output exceeds that of crop output. 
In other words, while in each new member state the proportion of crop and animal husbandry has gradually been 
shifting towards the former, in the old member states exactly the opposite has been taking place (see Figure 1). 
Among the EU10 countries only Poland was able to keep the importance of the animal sector at its pre-accession 
level (a loss of 1.3 percentage point only). As for the other new members, Slovenia has performed relatively well 
                                                 
62 See Council of the European Union (2011) and Figure 1 at the final chapter 
63 See Potočnik – Lombardero (2004) p. 379 
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(-3.9 pp) and in Estonia, in spite of a quite significant decline in share (-6.0 pp), animal husbandry remained more 
important than crop production. In the rest of the EU10, the animal sector lost between 6.6 and 10.1 percentage 
points. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in proportion of animal output, 3-year averages  
agricultural output = 100% 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As for the relative importance of the speed of development, it is to be clearly understood that although the EU10 
crop production has developed seven times faster than that of the EU15, in reality, there was no difference in the 
amount of increase (approx. EUR 15 billion from 2002/04 to 2011/13). As for the animal output, the ratio of the 
speed of development was less significant (only 1:1.7 in favour of EU10), but in value the EU15 progressed by 
EUR 24 billion against a mere 6 billion achieved by the EU10. It is to be noted that this progression of EUR 24 
billion was higher than the average annual animal output in the EU10 at the end of the period (i.e. in 2011/13). 
Table 3 and Figure 1 already foreshadow the events that took place in intra-EU trade for the last one and a half 
decade, enabling the old member states to take full advantage of the opportunities brought about by the Eastern 
enlargements to find new markets for their highly competitive animal sector. 
 
Trade developments 
Statistical data on international trade are be treated and interpreted very cautiously; this is the main conclusion 
drawn after thoroughly examining several trade reports and statistical data sets on agrifood trade within and 
outside the European Union. Frequent changes in methodology and consecutive data refreshments can cause 
comprehensive reviews to become obsolete within a very short lapse of time. Not to mention that the hidden 
economy, which in the EU10 is likely to have larger dimensions than in the EU15, may cause severe bias in trade 
statistics and evaluations. Bearing all the above in mind, the best solution seems to be to focus on those key 
phenomena and trends that are supported by most of the sources.64
 
 
                                                 
64 See e.g. Carraresi – Banterle (2013) or Csáki – Jámbor (2013) 
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Figure 2: Balance of extra EU27 trade of food, drinks and tobacco 
million euro 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
In the assessment of the European Commission released in April 2014 evaluating the first 10 years of the 2004 
enlargement, there are a number of findings on the trade aspects of NMS’ agricultural accession65 that could also 
have been reported almost unchanged on those of the EU10s’. One of such findings is associated with the 
increased demand for NMS products, stemming from the free access of these countries to the Single Market and 
driving the growth in competitiveness with economies of scale, which made their exports outside the EU more 
competitive. The report also states that agricultural exports to third countries have grown even faster than to the 
EU15. As a matter of fact, the extra EU exports of EU10 are on a constant uptrend for the last 10 or even 14 
years for some countries like Poland or Hungary (See Figure 2).66
                                                 
65 European Commission (2014) p. 9 
66 As liberalization of agrifood trade between the EU and the candidate countries significantly accelerated in the years preceding their 
accession, it seemed a reasonable choice to collect and analyse statistics from as far back as the late 1990s. 
 Except for Slovenia, all the other EU10 have 
achieved a positive balance in agrifood trade with extra-EU countries and the slope of the upward trends became 
even steeper from the outbreak of the global crisis. So, apparently, these countries have managed to increase 
their competitiveness outside the EU, due most probably to both rising access to CAP subsidies and their 
utilisation (like e.g. investing into farm modernisation). However, it appears that even increasing CAP support 
cannot help all EU10 farmers to overcome the competitive disadvantage they have to operate at, vis-à-vis their 
EU15 counterparts. Their handicap results from the accumulation and capitalisation in buildings, machinery, 
equipment and livestock of those subsidies the West European farmers benefited from for long decades and 
continue to benefit from. At least this is the conclusion one can draw looking at intra EU27 trade developments 
(see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Balance of intra EU27 trade of food, drinks and tobacco  
million euro 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The only country that could undoubtedly make full use of its EU accession and ensure an almost continuous 
improvement of its intra EU trade balance was Poland. All the other EU10 countries, with the exception of 
Lithuania until 2006, have seen their balances, at least temporarily, deteriorating through the process of mutual 
liberalisation of agrifood trade with the group of EU15. Most of them – i.e. the three Baltics, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – ended up with much bigger deficit than initially. Bulgaria returned to the same 
near equilibrium position of its trade balance it had before having entered the EU, while Hungary managed to 
overcome the initial difficulties and became the second best performer behind Poland. Finally, one more 
observation in connection to Figure 3: two countries with excellent natural endowments for agriculture, namely 
Romania and Hungary, had experienced important deterioration in their respective intra EU trade balance during 
the first years after accession. This similarity may clearly indicate errors committed during their preparation for 
membership.67
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Figure 4: Balance of intra and extra EU trade of food, drinks and tobacco  
million euro 
                                                 
67 Other scholars reached a similar conclusion, too. In a study, they go so far as to claiming that in some of the new member states (like in 
Romania and Hungary) “the majority of farmers were not prepared for the accession”. (See Csáki and Jámbor 2013, p. 47)  
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When it comes to adding up the results of extra and intra EU27 agrifood trade (see Figure 4), one cannot but 
refer to another finding of the aforementioned assessment of the Commission, whereby fast rising exports (i.e. 
exports rising faster than imports) transformed the NMS from a net importer to a net exporter.68 Of course, this 
statement is true for NMS as a group only, because there are many differences within the group. The EU10 as a 
group could report positive trade balance only in the last few years. Data for the period from 1999 to 2009 reflect 
a rather uneven development, when the EU10 cumulative deficit fluctuated between EUR 509 and 1,644 million. 
Since 2009/2010, however, due mainly to a skyrocketing improvement in the performance of the three main 
producer countries (i.e. that of Poland, Romania and Hungary), the EU10 agrifood trade deficit has turned into a 
growing surplus. 
Taking the new member states individually, one can find out that only four of the EU10 countries (namely Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Bulgaria) kept scoring mostly positive balance during the examined years. They were 
joined by Latvia at the very end of the period. As for the remaining five countries, none of them could report a 
trade surplus since 1999. Three of them saw their performance worsening, their deficit doubling (for the Czech 
Republic) or even tripling (for Slovakia and Slovenia) between 1999 and 2013. The deficit of Estonia was 
stagnating for the whole period, while that of Romania, after having taken an immense roundabout way towards 
the low negative range, returned to more or less the same level it had started from (see Figure 4). 
If one returns now to the EU10 as a group and takes a closer look at its exports and imports growth rates, one 
finds the following. Exports really did grow faster than imports, taking either the period between 1999 and 2013 or 
that from 2004 to 2013. Also did the growth rate of both exports and imports exceed those of the old member 
states. However, despite the much faster increase of exports of EU10 than of EU15, as the initial positions were 
extremely different, the extra exports of the EU15 represent several times that of the EU10 (see Table 4). The 
same logic holds true for the difference between exports and imports growth. 
 
Table 4: Changes in absolute and relative terms in trade of food, drinks and tobacco 
 Export (Bn. euro) 2013/1999 2013/2004 Extra export minus extra import (Bn. euro) 
 1999 2004 2013 1999=100 Bn. euro 2004=100 Bn. euro 2013/1999 2013/2004 
EU10 7.04 13.07 49.12 6.97 42.08 3.76 36.05 8.74 8.65 
EU15 171.24 211.33 349.90 2.04 178.66 1.66 138.57 15.20 16.41 
          
 Import (Bn. euro) 2013/1999 2013/2004 Growth diff. in pp. btw. export + import 
 1999 2004 2013 1999=100 Bn. euro 2004=100 Bn. euro 2013/1999 2013/2004 
EU10 8.23 14.16 41.56 5.05 33.34 2.93 27.40 192.00 82.30 
EU15 175.66 216.96 339.12 1.93 163.46 1.56 122.16 11.30 9.30 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Of course, taken individually, the member states show huge differences regarding the speed of growth of their 
agrifood exports and imports. The fastest increase in exports was achieved by the two less developed Baltic 
States (i.e. Latvia and Lithuania) and Romania, while in imports the afore-mentioned two Baltic States were 
‘accompanied’ by Bulgaria. Among the countries showing the slowest progress one can find Hungary (with the 
                                                 
68 European Commission (2014) p. 9 
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worst performance in three out of the possible four cases), the Czech Republic, Estonia and, for the period of 
1999-2013, Slovenia (see Table 5). Naturally, one has to take into account that the value of agrifood trade of 
these countries was still rather insignificant compared with that of the EU15’s, both in 1999 and 2004. In current 
prices, EU15 agrifood exports were 24 and 16 times, their imports 21 and 15 times larger than the EU10’s, in 
1999 and 2004 respectively. 
 
Table 5: Speed of growth in trade of food, drinks & tobacco* 
2013/1999 
Exports or Imports of year 2013 compared to Exports or Imports of year 1999 
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10 
Exports 6.20 5.70 7.04 21.86 15.11 3.55 8.16 14.11 4.47 7.40 6.97 
Imports 7.82 4.34 4.33 6.41 7.82 4.90 4.56 6.24 3.88 5.31 5.05 
  
2013/2004 
Exports or Imports of year 2013 compared to Exports or Imports of year 2004 
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10 
Exports 4.17 2.96 3.40 7.50 5.33 2.48 3.74 9.69 3.80 3.50 3.76 
Imports 3.84 2.39 2.51 3.45 4.54 2.16 3.29 2.77 2.70 3.06 2.93 
*The times the trade was increased; fastest growing countries in green, laggards in red 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Measured in per capita terms, the value of exports of the EU10 was a mere one-seventh and one-fourth, that of 
the imports one-sixth and one-fourth of that of the EU15, for the above mentioned two years.69 But, averages 
mask huge differences. In 1999, per capita values of exports ranged between EUR 13 (for Romania) and EUR 
186 (for Hungary); that of imports between EUR 31 (for (Romania) and EUR 286 (for Slovenia). The average 
values of the EU15: EUR 455 and EUR 467 respectively. In fact, there was enough room for trade to develop 
substantially. Therefore, when contemplating Table 6 which compares exports and imports growth rates to each 
other, such indices above 2 or even 3 (in case of Latvia and Romania) need to be properly evaluated, bearing in 
mind what level these countries’ indices started from. 
 
Table 6: Speed of growth in trade of food, drinks and tobacco* 
 Exports of year 2013/exports of year 1999 or 2004/ Imports of  year 2013/imports of year 1999 or 2004 
 BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10 
2013/1999 0.79 1.31 1.63 3.41 1.93 0.72 1.79 2.26 1.15 1.39 1.38 
2013/2004 1.09 1.24 1.37 2.17 1.17 1.15 1.14 3.49 1.40 1.14 1.28 
            
 Exports of year 2013/exports of year 1999 or 2004/ Imports of  year 2013/imports of year 1999 or 2004 
 BE DK DE IE ES FR IT NL AT UK EU15 
2013/1999 1.02 0.80 1.45 0.70 1.24 0.90 1.23 0.95 1.20 0.84 1.06 
2013/2004 0.99 0.87 1.19 0.80 1.28 0.97 1.21 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.06 
*The times exports increased faster than imports; exports grew faster than imports if the index > 1 
Source: Eurostat 
                                                 
69 These values reached 56% for exports and 49% for imports by 2013. (Source: Eurostat) 
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One more aspect of EU10 agrifood trade developments is worth mentioning if one wants to have a clear picture 
about where these countries started from and where they arrived to. By considering the 27 EU member states 
and arranging them in descending order by value of exports and imports, the following picture emerges. As for 
the exports, in 1999, only a few of the EU10 could rank higher than any of the EU15 countries; most of them 
ranked at the bottom of the list, doing only better than Cyprus and Malta. By 2013, at first sight significant shifts 
occurred, as several EU10 countries moved 4-5 or even 7 places upwards on the list. This was the case of 
Romania, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The others remained at the same place or moved at most 2 places up or 
down. But, if one takes a closer look, it becomes clear that countries of the EU10 mostly outpaced each other. 
True, most of them did already better than Luxemburg or Finland, and some of them did better than Greece or 
Portugal. But, regarding the places they occupied in the rankings in 1999 and 2013, it turns out that, if we 
eliminate Poland, the other 9 countries of the EU10 ranked from 14th to 26th places in 1999 and from 13th to 24th in 
2013. Something similar happened in the case of imports, but with somewhat smaller upwards moves and nine of 
the EU10 ranking from 16th to 26th places in 1999 moved to 14th to 25th in 2013. Poland was the only one who 
really made a qualitative change and left behind the other EU10 countries; ranking 8th place for both exports and 
imports, it outpaced such major agrifood traders as Denmark, Ireland or Austria. In 2013, Poland ranked 4th for its 
agrifood trade surplus (EUR 6.2 billion) behind the Netherlands (22.5), France (11.7) and Spain (8.9), here too 
outpacing such big traders as Denmark (5.4), Belgium (4.3) or Ireland (3.0). In this list Hungary ranks 8th with a 
surplus of EUR 2.78 billion, way ahead of Lithuania (0.95) and Bulgaria (0.83). 
Despite the differences in revealed trade performance, there is a consensus among experts that the EU10 
countries, in general, have profited from their accession to the European Union, as they have been able to 
increase their trade flows and took advantage of the expansion of the free trade area.70 And so did the old 
member states. By taking advantage of the strength of their economies and making full use of the mutual market 
liberalisation, the EU15 suppliers were able – despite the tariff barrier decrease asymmetry favouring the EU10 or 
even without any preferences – to increase their deliveries to the new member states considerably already prior 
to enlargement.71
The fact that Poland stands out so much by its trade performance of the group of the EU10, while Romania in 
spite of its second place within the EU10 for both agricultural output and GVA (see Table 2) is lagging behind – 
not only behind Poland but also behind Hungary, the Czech republic and Lithuania – draws the attention to an 
important issue. In the mentioned Commission paper, there is a key statement on NMS trade profile being similar 
to that of the EU15. According to the Commission, as a result of the ten-year membership, two-thirds of the NMS 
trade consists of final goods with higher value indicating that the food industry had already caught up with its 
EU15 counterparts.
 Among the winners of this process Germany should be mentioned first, but Austria as well – 
due to their very competitive food industry – and some other countries (like e.g. Italy and Spain, see Table 6). 
72 This statement may be true for the NMS (2004), but the situation becomes different for the 
EU10, with Romania and Bulgaria. In their case, the share of final goods in total agrifood trade was about 60 per 
cent for imports and only 30 per cent for exports in 2013.73
                                                 
70 See: Carraresi – Banterle (2013) p. 7 or Csáki – Jámbor (2013) p. 45. 
71 Juhász (2009) p. 7 and p. 114 
72 European Commission (2014) p. 9 
73 In 2013, 86.5% of EU10 agrifood imports had their origin in EU, and as most of them came from the EU15 or from Western 
multinationals implanted in EU10, the share of final goods was relatively high, and for this aspect without much difference all over the 
EU10. As for the exports, they are much less homogenous as for their destination, and their structure also vary a lot from country to 
country. (Source: Eurostat) 
 This explains why Romania’s trade performance is so 
much poorer than its output and why it is lagging far more behind Poland in exports than in production. It is the 
structure of the exports that matters, and in this regards, the two Balkan countries have a lot to do if they want to 
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catch up with their EU10 rivals (see Figure 5). Of course, the structure of exports is highly dependent on the 
structure of production, and thus we are back to where we started: pointing at the disastrous shift in agricultural 
production from a balanced structure towards a more extensive one, with more crop growing and less animal 
breeding (see Figure 1). In this field, although Romania is in the worst and Bulgaria in the second worst position, 
it is to remember that Hungary, Lithuania as well as the Czech Republic have recently seen their livestock 
decrease to a dangerously low level, too. 
 
Figure 5: Structure of the agrifood exports by category of product 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Reasons behind changes – with some focus on Hungary 
In this chapter, when assessing the whys of the above described production and trade patterns, a clear distinction 
will be made between the circumstances that affected all EU10 countries and those that resulted from the specific 
development of Hungary. Let us start with the former ones. As already mentioned, the application of a ten-year 
transitional period in the new member states – with gradual phasing-in of CAP direct payments, but provisions for 
an immediate and reciprocal market opening at the moment of enlargement – put an enormous competitive 
pressure on farmers and the whole agrifood business across the EU10. 
A second challenge for the new entrants was the adoption of an extraordinary CAP reform in 2003, just before the 
Eastern enlargement took place, and in the elaboration of which the new members had no say. In practice, in the 
EU there are two different support systems in force: one for the old member states (plus Slovenia and Malta, the 
only NMS able to implement the new support scheme) with more room to differentiate the support by farm or by 
region; and another one for the new member states where such a possibility is nonexistent. 
Finally, a third factor in connection with the difficult (if not unequal) competitive environments for EU10 farmers: in 
any case, when normative CAP rules would be “too” beneficial for some of the new member states (or too costly 
for the common budget) the old members (most of them being net contributors to the budget) act immediately and 
change the rule. Already, when preparing the 2003 CAP reform, the Commission feared that coupled direct 
payments would attract the conversion of more arable land into rye area and/or encourage a shift from potatoes 
to rye in the new member states (especially in Poland), thus proposed the abolition of rye intervention.74
                                                 
74 European Commission (2002) p. 7 and (2003) p. 60 
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soon after the enlargement when, thanks to successive good harvests, the European intervention stock of maize 
increased to 40 per cent of that of cereals (and of which 93 per cent were stored in Hungary), the Commission did 
not hesitate to propose an end to public intervention for maize75. Hungarian farmers were pointed at and blamed 
for having an interest in selling into intervention rather than trying to export76. No time was given them to adapt to 
their new environment. 
 
Table 7: Changes in agricultural output and GVA 
Euro per hectare 
 Output Gross value added 
 2005 2007 2010 2005 2007 2010 
Czech Republic 907 1 205 1 114 281 343 277 
Estonia 655 771 710 263 337 250 
Latvia 325 419 370 116 139 92 
Lithuania 582 784 745 216 290 237 
Poland 907 1 264 1 263 413 539 537 
Slovenia 2 199 2 306 2 298 989 879 848 
Slovakia 869 944 995 239 272 191 
EU15 2 242 2 432 2 399 1 035 1 080 996 
NMS (2004) 947 1 201 1 154 383 464 422 
EU7 847 1 132 1 105 348 442 409 
Hungary 1 413 1 504 1 284 519 538 422 
EU8 927 1 183 1 133 372 455 411 
Romania 826 984 1 142 445 454 495 
Bulgaria 1 231 1 087 854 566 402 303 
EU10 915 1 119 1 109 405 451 424 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Apart from the aforementioned unequal competitive market positions generated by the differing subsidisation 
level in the EU15 and the EU10 and explaining mostly differences in performance between these two country 
groups, there are other factors that explain differences among the EU10 themselves. Naturally, a lot depended on 
the initial conditions (like natural and capital endowments) that prevailed at the time of accession. In this respect, 
one has to remember that Slovenia by far had (and still has) the most developed agricultural sector among EU10 
countries which is reflected in data on per hectare value of output and gross value added (see Table 7). Although 
since 2009, the agribusiness of the country has been severely suffering from the unfavourable macroeconomic 
situation (see Figure 6), the Slovene agricultural performance is virtually standing alone within the EU10 being the 
only one to be compared with that of the EU15. 
An important element of initial conditions is related to the difference in farm structure. In most of the EU10 
countries, there was a dual farm structure at the time of accession; with a large number of small plots, too small 
to be viable and competitive on the Single market, and a relatively small number of very large entities, a sort of 
heritage of the collective farming system with some embedded inefficiencies. Only Poland and Slovenia were 
characterised by a European type farming system with small and lower middle family businesses, which proved to 
                                                 
75 European Commission (2006) 
76 European Parliament (2007) 
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be beneficial. It is not only that countries with farm structures similar to those in the EU founding countries can 
more easily take advantage of the CAP regime than the others; but there are opinions stating that in Europe the 
best framework for animal breeding is provided for by family farms of appropriate size.  In the latter, it is still 
possible to deal with the animals individually, while risks (like diseases) and tasks (e.g. manure treatment) arising 
from keeping too many animals in too small places are not significant yet.77
Also, the EU10 agriculture had been strongly influenced by the policy framework prevailing in the pre-accession 
period. Farmers in countries with initially high and uneven price and market support (e.g. Hungary and Romania) 
are considered to have lost with accession as it hardly brought any price increase for them. On the other hand, 
farmers in countries (like in Poland) where prices remained low before accession have gained. As for land 
policies, according to whether being restrictive (e.g. in Hungary) or liberal (like in the Baltics), they hampered or 
helped the agricultural sector to attract capital from inside or outside the sector.
 
78
Regarding the specialties of the Hungarian agriculture, one general remark has to be made. A basic feature of the 
transition process that made the difference with its main rivals was that in no other candidate country had there 
been so much struggle against a functioning sector of the economy in order to redistribute its capital goods, 
subsidies, political power and other positions of influence than in Hungary.
 
79 Privatization, restitution (of lands to 
former owners) and land laws (restricting land ownership to domestic physical persons) destroyed the confidence 
in the countryside, increased instability in land ownership, led to irresponsible land use and inhibited long-term 
investments.80
The competitiveness of the Hungarian livestock production has never been very high. Its natural endowments 
(lack of enough rainfall, hence lack of enough pastures and meadows) put the country at a competitive 
disadvantage against its neighbours or the Western European countries. In pre-transition times, the low 
profitability (or even the deficit) of the animal husbandry was hidden (and cross-financed) from the excellent profit 
of the auxiliary activities of the cooperatives.
 
81
The decline of animal husbandry has serious consequences for the entire agricultural sector. As the total number 
of livestock units in Hungary dropped to less than half of what it was in the mid-1980s
 Then, the shock of the transition and the EU accession ran, in two 
waves, down the sector to its competitive core. Since the EU accession alone, nearly four thousand commercial 
livestock farms have shut down in Hungary. In addition, there still exists the problem of low profitability, especially 
for pig and poultry breeding, the latter showing much better ability to react to market changes than the former. 
82, the lack of enough 
natural manure makes it more and more difficult to improve the quality of the soils, and thereby indirectly renders 
the fight against drought less efficient.83
                                                 
77 Pouliquen (1995) 
78 Csáki – Jámbor (2013) p. 47 
79 Varga (2004) p. 24 
80 Juhász (2012) 
81 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Hungarian statistical office (KSH) had not even reported data on the net profitability of the livestock sector. 
(Szabó – 2014) 
82 KSH – https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/agrar/html/tabl1_5_2_1.html 
83 So, the increased volatility in crop yields, reflected in increased volatility in crop production (see Figure 2), comes not only from weather 
condition (or climate change), but also from the lack of such common element as manure.   
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Figure 6: Cumulative real GDP growths since 2001 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Of course, the performance of the Hungarian agriculture cannot be separated from the broader context of the 
Hungarian economy. As after 2006 Hungary detached itself from the regional mainstream and has since then 
followed a much slower path of development than most of its partners in Central Europe (see Figure 6)84, the 
domestic market for agrifood products has also narrowed. In 2011, per capita food consumption was 90 per cent 
of what it was in the 1980s (see Table 8). The most dramatic decline took place in consumption of animal 
products, staple food (except for potatoes) and sugar, while major improvement occurred only for foodstuffs (e.g. 
fish or fruits and vegetables) for which much of the increase was supposed to come from imports (e.g. tropical 
products). 
 
Table 8: Annual per capita food consumption in Hungary 
kg 
 Meat Fish Milk Eggs Fats Flour,  rice 
Pota-
toes 
Sugar, 
honey 
Fruits, 
vege-
tables 
Other 
plant 
prod. 
Total 
1980s (A) 76.2 2.4 183.6 18.7 35.0 111.5 56.1 37.2 154.5 4.0 679.0 
2011 (B) 55.8 3.6 152.3 12.6 34.4 84.9 63.5 28.4 177.9 4.1 617.5 
A/B 137% 66% 121% 148% 102% 131% 88% 131% 87% 98% 110% 
B/A 73% 151% 83% 68% 98% 76% 113% 76% 115% 103% 91% 
1980s = decade average 
Source: KSH85 
 
Another factor, which in the course of time, proved to be a further limitation of possibilities for Hungarian 
agriculture, was the hasted privatisation of the food industry in the 1990s. It took place in two rounds – first the 
‘luxury articles’ (sugar, tobacco, beverages and confectionary), then the ‘heavy artillery’ (cereal, milk, meat) – at a 
                                                 
84 Something similar happened to Slovenia a couple years later. 
85 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_hosszu/elm14.html 
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time when the country was still at the forefront of the transition process in the region. As the old co-operatives 
were weakened, the farmers were not able to participate in the privatisation adequately, and more than half of the 
food industry, even entire segments of it, was sold to foreign investors. Later on, as institutions of market 
economy have been gradually developed in the neighbouring countries, the new foreign owners of the Hungarian 
food industry started to ‘rationalise’ (i.e. relocate) their production geographically in the neighbouring region.86
Finally, one has to mention the problem of the hidden (or black) economy. Its share in the agriculture and the food 
industry is estimated to be between 20 and 30 per cent. Relatively high tax burden, weak legal security and mass 
unemployment provide ideal environment for the hidden economy in Hungary. The complex and discriminatory 
tax system creates motivation primarily for the small businesses to engage in tax evasion. But in this way, 
indirectly, larger businesses are also involved. High level of tax evasion in agrifood economy is most harmful as it 
impedes integration, retards concentration, reduces transparency and discourages farmers to form producer 
organisations.
 
87
The CAP reform and the overall MFF deal were closely linked together throughout the negotiations. 
Consequently, when evaluating whether the EU10 countries are losers or winners of the new CAP, it is important 
to place the problem in the broader context of the MFF package. In this respect, it is interesting to discover that in 
terms of commitments, the new MFF makes real cuts only for those headings (agricultural and cohesion policies) 
where the EU10 have traditionally been more successful in obtaining community assistance. On the other hand, 
funds grow most under those headings (e.g. competitiveness) and sub-headings (e.g. research) where the EU10 
starting position to draw on funds has traditionally been less favourable compared to that of the EU15.
 
 
A new CAP regime for 2014-2020 
January 2014 marked the launch of the new seven-year Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2014-2020) of 
the EU. One of the most important changes compared to the previous (2007-2013) MFF is the re-designed 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the reform of which was formally adopted first by the European Parliament 
(EP) in November and then by the Council of Agriculture Ministers in December 2013. The new CAP relates to 
five important EP/Council regulations: direct payments, the single common market organisation, rural 
development and a horizontal regulation for financing, managing and monitoring the CAP. The fifth regulation 
defines the transitional rules for the year 2014 as, for technical reasons, the direct payments regulation will only 
apply as of 1 January 2015. 
88
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 This move gained momentum as the Hungarian economy slowed down after 2006. Between 2003 and 2010, the output of the food 
industry lost one fifth in volume. Even if a slight recovery has been taking place since then, no clear reversal of the trend can be observed 
yet. (Potori – 2014) 
87 There are sectors where the reason why there is no inter-branch organisation is that traders are not interested in transparency. (Potori – 
Ibid) 
88 European Commission (web-2)  
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Figure 7: Redistribution of direct payments 
 
 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development (2013) p. 30 
 
As direct payments (DPs) make up about 70 percent of CAP budget, at times of bargaining they are always at the 
centre of attention. Differences in per hectare support – which became more pronounced after the enlargements 
in 2004 and 2007 – were a subject of constant complaint by the new entrants, especially the three Baltic States 
and Romania and Bulgaria. Now the new CAP, while cutting back DPs in general, allocates relatively more 
support for those member states (MS) where per hectare payment is below 90 percent of the EU average. It also 
guarantees a minimum level of EUR 196 per hectare aid to be reached by 2019 (see Figure 7). These changes 
are to be financed by members with above EU average DPs per hectare. Thus, in the new CAP there is a modest 
redistribution of the DPs across (and also within) the MS, a phenomenon called external (and internal) 
convergence. 
When assessing the impacts of external convergence on the EU10 countries, we have to take into account the 
following: first, DPs will be put on a strict diet in the next MFF; second, the EU-27 will have to finance DPs for 
Croatia; and third, external convergence will have to be financed by members with above EU average DPs (i.e. 
also by Slovenia). If we compare average DPs of the period of 2015-2020 to those of 2013 (see bars in the 
middle in Figure 8) or the DPs of the end year of the old and the new MFF (see right-side bars in Figure 8), it is 
clear that in real terms for most of the EU10 DPs will decrease rather than increase. Only the Baltic States 
(especially Latvia and Estonia) can get access to substantially more support than in the previous period. 
Another aspect of the DP regime is related to the already mentioned fact that with the exception of Slovenia and 
Malta all other NMS apply the simplified Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), a flat rate payment per hectare at 
member state level. Originally, the SAPS was established for five years. However, following the reform of 2008 
(the so-called “Health Check”) its application was extended until 2013, and now the new CAP deal changed the 
end-date to 2020. In the meantime, in the old member states, the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) has been in use 
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since the 2003 reform. The calculation of the SPS varies from one country to another, and, depending on the 
model chosen, reflects past performances at individual and/or regional level. As such a differentiation is 
impossible with the SAPS, the differences in per hectare support between the old and the new members, which 
are to be decreased by the external convergence (see above), will remain considerable at farm gate level. The 
so-called internal convergence may, however, be considered as a first step in the right direction as it pushes the 
countries with historical references to move towards a fairer and more converging per hectare payment at 
national or regional level.89
 
Source: European Commission (web-2) 
 
 
A third important feature of the new common agricultural policy relates to the fact that it will be anything but 
common. Although there will be a common framework, because the new regulation makes the whole system 
largely flexible and renders several main elements optional, in practice 28 different agricultural policies will be 
implemented. The share of “coupled” payments for example, which are linked to a specific product, may reach as 
much as 15% of the national envelop and the Commission may approve an even higher rate where justified. In 
case of general market disturbances the Commission will for all sectors be authorised to take emergency 
measures. Further flexibilities and options involve the possibility to redistribute payments for the first hectares of 
the farms, and/or towards small farmers, and/or towards farms situated in less favoured areas and in areas with 
natural constraints. There is also a possibility to transfer quite important shares (i.e. up to 15-25%) of funds 
between the two pillars of the CAP. 
 
Figure 8: Evolution of direct payments in real terms (2011 prices) under the new MFF deal (2014-
2020) compared with the old one (MFF 2007-2013) 
As for some special issues where the EU10 could have easily been on the loser side (e.g. capping and greening), 
we must note that the Commission’s original proposals were considerably watered down in the final version of the 
reform. Instead of introducing a compulsory capping – which would have been progressive for farms with DPs 
more than EUR 150 thousand a year and confiscating above EUR 300 thousand – there will only be a 
                                                 
89 The member states have two options: either to achieve a regional/national rate by 2019 or to get individual rates closer to each other by 
the same date. In the latter case by gradually increasing those under 90% of the average (with the setting up of a minimum level at 60%) to 
the detriment of those above the average but with possible limitation of individual losses to 30%. (Source: European Commission – 2013a, 
p. 2) 
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compulsory “degressivity” and a voluntary “capping”. This, in practice, will take away at least 5% of the DP above 
EUR 150 thousand (greening not included and with the possibility for the salary costs to be deducted before 
calculation), which is good news for the biggest farms vis-à-vis the originally envisaged “confiscatory” capping.90 
As for the greening, two of its three basic practices (crop diversification and ecological focus area) will only be 
applied above a certain farm size, which is good news for the very small farms. Due to dual farm structures in 
some EU10 countries – an enduring heritage of the past – very big and very small farms are of quite importance. 
So, all changes affecting their incomes or costs pose important challenges at the political level.91
                                                 
90 This reduction does not need to apply to members states applying the redistributive payment under which at least 5% of their national 
envelope is held back for redistribution on the first hectares of all farms. (Source: European Commission – 2013b, p. 2) 
91 Interestingly, the Hungarian government decided to introduce the capping in the spirit of the Commission’s original proposals, i.e. by 
imposing a sort of “confiscatory” capping on farms cultivating more than 1200 hectares.(Source: Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture – 
http://www.kormany.hu/hu/foldmuvelesugyi-miniszterium/parlamenti-allamtitkarsag/hirek/a-kormany-minimalizalni-akarja-az-orosz-
embargo-karat 
 
 
Conclusions 
No sector of the economy can cut itself from its broader social and economic surroundings and developments. 
When trying to assess the causes behind the differences in agriculture development speed in the EU10 countries, 
one can enumerate several factors: natural and capital endowments, initial positions and structures, pre- and 
post-accession strategies and policies. But what really counts is the general social and economic framework that 
can help or hamper the development and modernisation of agriculture. When, on the bases of facts and statistics 
presented in this study, Poland and Estonia are considered to be the two most successful countries of the region, 
this statement seems to harmonise with the above theory. 
As for Hungary, a combination of inexperience and greed of the new elite resulted in a stagnating economy with 
low or limited growth prospects. The number of the farms halved since 2000. The sector is becoming more and 
more specialised and focusing on field crops (mainly wheat, maize, sunflower and colza), while switching away 
from livestock breeding or other similarly labour-intensive activities like the production of certain vegetables, 
which are gradually shrinking and/or stagnating at a very low level. One can only hope that generous CAP 
support will at least be sufficient to prevent the agricultural sector from being further distanced from its main 
rivals. 
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Automotive industry in the EU10 economies: 
Developments in the past decade  
Gábor Túry 
Introduction 
Following the recent global economic downturn, the position of companies in the automotive industry and their 
outlook was a major issue regarding the development of consumer markets. This is natural, since the industry 
employs 5% of all workers in the manufacturing industry of the world (more than 50 million people including 
suppliers) and thus has significant weight in the global economy. No other manufacturing activities have shown 
such tremendous development in past decades as automotive investments and no other investments seem to be 
as important for decision makers. 
The purpose of this study is to review the development of EU10 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania) countries in the past decade in the automotive industry. This 
study focuses mainly on passenger car production, but also considers other types of road vehicles like light- and 
heavy commercial vehicles, buses and production of parts and components of the OEMs92
Whereas only seven countries accounted for 80% of the world’s automotive output in 1975, by 2010 there were 
eleven countries demanding a share of the cake (OICA Production statistics, 2011).
. The study deals with 
the structural characteristics of the branch and highlights the differences between productions in EU10 countries 
by using trade data. Apart from the ten years horizon the study looks back until 1990 when trade integration and 
liberalization of the capital flows opened a new horizon to the former centrally planned economies in the 
automotive industry as well. Most of the EU10 countries have a heritage of automotive production (passenger 
cars, buses, heavy commercial vehicles). Since the beginning of the 1990s, more integrated into the world trade 
and with the appearance of transnational companies (TNCs), they have been exploiting their capacities 
differently.  The effects of EU integration as well as the effects of the recent economic crisis are also taken into 
account. A separate section analyses how the automotive industry/production fits into European and global 
production and global values chains. 
 
Changing global framework and the consequences of the crisis 
The world automotive industry underwent a sea change as global production took shape over the past four 
decades. Back in the 70's when Japanese automotive exports drove U.S. and European manufacturers to slash 
costs and relocate parts of their manufacturing processes, merely half a dozen countries accounted for the lion’s 
share of production (Sturgeon and Florida, 2000). Growth in global production brought a profound change in the 
world’s car manufacturing.  
93
                                                 
92 An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) manufactures products or components that are purchased by another company and retailed 
under that purchasing company's brand name. OEM refers to the company that originally manufactured the product. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Original_equipment_manufacturer 
93 The situation in the end of 2013 is the same as in 2010 
 Global production also 
required global players in related industries. An increasing number of new investments have been realized in 
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developing countries with growing purchasing power since expected economic growth and favourable labour 
costs proved to be attractive alternatives to increase the capacities in the traditional production countries. This 
trend had a far more limited impact on the output of the central areas (automotive centres) than previously 
forecasted (Sturgeon et al., 2007). Low labour costs alone were attractive only up until the mid-1990s, not 
forgetting that the unique, national nature of the automotive industry added weight to political arguments, 
prompting big assembly companies to provide local, domestic markets with cars manufactured locally (Rechnitzer 
and Smahó, 2012). 
Assembly continues to play a crucial role, since automotive companies are trying to avoid moving a substantial 
part of existing production to low labour cost countries. In the current crisis European carmakers have felt this 
expectation growing as governments offered helping hands to several carmakers deemed flagships of the 
respective national industries. Yet this applies even more to the relocation of existing plants (Tirpák and Kariozen, 
2006, p. 6.); new assembly plants are clearly focused on emerging markets (China, India) and on developing 
areas with lower manufacturing costs (Central and Eastern Europe, Turkey). Changing production figures in 
China provide a good example of transforming global production focusing on emerging markets. Chinese 
production increased from 2 million vehicles to 22 million vehicles between 2000 and 2013 (OICA production 
statistics, 2014a). The increase of production in China totally reshaped the production map (see Table 1): the 
proportion of the European Union and North America in global production significantly decreased. The decrease 
was due to stagnation in the European and North-American region against Asian production, which has been 
increasing sharply since the beginning of the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2013 China became the largest producer 
in Asia and globally as well. Its production has increased ten-fold.  
 
Table 1: Regional distribution of road motor vehicle production by main regions*  
percent of total 
Region 2000 2005 2010 2013 
EU15 30.0 25.2 17.9 14.8 
EU6 2.4 2.9 4.2 3.9 
non-EU 2.9 3.7 3.3 3.9 
North America 30.3 24.5 15.7 18.9 
South America 3.5 4.3 5.3 5.2 
Asia 30.5 38.5 52.5 52.3 
Other 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 
*EU15: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK;  
  EU6: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia;  
  non-EU: Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine;  
  North America: Canada, Mexico, USA;  
  South America: Argentina, Brazil;  
  Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Uzbekistan 
Source: author’s calculations based on OICA, 2014a 
 
According to the literature (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Sturgeon and Florida, 2000; Sturgeon and 
Biesebroeck, 2011; Veloso and Kumar, 2002) we can summarise past trends in world automotive production as 
follows:  
- The spread of vehicle production and sales from the developed world to the developing economies since 
the 1990’s. The markets of developed countries, mainly in the U.S., North America and Western Europe, 
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became saturated by the late 80’s and early 90’s, reducing their car replacement absorption capacity as 
determined by the lifespan of cars. As a result, the past two decades have seen substantial globalisation 
and consolidation processes taking place in the geographical allocation of production; 
- Rapid growth of production and sales came from a few developing countries. These are Brazil and 
Mexico in the Latin American region, China and India in Asia and the Central European Region;94
- Due to technological innovations (platform and modular production) in the 1990’s, automakers are 
planning operations on a global scale. This holds not only for OEMs but for supply chains now designed 
to be global; 
 
- Because of increasing mergers and acquisitions ownership structure has been changing in the last 20 
years. Thanks to geographical presence automotive companies have become global; 
- Despite global presence, regional production systems are dominant. Vehicle manufacturers in Western 
Europe and North America heavily concentrate productions and sales in their home region. On the 
production side, regional integration is a dominant trend. 
 
In 2013, the automotive industry95
Shrinking output has radically changed production based in the traditional triad (North America, Europe and 
Japan). The crisis only accelerated the geographical reallocation of production since the 1990s. The European 
and Japanese output has grown only modestly in the crisis period, while North American production declined. 
Central and Eastern European countries in total, increased their previous modest production rates. Lately, the 
industry outlook has been largely determined by the output of the Chinese automotive industry and its growing 
weight in world production.
 manufactured nearly 87,3 million vehicles (OICA production statistics, 2014b). 
The fact that global production of 73 million units in 2007 was reduced by 3.5% in 2008 and further 12.6% in 2009 
is a clear indication of the impact of the past crisis. The consolidation period of the markets began in 2010 when 
automotive production increased year-on-year by 25.6%.  
96
In terms of vehicle types manufactured, passenger cars outnumbered commercial vehicles (accounting for two-
thirds). Comparing the output of the two groups, we can see that they responded differently to the downturn: the 
 
When analysing the outputs of individual regions, we have to relinquish some of our reservations concerning 
quantity-based statistics i.e. compare the regions based on production volume. For the reason that when it comes 
to the applicability of data, automotive outputs vary immensely, which reflects not only the safety and 
environmental standards and regulations (CO2 taxation) characteristic of a country or a region, but also the 
typical features of the given market. For example in the U.S. there is a strong consumer demand for crossover 
utility vehicles, while in Europe small cars dominate the market (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers 2014; 
ACEA 2014b). 
China produced nearly the same number of units as Europe, and easily overtook North America and Japan in 
2009. Figures, however, do not always reflect actual supply and demand, as sizeable inventories were 
accumulated during the crisis and inventory sales increased significantly when demand was revived. 
                                                 
94 Humphrey and Memedovic (2003, p.2.) called it “Eastern Europe” but for geographical reasons we use the phrase Central Europe or 
Central and Eastern Europe 
95 Production of motorized road vehicles: passenger cars and commercial vehicles 
96 Based on the data of the OICA, in 2013 the Chinese production gives the one-quarter of the world's output. 
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share of commercial vehicles fell by close to 5 percentage points between 2007 and 2009. But this trend was 
again a continuation of an already existing trend. Lower demand leading to reduced output led the industry to get 
rid of (some of) its excess capacities, eliminating mass redundancies resulting from the industry’s wide-ranging 
production structure. The impacts of this elimination hit both production in the parent country and employment at 
the subsidiaries. 
Economic downturn and lack of increase in demand also strongly affected vehicle production in the EU697
 
 
* passenger cars + light commercial vehicles + heavy trucks + buses and coaches; excepting semi-knocked-down and 
completely knock-down assemblies 
Source: author’s calculations based on OICA, 2014a 
 
The automotive industry in the EU10 
 
countries. Figure 1 shows that despite impressive production development in the region, the output of individual 
countries varied. Since 2008, only the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania have been increasing figures. 
Despite the crisis, Romanian vehicle production has not decreased. Since 2009, the production in Hungary has 
been stagnating, while Poland and Slovenia have been experiencing decreasing output. Decrease is most 
pronounced in Poland, where 2013 is the fifth year when Polish car factories were downsizing production of 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (Polish Automotive Industry Association, 2014, p.23.). Regarding 
Slovenia, decreasing production at Novo Mesto-based Revoz (assembly of Renault cars) affected production 
figures.  
 
Figure 1: Road motor vehicle production* in the EU6 countries 
1000 pieces 
This study analyses the automotive industry that includes not only passenger car manufacturing but commercial 
vehicle manufacturing i.e. production of light commercial vehicles, heavy commercial vehicles and buses as well. 
Covering the whole spectrum of automotive industry in the EU10 countries is legitimated on the one hand by the 
increased mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of the commercial vehicle industry in the past years98
                                                 
97 Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania 
98 see Volkswagen-M.A.N. and Volkswagen-Scania acquisitions, Volvo Truck merger with Renault Truck, Fiat Industrial merger with 
Renault bus and tram division 
. It results an 
increased size of the global value chains including the EU10 production sites as well. On the other hand, in some 
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countries production of commercial vehicles and buses gives an increasing share in the automotive industry. In 
Poland the share of the commercial vehicles (including production of buses) rose from 13.0 % to 18.6 % between 
2004 and 2013 (OICA, 2014a). Decreasing share of the production of the commercial vehicles also shows the 
changing production structure and decreasing number of the actors in the region. Several traditional companies 
ceased  operations because of lack of demand or and changing global strategy of the foreign owner. There are 
several companies ceased their operations:  Ikarus and NABI99
Referring to OICA statistics (2014a) and the United Nations’ List of Industrial Products
 bus manufacturers in Hungary, Avia commercial 
vehicles manufacturer in the Czech Republic Jelcz and Autosan bus manufacturer in Poland, TAM commercial 
vehicles manufacturer in Slovenia. 
100
In 2013, nearly 3.5 million vehicles rolled off the production lines (see Figure 1) in the six new EU member 
countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania (OICA production statistics, 
2014b). This represents 17.3% and 3.9% of European
, passenger car 
manufacturing does not exist in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In Baltic countries, the automotive sector is 
concentrating more on specialist component manufacturing, rather than the assembly of vehicles (ACEA, 2012). 
In Estonia some sub-sector companies (Silwi, Baltcoach, Respo Haagised) assemble special vehicles or trailers 
(Terterov and Reuvid, 2009, p. 132) based on imports, whereas others produce various spare parts for vehicles 
and subcontract with large automotive companies (Volvo and Scania). The same applies to the automotive sector 
in Latvia, consisting of small and medium-sized enterprises (Amo Plant) mainly producing car components and 
trailers. In Lithuania, the situation is similar: the automotive industry focused on the manufacturing of automotive 
components. More than 400 companies are producing electrical and electronic, metal and plastic components to 
automotive industry to various OEMs (Invest Lithuania, 2014). Therefore if we compare automotive industry in the 
EU10 countries to Baltic countries, in the last ten years we can only talk about a supplier industry that has links to 
the global value chain. 
101 and world outputs respectively. The EU10 countries’ 
share in European output more than doubled (2,6 times higher) since 2000 and the rate is almost the double (1.7 
times higher) of world output. This development is even more dynamic if we also consider that the share of CEE 
countries102 in the manufacturing of passenger cars in the European Union has increased more than three-fold 
from 1996 to 2013 (ACEA, 2014b; OICA Production statistics, 2014a).103
We cannot speak of industrialisation in the case of transition economies, since these countries already had 
developed manufacturing industries before the change of regime (Inotai 1995). Currently we are witnessing new 
 Looking back, since the European 
accession production has been increasing from 1.4 million to 3.4 million vehicles per year. Contrary to 
international trends, the manufacturing of passenger cars became completely dominant in these countries. 
Compared with the global and European average of 75% and 91% respectively, 97% of vehicles manufactured in 
the region were passenger cars in 2013. The vast majority of passenger car models assembled in the EU10 
countries are so-called economy- or subcompact and compact cars, but premium category vehicles are also 
manufactured here (in the Bratislava, Mladá Boleslav and Győr plants of Volkswagen, Škoda and Audi Hungaria 
Motor respectively).  
                                                 
99 North American Bus Industries (NABI) was sold to New Flyer Industries in 2013 and Hungarian production places were closed by 2014. 
100 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/industry/commoditylist2.asp 
101 According to the OICA classification, Europe means EU27 plus Serbia, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Turkey. 
102 According to the ACEA classification, CEE means Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
103  Referring to OICA (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, www.oica.net) database, In the case of CEE production 
figures semi-assembled import contents have been decreasing since the beginning of the 2000s. Regarding automotive production, the 
paper takes into account the double counting method by using net figures. 
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manufacturing mechanisms and products replacing old technologies. The nature and pace of the transition varies 
from country to country. The automotive industry tradition is rooted in the period of regime changes in 1990. 
Production in the former socialist countries – with the exception of the long tradition of the Czech automotive 
industry – was based mainly on licence agreements (Fiat in Poland, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Renault in 
Romania) dating from the sixties (Pavlínek, 2008, p.3.). According to UN statistics (UN Industrial Statistics 
Yearbook, 1990), Central and Eastern European automotive production in 1990 was 699 thousand pieces, which 
represented 1.7 percent of the world and 3.6 percent of European production at that time.104
Ten car manufacturing companies from Japan to the U.S. and another half dozen automotive firms (in the bus 
and truck industry) currently have almost three dozen production sites throughout EU10 countries (see Table 2). 
 The biggest 
producers were Poland (309 thousand) the former Czechoslovakia (248 thousand) and Romania (110 thousand). 
Production in Bulgaria (24 thousand) and Hungary (9 thousand) was more modest. However, taking the structure 
of production into account, we should add some remarks. Eighty-eight percent of Hungary’s output came from the 
production of buses: at the time Hungary was the third biggest bus producer in Europe (excluding the Soviet 
Union). The former Czechoslovakia - besides having remarkable car production - produced enough trucks to 
ensure its leading position among socialist countries. Regarding comparability of historical data we should note 
that Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia while the Baltic States were part of the Soviet Union.  
The automotive industry in the EU10 region is rather heterogeneous, despite the more or less similar local 
resources (tax incentives, low production costs, well-established infrastructure) in the economies. This can be 
explained - among other things - by the different ways these countries opened up to foreign investors in 1990s, 
the industrial traditions of individual countries, the outputs of local subsidiaries of international companies.  
As a result of the bankruptcies, production may cease (Daewoo Motors’ affiliate in Poland) or if a new owner 
emerges (Daewoo Motors’ affiliate in Romania), production might continue.  
Mergers of international companies (Fiat with Chrysler, Fiat Industrial with Renault bus and tram division, Volvo 
Trucks with Renault Trucks, Volkswagen with Scania and Volkswagen with M.A.N.) can modify the international 
map of production. Bus production of the Italian company Iveco in the Czech Republic has been growing since 
the merger of the Fiat industrial bus division with Renault bus division, but production ceased in Hungary some 
years after the acquisition of the Ikarus Rt because of overcapacity. Acquisitions of the Scania and the M.A.N. by 
the Volkswagen could result in increasing cooperation between the affiliates in the EU10 region or optimization of 
the production between the production facilities. 
Cooperation agreements (Toyota Motors with the French PSA, General Motors with Fiat, General Motors with 
Suzuki) created new production plants or increased the previous production. In the Czech Republic the 
Japanese-French TPSA presented their cooperation producing a new mini city car. Cooperation with the 
Japanese Suzuki and the General Motors owned Opel results in the production of a mini car in Hungary and 
Poland with the same platform but different brand.  
To ensure their market presence and to boost their competitiveness (Dunning, 1993) the big European and 
overseas carmakers use the specific attributes of the region to relocate some of their activities, just like 
companies from the Far East do. Mainly Japanese (Suzuki Motor, Toyota Motor) and South-Korean (Daewoo 
Motors, KIA-Hyundai) or Chinese (Great Wall Motors) companies have set foot and established a stronghold for 
their expansion into Western Europe (Hyun, 2008, p. 226.). 
                                                 
104 Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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Almost every main carmaker and their suppliers, which account for 80% of world production, are present in the 
region. It will come as no surprise that given developments in the 2000s, the region has been labelled the “new 
Detroit” (Unicredit, 2007). 
 
Table 2: List of automotive companies in EU10 countries in 2013* 
parent company subsidiary location (country/city) 
founded/ 
purchased production workforce 
export 
share as 
total 
Volkswagen 
AG/AUDI AG 
Audi Hungaria Motor 
Kft. HU/Győr 1994/2020 
engines, parts, 
car assembly 10,000 99.8% 
Daimler AG 
Mercedes-Benz 
Manufacturing 
Hungary Kft. 
HU/Kecskemét 2008 car assembly 3,119 99.7% 
Suzuki Motor 
Corporation Magyar Suzuki Zrt. HU/Esztergom 1991 car assembly 2,930 91.5% 
General Motors 
Europe Ltd. 
Opel Szentgotthárd 
Autóipari Kft. HU/Szentgotthárd 1991 
engines, 
components, 
remanufactures 
transmissions 
680 95.0% 
Kühne Zrt. Kravtex Kereskedelmi Kft. HU/Győr 1992 buses 400  
General Motors 
Europe Ltd. 
General Motors 
Manufacturing Poland 
Sp. z o.o. 
PL/Gliwice 1998 car assembly 2,930 96.5% 
General Motors 
Powertrain Poland Sp. 
z o.o. 
PL/Tychy 1996 engines 550  
Toyota Motor 
Corporation 
Toyota Motor 
Industries Poland Sp. 
z o.o. 
PL/Jelcz-
Laskowice 2002 engines 798  
Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing Poland 
Sp. z o.o. 
PL/Wałbrzych 1999 engines, transmissions 2,040  
Volkswagen AG 
Volkswagen Poznan 
Sp. z o.o. PL/Poznań 1993 
components, car 
assembly 6,800 98.5% 
Volkswagen Motor 
Polska Sp. z o.o. PL/Polkowice  engines 1,215  
Sitech Sp. z o.o. PL/Polkowice  components 1,640  
Fiat Automobiles 
S.p.A. Fiat Auto Poland S.A. 
PL/Bielsko-Biała 1971/1992 engines, components   
PL/Tychy 1971/1992 car assembly 3,340 99.5% 
Ukrainian 
Automobile 
Corporation JSC 
Fabryka Samochodów 
Osobowych S.A. PL/Warsaw 1951 components   
Solaris Bus & 
Coach S.A. 
Solaris Bus & Coach 
S.A. PL/Bolechowo 1996 buses, trams 2,000 77.6% 
Scania AB Scania Production Slupsk S.A PL/Słupsk 1993 buses 747 100% 
Volkswagen 
AG/M.A.N. SE 
MAN Truck & Bus 
Polska Sp. z o.o. 
PL/Poznań  buses, components 976 98.5% 
PL/Starachowice 1948/1999 components of buses 1,420  
PL/Niepołomice-
Kraków  trucks 438 76.2% 
Volvo AB Volvo Polska PL/Wroclaw 1995 heavy trucks, buses 2,300 99.2% 
Jelcz Jelz Sp. z o.o. PL/Wroclaw 1952 trucks, components 430  
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Table 2 (continued) 
Fiat Group Kapena PL/Włynkówko 1968/2003 buses   
Solbus Fabryka Autobusów Solbus Sp. z o.o. 
PL/Solec 
Kujawski 2001 buses 150  
Volkswagen AG Škoda Auto a.s. 
CZ/Mladá 
Boleslav 1895/1991 
engines, 
gearboxes, 
components, car 
assembly 
20,419 
90.6% 
CZ/Vrchlabí 1946/1991 gearboxes 529 
CZ/Kvasiny 1934/1991 car assembly 3,374 
Toyota Motor 
Corporation -PSA 
Peugeot Citroën 
Toyota Peugeot 
Citroën Automobile 
Czech s.r.o. 
CZ/Kolín 2002 car assembly 3,200 99.6% 
KIA-Hyundai 
HMMC-Hyundai Motor 
Manufacturing Czech 
s.r.o. 
CZ/Nošovice 2006 gearboxes, car assembly 3,500 99.4% 
Tatra Tatra a.s. CZ/Koprivnice 1897 heavy trucks, military vehicles 3,000 59.5% 
Sor Libchavy spol. 
s. r. o. 
Sor Libchavy spol. s. 
r. o. CZ/Libchavy 1991 buses 628 44.0% 
Fiat Group Iveco Czech Republic, a.s. CZ/Vysoké Myto 1895/1994 buses 2,891 91.9% 
Volkswagen 
AG/M.A.N. SE PBS Turbo s.r.o. CZ/Velká Biteš 1956/2000 components 197  
KIA-Hyundai KIA Motors Slovakia s.r.o. SK/Zilina 2004 
engines, 
components, car 
assembly 
3,900 99.0% 
PSA Peugeot 
Citroën 
PSA Peugeot Citroën 
Slovakia SK/Trnava 2003 car assembly 3,500 99.5% 
Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Slovakia a.s. 
SK/Bratislava 1971/1991 car assembly 8,417 99.3% 
SK/Martin 2000 components 815  
SK/Kosice 2004 assembly, logistic 168  
Renault S.A. Revoz d. d. SI/Novo Mesto 1959/1991 car assembly 2,076 98.4% 
Renault S.A. Automobile Dacia S.A. RO/Mioveni 1966/1999 car assembly 8,000 93.0% 
Ford Ford Romania S.A. RO/Craiova 1976/2007 engines, car assembly 4,000 94.0% 
Great Wall Motors 
Co. Ltd Litex Motors AD BG/Lovech 2009 
car assembly 
(CKD) 150  
* all data for 2013 
Source: data were collected by the author based on ACEA (2014a) and corporate reports 
 
The role of the automotive industry in the EU10 economies has increased tremendously in the past 20 years or 
so. Its share (manufacturing of motor vehicles: NACE Rev. 1.1 DM34 and NACE Rev. 2 C29105) in the gross 
value added of the manufacturing industry grew almost four-fold from 3.5% in 1995 to 12.8% in 2012106
                                                 
105 Taking effect from January 19, 2007 and mandatory for EU Member States as of January 1, 2008, the statistical classification of 
activities in accordance with NACE Rev.2 is indicated as CM, older data is given indicating the old nomenclature. 
106 Eurostat database: National Accounts, 2014 
.  
 
 
 
 
Gábor Túry: Automotive industry in the EU10 economies: Developments in the past decade 
 
 
Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 91 
 
Table 3: Importance of the automotive industry: detailed data of the manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (NACE Rev. 2 C29) 
Country 
Employment 
(2013) 
GVA 
(2012/see notes) 
Employees (1000) Percent of manufacturing employment 
Percent of the 
manufacturing GVA 
EU28 2 956.3 8.9 9.1* 
EU27 2 951.8 9.0 9.1* 
Germany  1 097.5 14.2 15.8* 
Czech Republic 191.5 15.0 17.9 
Hungary 105.1 12.8 17.7 
Poland 230.7 7.8 8.1 
Slovenia 19.0 9.4 8.1 
Slovakia 89.4 16.6 20.1 
Estonia 3.9 3.5 4.0 
Latvia : : 2.1** 
Lithuania : : 1.4* 
Bulgaria 10.0 1.8 2.2 
Romania 160.9 9.6 14.7 
: not available; 
* 2011;  
** 2010 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat statistical database: Employment and unemployment (LFS) 2014 and 
National Accounts 2014 
 
The economic importance of the industry varies greatly from country to country because the automotive industry 
in the region is anything but homogeneous. The types of vehicles and the individual models are different, while 
the value added also varies. The industry is highly important in terms of employment (see Table 3) in the Czech 
Republic (4.0%) and in Slovakia (3.9%), while in Poland and Romania the share of employees (1.5% and 1.8% 
respectively) is only less than half of the Czech figure. Hungary ranks in the middle (2.7%). Considering the total 
share of the automotive industry, i.e., indirect contribution including production and service activities connecting to 
supplier industries, its share in employment could be 5-6 times the figures cited above (ACEA, 2014b, p.29.).  
Compared to employment, the industry has outstanding figures in terms of gross value added (see Table 3). The 
biggest differences between gross value added and employment rates are in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. 
Despite outstanding figures, based on gross value added per employee, it is clear that the region has generally 
more labour-intensive activities (Barta, 2012, p.57.; Sturgeon and Biesebroeck, 2011, p.188.; Vass, 2005, p.5.). 
The region has its biggest advantage with regard to production costs. Comparing labour cost levels between 
Western-Europe and the Central and Eastern European we see that the difference is fivefold, benefitting the CEE 
countries (PWC, 2013). Geographical proximity to the main markets is also a crucial factor investing into the 
EU10 countries (Schmitt, A. - Van Biesebroeck, J., 2013). 
The engine of economic growth in the EU10 region is the expansion of exports (from this point of view, Poland 
with its sizeable domestic market is an exception). Thanks to FDI, the corporate sector and the export focus of 
the countries increased in the CEE region (Djankov and Hoekman, 1996; Jensen, 2002). Earlier, in the first half of 
the 90’s, the most typical investments were labour intensive and generated lower added value; these were 
followed later by major investments in electronics and machine manufacturing representing higher technological 
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levels (Barta, 2012). The automotive industry has an outstanding position regarding foreign capital invested in the 
EU10 region: the industry has exceeded 40 billion USD FDI in the past two decades (Pavlínek et al., 2009). As a 
result, production value in the manufacturing of motor vehicles increased sharply; by fivefold between 1990 and 
2013 (UN Industrial Statistics Yearbook, 1990; OICA, 2014a). Making up for lost time, Slovakia attracted record 
FDI from the late 90’s, as a result of which the industry grew seventeen-fold, which was unprecedented in the 
region in the aforementioned period. 
Other studies have tried to measure the significance of the industry by quantifying its contribution to economic 
growth. Tirpák and Kariozen (2006) measured the GDP contribution of the passenger car industry107
Product classification SITC Rev.3 provided by the World Trade Origanization is used in this study.
 . In 2005 the 
highest level is in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where it lately has explained about one fifth (19% and 23% 
respectively) of total GDP growth. In Hungary the industry contributed only 4.3 percentage points and in Poland 
only 2.2 percentage points compared to the actual GDP growth. 
In addition to local market-seeking motives (Volkswagen, 1991, p. 11.), automotive investments in EU10 
countries built their capacities largely on exports. For example, 98-99% of the Czech automotive output was 
exported in 2013 (AIA, 2014). The export rates in 2013 for the different companies vary from year to year; while 
the biggest exporter is Škoda Auto, which exports 90.6% of its production, the Japanese-French Toyota Peugeot 
Citroën Automobile (TPCA) group exports 99% of its production. The rates are very similar in Hungary, Slovenia 
and Slovakia as well (see Table 2). What is more, in spite of its rather large domestic market, Poland has also 
similarly high export rates.  
Foreign trade linkages are influenced by the intra-firm positions of the affiliates in global production chains of the 
foreign firms. Regarding export directions, the most “EU dependent” countries were Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic in 2013, with 82.6% and 80.8% of all exports respectively. On the other side the least “EU dependent” 
countries are Lithuania and Bulgaria with 40.1% and 44.6% respectively. Germany is the biggest partner for all 
countries except for the Baltic economies, where the eastern dimension (neighbor countries and Russian 
Federation) dominates. Trade relations are also influenced by geographical location. For Estonia, the largest EU 
trade partners are Sweden and Finland. In the case of Latvia and Lithuania, mutual trade is most important in the 
EU. Southern linkages are evident in the case of Slovenia, where the fourth biggest partner is Italy. 
The product structure of foreign trade changed dramatically in the transition countries as early as in the first half 
of the 90’s (Havlik, 1996). Given the product specialisation in the sector, certain activities in the manufacturing 
industry (manufacturing of iron and steel products, textile and chemical industry, manufacturing of machinery and 
vehicles) had a greater weight in exports compared to the previous period. The product structure of foreign trade 
is also influenced by the fact that in addition to electronic parts (manufacturing of electric machinery and 
equipment – DL) the manufacturing of vehicles (manufacturing of motor vehicles – NACE Rev.1.1: DM43; NACE 
Rev.2.: C29) has also high export intensity (Havas, 2010, p. 3.). 
108 Statistics 
show that the automotive industry109
                                                 
107 Tirpák and Kariozen (2006) used the phrase “car industry” to describe the passenger car production. 
108 http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramTechNotes.aspx?Language=E 
109 Automotive products: motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (other than public transport 
type vehicles) including station wagons and racing cars, motor vehicles for the transport of goods and special purpose motor vehicles, road 
motor vehicles, n.e.s., parts and accessories of motor vehicles and tractors, internal combustion piston engines for vehicles listed above, 
electrical equipment, n.e.s., for internal combustion engines and vehicles, and parts thereof (SITC groups 781, 782, 783, 784, and 
subgroups 713.2, 778.3). 
 achieved excellent performance in exporting motor vehicles and their 
components: in 2013 it accounted for 16% of total exports from EU10 countries. This share is around three 
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percentage points higher than in 2000. The weight of the industry in exports varies considerably from country to 
country. It has the highest share in Slovakia, where it accounted for more than one quarter of total exports (see 
Table 4). At the other end of the scale we find Bulgaria, where vehicle manufacturing played a continuously 
increasing role in external trade despite the share of the industry in exports being a mere 1.7% in 2013. 
 
Table 4: Share of automotive products in the exports of selected countries  
percent 
Year BG CZ EST HU LT LV PL RO SI SK 
2000 0.4 16.4 1.8 17.2 2.6 0.5 13.0 1.9 12.3 20.3 
2001 0.4 16.8 2.5 17.4 5.1 0.7 12.3 2.1 11.8 18.0 
2002 0.5 17.0 3.2 17.1 6.9 0.9 12.9 2.5 12.9 19.6 
2003 0.4 16.5 3.2 13.7 5.4 0.8 13.7 2.6 12.1 27.5 
2004 0.4 15.6 4.1 13.4 4.8 1.2 16.6 3.2 13.5 23.0 
2005 0.6 17.4 5.0 16.5 5.2 2.4 16.7 4.9 16.3 18.1 
2006 0.4 17.9 5.1 17.7 7.3 4.5 17.0 6.6 15.2 19.8 
2007 0.6 17.7 6.7 18.0 8.2 5.1 16.9 8.7 18.8 23.3 
2008 0.7 16.7 6.1 16.7 6.4 5.3 17.5 8.5 18.1 21.8 
2009 1.0 18.7 4.4 14.6 5.4 5.0 17.9 12.2 18.4 20.2 
2010 1.5 18.5 3.8 14.4 5.9 4.4 15.7 12.5 16.7 21.0 
2011 1.7 18.5 3.3 14.8 6.5 4.8 15.5 12.1 15.6 22.3 
2012 1.4 18.6 3.2 15.7 5.4 3.8 13.5 13.1 14.6 24.7 
2013 1.7 19.2 3.3 17.3 5.2 2.9 13.1 15.2 14.5 26.1 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext 2014 
 
Regarding export destinations of the automotive products, Germany has key role. Germany is the biggest trade 
partner for seven of the EU10 countries (see Table 5). The country is not only the biggest market for the 
automotive companies located in the EU10 countries but German companies (Volkswagen-Audi-M.A.N. and 
Daimler) have leading role regarding the production. The other trade characteristic is that most of the trade 
partners are EU15 countries.  
The Baltic States have strong economic linkages to the former Soviet republics (Benkovskis et al., 2014). 
Therefore the main export directions of Baltic countries are neighbour countries and CIS110
                                                 
110 Commonwealth of Independent States 
 countries. The 
strength of the eastern relationship is increasing from north to south (see Table 5). The same characteristic 
applies to Bulgaria where after Germany, neighbour countries i.e. Turkey and Romania are the most important 
trade partners.  
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Table 5: Directions of the automotive  
the largest partner above 5% regarding the automotive exports 
Rank BG CZ EST HU LT LV PL RO SI SK 
1 DE DE DE DE DE LV EE RUS DE DE 
2 UK SK UK FR UK LT LT BLR TK FR 
3 FR ES IT AT FR RUS DE KAZ RO RUS 
4 SK   FR IT RUS SE RUS LV RUS TK 
5 RUS   CZ PL CN FI SE KG    IT 
6         CZ   BE     UK 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext 2014 
 
While the direct and short-term impacts of the operations of foreign companies at corporate and regional levels 
can be measured (employment, growth in output, encouraging further investment, profits reinvested, growing 
exports), indirect and long-term impacts do not transform into figures very easily. We can specify expectations 
which, given the primary impacts, represent vertical and horizontal spillovers of corporate- and industry-level 
modernisation  (preserving jobs, expanding employment, increasing real incomes as well as in-house technology 
and knowledge transfer (Mišun and Tomšík, 2002, p. 57.)) –. The differences in competitiveness between foreign 
and domestic enterprises, however, highlight a key problem. They have led to the creation of parallel 
development tracks, dual economies, (Pavlínek, 2004) and at the same time so-called “cathedrals in the desert” 
in emerging economies (Morris, 1992; Grabher, 1994, 1997). The quality control (quality, deadlines, cost factors, 
the ‘just in time’ system) export-oriented companies are isolated, and establish an insignificant number of 
relations with domestic companies (Pavlínek, 1998; Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; Swain, 1998); these relations are 
also tied to the TIER 2 and TIER 3 level of the supply system.  
 
The output structure of the automotive industry  
Regarding foreign automotive companies in EU10 countries, the main part of the output (between 90-100 
percent) is exported. Therefore this study analyses the output figures of the EU10 automotive industry using 
export data. Figure 2 shows the proportion of the main groups among automotive products. There are some 
groups that have a significant share in automotive export. If we consider the mentioned strong export-orientation 
of production, we can state that the SITC groups’ cars (781) and freight transport vehicles (782), parts and 
accessories of motor vehicles (784), electrical lighting or signalling equipment (778.34) and internal combustion 
engines (713.22 and diesel 713.23) make up the main part of automotive output. Manufacturing of buses (783.11) 
is notable only in Poland (Solaris, M.A.N. and Scania); nonetheless, it has only a 4.1 percent share in automotive 
export. However, the importance of Polish bus production in European bus manufacturing has been increasing 
since the 2000s. Poland has appeared as the third largest bus manufacturer after Sweden and Germany, and the 
second largest bus exporter after Germany in Europe at end of the 2010s (Gwosdz et al., 2011). Since 2013, the 
European production of complete buses of the Volvo bus division has been concentrated at the main plant in 
Wroclaw in Poland. (Volvo, 2014, p. 42.).  
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Figure 2: Structure of automotive export in the selected countries 
in 2013, in percent of total automotive products 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext 2014 
 
To analyse the output of the automotive industry, this study distinguishes between two main products: completely 
assembled vehicles and components/parts. Based on the figures from 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013, there are 
certain characteristics of output by different countries. There are countries where production of vehicles (personal 
vehicles, commercial vehicles, buses) provides the main part of automotive production, while in other countries 
components (internal combustion engines and gearboxes) and parts dominate output (see Figure 3). There are 
remarkable shares of vehicle production in Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia and Bulgaria in 2013.  
 
Figure 3: Classification and importance of the automotive industry 
Country 
Share in export Product type 
Weak Strong Vehicles Main parts and accessories 
Czech Republic  ● ●  
Hungary  ●  ● 
Poland  ●  ● 
Slovenia  ● ●  
Slovakia  ● ●  
Bulgaria  ●  ●  
Romania  ●  ● 
Estonia  ●   ● 
Latvia  ●   ● 
Lithuania ●   ● 
Source: author 
 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
CZ HU PL SI SK EST LT LV BG RO
713.21 713.22 713.23
778.31 778.33 778.34
778.35 781 782
783 783.08 783.11
783.19 783.2 784
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In other countries like Hungary, Poland and Romania, component manufacturing provides the biggest share in 
the output of the automotive industry. Based on firm level data of the national investment promoting agencies 
(Estonian Investment and Trade Agency, Invest Lithuania), there is remarkable component manufacturing 
industry in the Baltic countries as well. Regarding long-term data, there are increasing component and parts 
manufacturing shares in Poland and Slovakia, and increasing vehicle manufacturing in Bulgaria and Romania 
between 2000 and 2013. Poland has become a parts manufacturer when compared to its position in 2000, when 
the production of vehicles dominated output. As previously mentioned in t Baltic countries, the automotive sector 
is concentrating more on specialist component manufacturing. The Lithuanian automotive sector is largely 
oriented towards specialist component production rather than the assembly of vehicles, with a particular focus on 
wiring devices. 
 
EU10 automotive production as part of the global value chain 
Through the increasing export of automotive companies, the foreign trade relations of EU10 economies have also 
strengthened (see Table 4). However, investigating the trade types of these economies adds a new dimension to 
the question. Namely, a notable part of the output of the automotive firms (OEMs) in the region is exported as end 
products or as part of global value chains. As mentioned, these products - namely engines, transmissions and 
other main components - are massively exported in Hungary, Poland111
                                                 
111 Regarding intra-firm trade see: Audi Motor Hungaria Kft. and Opel Szentgotthárd Autóipari Kft in Hungary; Toyota Motor Industries 
Poland Sp. z o.o., Toyota Motor Manufacturing Poland Sp. z o.o., Volkswagen Motor Polska Sp. z o.o., Sitech Sp. z o.o., Fiat Auto Poland 
S.A. and General Motors Powertrain Poland Sp. z o.o. in Poland. 
 and Romania. For companies operating 
in countries on the export side, the latter figure can be as high as 82% (Marin et al., 2002).  
Manufacture of motor vehicles is considered a high value-added sector. Simkova (2013) highlighted the 
outstanding performance of the automotive industry among manufacturing activities. Analysis by M. Saito and his 
co-authors (2013) confirmed that the higher value added in exports inter alia in the EU10 economies is correlated 
with the presence of global value chains. This is evident in trade figures as well: between 1995 and 2008 the 
EU10 region increased its share in global value chains from 4.4% to 9.3% (Grodzicki, 2014, p 8.). At this point a 
question arises: what about the input side of the output? Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013), Amador et al., 
(2013) among others show based on the World Input-Output Database that importing to export, i.e., the share of 
foreign value added in exports are extremely high in the CEE countries. For 2011, these are above 40% in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (Éltető, 2014). These figures confirm that multinationals mainly use their 
own technology and know-how and do not rely on local technologies (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013). The 
automotive industry of the Central and Eastern European region is linked into the global value chains (corporate 
network) as a supplier and an assembler of the end product.  
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Figure 4: Trade relations in the global value chain of Toyota Motor Industries Poland, 
Volkswagen Motor Polska and the Opel Szentgotthárd Autóipari Kft. 
 
 
Source: Toyota Motor Industries Poland 2014; Volkswagen Motor Polska 2012, p. 6.; Mesics, 2008, p. 8. 
 
In addition to the assembly of vehicles, other activities with high added value in the industry also play a key role, 
like assembly/production of internal combustion engines and gearboxes. Hungary and Poland excel in 
manufacturing engines, while thanks to its large number of automotive suppliers, the Czech Republic is 
outstanding in the manufacturing and export of vehicle components like brakes, safety systems and lighting 
equipment (Halesiak et al., 2007). Despite its small size, Slovenian automotive suppliers and engineering firms 
have strong supplier linkages to the European automotive industry (Erenda et al., 2014). Slovenia’s automotive 
industry accounts for 21 percent of the entire exports of the country and notably, 80 percent of what is produced 
by the industry is exported in 2011112
Figure 4 shows the linkages of engine and other component manufacturers previously mentioned. In Poland, the 
Toyota Motor Industries Poland Sp. z o.o.
. 
113
                                                 
112 The Slovenia Times (2011): Made in Slovenia: Automotive Industry, 14 Nov 2011, http://www.sloveniatimes.com/made-in-slovenia-
automotive-industry/2 
113 Spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością Polish name for the Limited liability company 
 delivers internal combustion engines to the other Toyota factories 
located in the U.K. and Turkey cooperates with subsidiaries in France and South Africa. The other Polish 
subsidiary, Volkswagen Motor Polska Sp. z o.o., also has European relations with German, Czech and Spanish 
locations as well as with U.S., Mexican, South African and Indian Volkswagen subsidiaries. Hungarian affiliate 
Opel Szentgotthárd Autóipari Kft., which produces transmissions and engines, has linkages with European 
production sites regarding engine delivery. For transmission delivery, the main partners are the GM factory in 
Sliedrecht (Netherlands) and the Chinese GM joint-ventures. The revenue (engines and vehicles) of the Audi 
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Hungaria is predominantly derived from subsidiaries of the Volkswagen Group (Audi Hungaria Motor, 2014, 
p.12.). Regarding its motor production division, in 2013 Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. has direct linkages (trade 
relations) to all European affiliates of Volkswagen from Poland to Spain. It also has trade relations with Chinese 
Volkswagen joint-ventures and Indian affiliates of the company. In 2013, the biggest partner after Audi AG and 
Volkswagen AG was the Chinese joint-venture FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Company Ltd. 
According to the analysis of trade relations between Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. and Volkswagen de México S.A., 
Túry (2014) identifies some factors that influence the trade intensity between Hungarian and the Mexican 
affiliates.114
In case of intra-firm trade, production facilities in the EU10 countries have direct linkages mostly in the value 
chain.
 After examining intra-firm relations of Audi Hungaria Motor Kft., Túry (2014) distinguishes two types 
of cooperation: joint technological development and intra-firm trade. The company has indirect technological and 
direct trade linkages with Mexican subsidiary Volkswagen de México S.A. Regarding collaboration in technology 
development, all development is coordinated by the Volkswagen Group, while trade relations exist between 
affiliates as well.  
115
 
Source: author, based on the idea of Schmid and Grosche 2008, p. 19. 
 
 
 Trade relations mean delivery of components, delivery of engines and transmissions and delivery of 
finished products. Based on Porter’s idea (1985), Schmid and Grosche (2008) distinguished four stages of the 
automotive industry: procurement, R&D, production and sales. Based on this, Figure 5 shows the linkages of 
EU10 subsidiaries to the global value chain.  
 
Figure 5: Linkages in the value chain  
                                                 
114 There are internal factors like global vehicle model change, capacity problem (bottleneck) of the Mexican affiliate, economies of scale 
by production of certain engines and outcomes of intra-firm competition among the affiliates that have an influence. Last but not least, 
external factors like the trade liberalisation agreement between the EU and Mexico increased trade volume. Most of the factors are internal 
firm issues that influence volume and trend of trade relations in the global value chain. 
115 Regarding the share of export in the sales of EU10 affiliates, they have mostly foreign relations 
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Outlook 
EU10 countries’ international proportions were strongly affected by the wide exposure of the region’s economy to 
external markets. These are not only EU markets but via the global value chains (production and sales network), 
third countries as well. EU markets account for some 60 to 83% of total automotive exports in EU10 countries, 
and the dependence on imports is also significant. To make the picture even more complex, recent growth trends 
seem to suggest that new EU member states are not synchronised with one another, and what is even more 
surprising in light of the high level of intertwining, they are out of sync with the average growth trends of older 
Member States too.  
When the international financial and economic crisis spilled over into Europe, EU10 countries found themselves 
in a highly vulnerable situation. The previous economic figures were based on the growing (export) performance 
of one or two key industries, which causes small problems during a short period of economic downturn but 
wreaks structural havoc at national level in a massive recession like this. While in the U.S. markets, crossovers 
vehicles116
The outlook for automotive production in EU10 countries is not just dependent on demand in the main (external) 
markets, but on current global players’ structural changes. Slumping sales figures in traditional markets 
encourage carmakers to relocate production to emerging markets. Over the past couple of years the industry has 
undergone substantial changes, not only in terms of geographical (regional) allocation of production but also in 
terms of major technological development in certain countries. Ramping up their production, China and India now 
have technologically more advanced models to make them increasingly worthy competitors of carmakers in 
developed countries. In recent years Chinese and Indian companies had several successful businesses acquire 
majority stakes in European manufacturers
 have the biggest share of the cake (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, 2014) in sales, the demand 
for small cars is highest in Europe (ACEA, 2014b), and fuel-efficient cars with lower consumption were much 
sought after. In this segment, the European market is strongly influenced by massive quantities of cars produced 
in EU10 countries. 
117, providing access to a significant portion of current technologies 
and developments. This latter presents a strategic issue because - for example - it thwarted the sale of Saab 
Automobile to a Chinese consortium. (The purchase was blocked by former owner General Motors, which 
opposed the transfer of technology and production rights to a Chinese company.118
The outlook for EU10 plants closely integrated into the global car manufacturing system is determined both 
directly and indirectly by international automotive processes. Changes have brought about a consolidation of 
automotive players but are also key to their future competitiveness. In addition to acquisitions and fusions since 
the 1970s (Heneric et al., 2005), further consolidation can be expected, which will primarily take place in the form 
of technological collaborations between individual companies and within companies as well. EU10 subsidiaries 
are parts of the international partnerships of their parent companies: in Hungary, GM-Suzuki agreed to 
manufacture models on a joint platform; the Fiat-GM (Powertrain) cooperation in Hungary and Poland to 
manufacture engines; and the Fiat-Ford partnership to assemble Ford cars in Fiat’s Poland facility. There are also 
examples of collaboration initiated by plants in the region, such as the Japanese Toyota Motor Corporation 
) 
                                                 
116 A crossover (CUV) is a vehicle built on a car platform and combining, in highly variable degrees, features of a sport utility vehicle (SUV) 
with features from a passenger vehicle, especially those of a station wagon or hatchback. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossover_(automobile) 
117 In 2005 the Chinese Nanjing Automobile Corporation acquired some assets of MG Rover Group and Powertrain Ltd, the British Land 
Rover was acquired by an Indian company Tata Motors in 2008, while Swedish Volvo cars (Volvo Personvagnar AB) have been under the 
ownership of the Chinese Zhejiang Geely Holding Group since 2010. 
118 http://newsroom.saab.com/news/news/saabautomobilefilesforbankruptcy.5.33e35a55134420c33657ffe39.html 
Gábor Túry: Automotive industry in the EU10 economies: Developments in the past decade  
 
 
100 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
collaborating with the French PSA Peugeot Citroën for city cars manufactured in a Czech plant. Or sometimes it 
is regional cooperation that brings about international cooperation (Audi models assembled in India in the local 
Škoda facility119). Due to geographically concentrated but highly diverse activities in the region, there is an 
excellent basis for in-house cooperation in the industry. Some of the German Volkswagen engines manufactured 
by Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. are built in the company’s Czech and Slovakian plants, while the Czech (Hyundai) 
and the Slovakian (Kia) plants of the Korean Hyundai Kia Automotive Group have set up a joint supplier 
system.120
The future points to further standardisation of products and production of vehicles. Introduction of the MQB
 
121
The joint funding of necessary R&D projects is crucial not only in terms of financial background but also when it 
comes to sharing risks. This does not only mean mutual utilisation of identical components of certain models, but 
also far-sighted developments such as replacing the current combustion engine drive train. Thinking about the 
future, companies agreed to cooperate in the hope of gaining competitive edges and future market niches 
(Toyota
 
platform system by Volkswagen beginning in 2012 – which was based on a formerly installed platform and 
modular system – led to more uniform production. However, there is a higher flexibility in production through 
standardisation, meaning utilisation of the concept within plants and across brands and locations (Volkswagen, 
2012). There is no question that those manufacturers that organise their production and sale globally, will be 
more competitive. Therefore, individual production plants – including subsidiaries in the EU10 countries – of the 
companies could be more involved in the global value chain of the company.  
122-Daimler123-Tesla Motors, PSA Peugeot Citroën-Mitsubishi124
Also, sectoral development programmes of the EU member states (the so-called scrappage schemes) could give 
fresh impetus to the European automotive industry in the short run, but they are certainly not an alternative in the 
), which is paving the way for alternative 
drive technologies to replace traditional fuel-powered technologies. In addition to the industry itself, the crisis has 
redrawn market demand as well.  
 
Summary 
In the last decade and a half we have seen tremendous development in automotive capacities in EU10 countries. 
Total production has been increasing 2.5 fold to 3.5 million vehicles from 2000 to 2013. There are countries 
where automotive products became dominant export products and there are countries where the industry has 
only a small proportion of exports. The structure of production is also different between countries. In some 
countries the vehicle assembly is the main activity, while in other countries, the parts and components provide the 
bulk of output. Common to these countries that almost 100 percent of output goes to exports. Regarding 
international trade, intra-firm trade i.e. trade within the global value chain is the main organising principle. Intra-
firm linkages mean trade with finished vehicles and also with parts and components not only with European, 
Asian and transatlantic affiliates, but with global markets as well. Therefore, the outlook of the automotive industry 
in the EU10 region indirectly depends on the development of global markets. 
                                                 
119 Audi AG 2010: Annual Report 2009 p. 133. 
120 http://worldwide.hyundai.com/company-overview/news-
view.aspx?ListNum=4&idx=45&page=1&strSearchColumn=&strSearchWord=slovakia 
121 Modularer Querbaukasten i.e. Modular Transversal Toolkit 
122 http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/tesla-motorsand-toyota-motor-159048.aspx?ncid=11092 
123 http://techcrunch.com/2009/05/19/tesla-worth-a-half-billion-dollars-after-daimler-investment/ 
124 http://www.psa-peugeot-citroen.com/en/psa_espace/press_releases_details_d1.php?id=1122 
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medium term. EU funds designed to promote community transit could help some sectors of the industry stay 
afloat.  
In addition to presenting competitiveness and market growth challenges, opportunities faced in the European and 
U.S. automotive companies may be able to rearrange the map of production. The strengthening market and 
production positions of China, India and Russia have a double-edged impact on the EU10 region. The outlooks 
depend partly on the position of the region, the strategies of European and U.S. companies in the short term and 
the development of Chinese and Indian companies and foreign companies in Russia in the medium term. Future 
trends will be influenced by the acquisitions, fusions, sales and collaborations within the industry, which have 
already benefited the region in the form of several joint developments.  
New production methods and technological inventories also influence the global production map. In the EU10 
region as in others, the implementation of modular production means more opportunities for subsidiaries to 
engage in increasingly diverse ways in the global value chain. 
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Labour market of the new Central and Eastern European 
member states of the EU in the first decade of 
membership125
Annamária Artner 
Introduction 
 
The Central and Eastern European countries that accessed the EU until 2007 (EU10126) have integrated into the 
global economy successfully in the past decades. They have liberalized their trade, privatized and deregulated 
their economies, made efforts to adapt to the EU’s legal and institutional systems and have been able to attract 
the investments of global companies. Since the middle of the 1990s but especially after 2000, when the 
transformation crisis127
Generally, economic growth involves the increase of employment and wages. This has happened in Central and 
Eastern Europe too during the first years of the EU-membership, giving rise to the standard of living on average 
and decreasing poverty and inequality in the region. The crisis of 2008, however, and its long-lasting 
consequences have broken these trends by slowing down the processes of improvements or even resulting in 
deterioration. 
 was already more or less over in the region, the gross domestic product per inhabitant of 
the CEE-countries in purchasing power standard (PPS) has been approaching to the average of the older 15 
member states (EU15). In the meantime the ratio of total inward foreign direct investment stock of the ten 
countries to the inward FDI-stock of the EU15 has grown faster than the weight of their GDP relative to the GDP 
of the EU15. 
The economic growth of these new member states has been more dynamic in the past decades than that of the 
older 15 members. Between 1995 and 2008 the aggregate GDP of the EU10 at market prices has grown from 3.9 
to 8.4 per cent of the aggregate GDP of the EU15. After that period this catching up process has come to a halt 
and in 2013 the relative ratio of the GDP of the ten new members together to the aggregate GDP of the older 
ones was equal with the 2008 level. Even though between 2004 and 2013 the real GDP per capita enhanced 
more in the EU10 than in the EU15 and in eight out of the ten CEE countries the per capita GDP grew faster even 
than in Germany or Austria. Between 2004 and 2008 all EU10 but Hungary increased their real per capita 
production more rapidly than any other EU-country. Concerning the speed of catching up the least successful 
country within the EU10 group was Hungary. In 1995 within the group of the EU10 the Hungarian GDP per capita 
was the third highest in percentage of the average of the EU15. In 2013 it was only higher than the corresponding 
Bulgarian and Romanian data. 
In the last decade the real labour productivity per hour worked and GDP per employee also grew at a higher pace 
in the EU10 than in the EU15. 
All these facts represent that the new Central and Eastern European member states of the EU have played an 
important role in the extension of the production of the European capital after 2004. 
                                                 
125 This work was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA Grant No 104210K). 
126 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
127 Kornai (1994). 
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This is a natural pattern of catching up: the high economic growth reflects competitiveness but the concomitant 
growth of wages evaporates this competitiveness. This process passes off frequently by and under the coverage 
of a credit boom as it happened for example in the 1970s in the developing countries and in the 2000s on the 
periphery and semi-periphery of Europe (Southern and Eastern members). After such kind of a “pseudo” growth 
the correction according to the rules of the market economy is always painful for the wage-earners, unemployed 
and pensioners. 
At the end of the process which begins with a catching up phase, with the concomitant increase of employment 
and wages, the reduction of the unit labour cost via pressing down wages and social benefits on average relative 
to the GDP, becomes inevitable. The decrease of wages does not mean the reduction of all wages nominally. It 
usually happens by appearance or with the expansion of cheap labour segments on the labour market, as for 
example increasing employment of women and youth, growing share of part time workers128
In the following, statistical data is presented in order to exemplify the above mentioned processes, using Eurostat 
databases. The analysis is conducted for the period between 2004 and 2013. In most cases EU10 and EU15 
data are used, however due to limited data availability in a few cases the average of the new member states 
(NMS12
, public work 
programs (e.g.: in Hungary), or the “mini jobs” (e.g.: in Germany), increasing immigration, etc. These low-wage 
labour market segments exert a pull-down effect on other segments of labour market too. The easiest and most 
frequent and “spontaneous” way of wage cuts is the fall of real wages in the face of soaring inflation, when the 
rise of nominal wages is under the inflation rate. 
Although the reduction of real unit labour cost is a consequence of austerity policies of the governments, it is also 
a natural consequence of the crisis. In crisis unemployment grows that depreciates the price of labour. 
129
Employment
) given by the Eurostat and the average of the EU  are applied in the analysis. The relationship 
between the data of the EU27 and the EU10 (or NMS12) characterizes the relationship between the new member 
states and the EU15 very well. If, for example, an indicator for the EU10 (or for the NMS12) grew more than that 
of the EU27 this indicator grew even more relative to the EU15. 
 
130
The global economic crisis has had a well-known negative effect on employment all around in Europe and the 
EU10 countries have been among the most affected EU member states. From 2008/2009 to 2011 the 
 
In parallel with increased inward foreign capital investments, employment of Central and Eastern European 
countries has grown as well as a result of the EU10 countries’ integration into the global and European economy. 
Until the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 employment grew also in Western Europe but at a slower pace than in the 
Central and Eastern European countries. Mainly due to Poland’s favourable labour market performance, the 
share of the ten new Central and Eastern European member states together within the total employment of the 
European Union has been growing. Between 2004 and 2008 3.4 million new jobs were created within the EU10 
region, of which 2 million jobs in Poland alone. It is remarkable that Hungary was the only country within the 
group where the level of employment decreased in these years. 
                                                 
128 Typically their hourly salary is lower than earnings of full time workers per hour. 
129 EU10 plus Cyprus and Malta. As these countries are very small economies with small number of population the aggregate data for 
NMS12 are practically equal with the data for EU10. 
130 The data in this chapter derive from the Eurostat, Statistics by them, Labour market, Employment and unemployment. Employment. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database 
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employment share of the EU10 in the EU27 decreased to the 2004/2005 level. Since 2011 this share has been 
gradually growing again although it has not reached the level of 2009 yet (Figure 1.). 
 
Figure 1: Level of employment in the EU10 and share of EU10 in the employment of the EU27 
1000 persons (left scale) and per cent (right scale), 2004-2013 
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by them, Labour market, Employment and unemployment131
On the one hand part time employment is less common in the EU10 than in the EU15. In the last decade the 
share of part-time employees was one tenth or less within the EU10-countries, while their share in the EU15 grew 
from 19.4 per cent in 2004 to 23.6 per cent in 2013 on average
 
 
Considering the whole decade after 2004, that contains the effect of the crisis, the data show that within the EU10 
region EU-membership has not resulted in significant improvement of the labour market performance, with the 
only exception of Poland. The share of the ten new member states together within the total employment of the 
EU28 increased from 19.4 per cent in 2004 to 19.6 per cent in 2013. Without Poland the aggregate share of the 
nine new member states has decreased from 12.8 per cent in 2004 to 12.5 per cent in 2013. 
On the long run the EU-membership could revitalize employment only in Poland, where the initial level of 
employment was the lowest (51.7 per cent) at the time of accession. Polish labour market has been characterized 
by high rate of temporary contracts, which share grew from 22.7 in 2004 to 26.9 in 2013 within the Polish 
employment. The latter is the double of the EU27 average. 
132
                                                 
131 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database 
132 Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Labour market, Employment (main characteristics and rates) - annual averages [lfsi_emp_a] 
. In the EU10-countries the share of part-time 
workers grew either very slowly or in a few cases decreased between 2004 and 2013, partly due to the high 
share of the shadow economy in the region (see later). 
On the other hand the employment rates in the 15-64 years of age cohort grew faster in all EU10 countries than 
the average of the EU15 with the exception of Slovenia, where the employment rate decreased by two 
percentage points during the examined period. In 2004 Slovenia had the highest employment rate in the group of 
EU10 and was even higher than the average of the EU15. However, after 2008, the first year of the crisis, the 
Slovenian employment rate has decreased considerably. 
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Since 2004 the employment rate of the youth (15-24 years of age) has been lower in the new member states than 
in the EU15 on average and has decreased in the majority of the CEE countries. 
The real number of people who work is likely to be higher in the CEE countries, than the above data prove 
because the shadow economy (undeclared and underreported work) is more extended in these countries (and in 
Southern Europe) than on the Western and Northern part of the EU.133 In the period before the crisis the shadow 
economy (measured as a percentage of GDP) has decreased across Europe. Since 2009 its share has continued 
to decrease in Western and Northern Europe, while in Southern and Eastern Europe the progress has come to a 
halt. According to estimations in 2013 the weight of the shadow economy reached 15 to 31 per cent of the GDP 
of the EU10, 19 to 24 per cent in the Southern member states134 and 8 to 16 per cent in other EU-countries.135
The different incentives as for example flat tax rates and reduced social security contributions that have been 
phased in by the governments to encourage participation in the formal economy have not proved to be successful 
on the long run. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia have made similar steps 
in the last decade. Moreover, Slovakia, the country that has one of the longest experiences with the flat tax rate, 
abolished it in 2013 introducing a progressive income tax system in the frame of the austerity package. This might 
also happen in other flat tax rate countries in the coming years if the expected results concerning the contraction 
of the shadow economy do not occur. Correlation between the extension of electronic payment systems and 
shadow economy shows that the spread of electronic payment systems can also improve the situation by making 
tax evasion more difficult.
 
The persistence of the extended shadow economy is the consequence of the insufficient demand for formal 
employment. 
136
                                                 
133 Schneider (2011), (2012) and (2013). 
134 Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
135 Schneider (2013) pp. 4-6.  
136 Schneider (2013) pp. 14-15. 
 
 
Unemployment 
Ten years ago unemployment was a more severe problem in the CEE countries than in the EU15. In 2004 
unemployment rate was only lower in three CEE countries than the average of the older member states (EU15). 
However, in the last decade unemployment has improved in the EU10. Until 2008 unemployment decreased both 
in the EU10 and in other member states, but the improvement was faster in the former group. In 2008 there were 
three countries only (Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary) where the unemployment rate was higher than the average of 
the EU15. Between 2008 and 2010 the unemployment rate grew both in the ten CEE countries and in the EU15 
on average. After 2010, however, unemployment started to decrease in seven CEE countries and increased in 
only two CEE countries, but at a slower pace than the average of the EU15. It was only Slovenia where 
unemployment rate continued to grow considerably. As a result, in 2013 there were only four countries within the 
EU10 group where the unemployment rate exceeded the EU15 average and even among these four countries 
two recorded a decreasing trend (Figure 2.). 
 
 
 
Annamária Artner: Labour market of the new Central and Eastern European member states of the EU in the ... 
 
 
110 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rates in the Central and Eastern European countries and the EU15 
percent 
 
Source: Eurostat online, statistics by theme, Labour market, Employment and Unemployment137
 
 
 
This also means that on aggregate level the joblessness of the EU10 group decreased more between 2004 and 
2008 and increased more between 2008 and 2010 than that of the EU15. After 2010 the trend reversed again. 
Since 2010 the aggregate unemployment of the EU10 has been more or less on the same level with an increase 
in four and a decrease in six countries. In the EU10 group the rise of unemployment stopped in 2010 and since 
then it has remained relatively stable with slight increase in four and modest decrease in six countries. In the 
EU15, mainly due to the unfavourable labour market situation in the most crisis-hit Southern member states, 
unemployment has continued to deteriorate. In the whole period, i.e. between 2004 and 2013 unemployment 
within the group of the EU10 growth of unemployment rates measured in percentage point exceeded that of the 
EU15 average only in Hungary and Slovenia (Figure 3.). 
 
Figure 3: Change of unemployment rates in percentage point 2004-2013 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat online, statistics by theme, Labour market, Employment and 
Unemployment138
 
 
                                                 
137 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database 
138 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database 
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU15
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Poland Slovakia Estonia Czech 
Republic
Romania Latvia Bulgaria Lithuania EU15 Slovenia Hungary
2004-2008
2008-2010
2010-2013
2004-2013
Annamária Artner: Labour market of the new Central and Eastern European member states of the EU in the ... 
 
 
Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 111 
 
 
In the last decade this difference in the unemployment trends of the two country groups has resulted in a 
declining share of unemployment of the EU10 within the total EU level unemployment. This is also valid for youth 
unemployment (unemployed under 25 years of age). In 2013 the number of unemployed was more by 6.4 million 
in the EU15 then in 2004, whereas their number decreased by 1.4 million in the EU10 group during the same 
period. In the case of youth unemployment the trend is similar. In the last decade the number of unemployed 
under 25 years of age grew by close to one million within the EU15 while decreased by 1.4 million in the EU10.  
As a result, the weight of both the total and youth unemployment of the EU10 in the corresponding figures of the 
EU27 was lower in 2013 than 2004 (Figure 4.). 
 
Figure 4: The share of the EU10 in the total and youth unemployment of the EU27 between 2004 
and 2013  
percent 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat online, statistics by theme, Labour market, Employment and 
Unemployment139
                                                 
139 
 
 
The unemployment rate of young people aged less than 25 years in the new member states has been higher in 
the whole examined period than that of the EU15 on average but has increased less than the average of the 
EU15 or in some CEE-countries has even decreased until 2014. The only exception is Hungary where the youth 
unemployment rate grew dramatically, from 15.5 in 2004 to 27.7 per cent in 2013 (Figure 5.). 
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Figure 5: Unemployment rate of people aged less than 25 years in 2004 and 2013 
percent and change between 2004 and 2013 in percentage point 
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the Eurostat Statistics by theme, Employment and unemployment, Unemployment 
rate by sex and age groups – annual average, %.140
 
 
 
Labour compensation, unit labour cost 
As we have seen until now the growth of employment in the EU10 has not been buoyant but more dynamic in the 
majority of the last decade than the labour market of the older member states. This reflects a competitive 
advantage of the Eastern members relative to the Western ones. This competitive advantage consists of low 
wages of the relatively well educated population plus the shadow economy. The latter has advantageous effects 
on the reproduction of capital and hence on economic growth. The shadow economy on the one hand decreases 
wages indirectly on the registered labour market and on the other hand ensures extra effective demand for goods 
and services of the registered economy. Besides, on the input size shadow economy cuts down costs for the 
industries and services that use its products. 
 
Figure 6: Compensation of employees per GNI and GDP, 2004-2013 
percent 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Annual national accounts, GDP and main 
components, Current prices141
                                                 
140 
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In EU10 the profitability of foreign investments could have been higher than in the more developed European 
countries that are characterized by higher wages. The wages in the new member states are low enough for 
ensuring cost competitiveness even with the social contributions payable by employers. The unit labour cost has 
been much lower in the EU10 in the past decade than in the EU15, and labour compensation per GDP or GNI is 
by 8-10 percentage point less in the former than in the latter (Figure 6.). 
 
This has supported the integration of the Eastern European countries into the global and European economy 
through providing higher profit margins to foreign direct investments in the new member states than in the more 
developed European countries. With the on-going relocation of technologies from the West to the East the 
productivity of the EU10 has been growing faster than in the EU15 on average. Figure 7 shows the productivity 
index measured as the GDP per employee. Between 2004 and 2013 the productivity of the ten new member 
states (EU10) grew faster than the average index of the EU15. 
 
Figure 7: GDP per employee 2004-2013 
2004=100 
 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by them, Labour market, Employment142 and National 
accounts143
                                                                                                                                                        
141 
 
 
However, in the EU10 the compensation of employees (CoE) has kept step with the growth of GDP and for this 
the share of the CoE in the GDP remained on the same level before the crisis, i.e. in 2004-2007. In the EU15, on 
the other hand, the tendency of the CoE/GDP was decreasing in the same period (Figure 6.). 
This means that wage competitiveness of the new member states has gradually lessened relative to the EU15 in 
the first years of membership. This development has based been on the increase of wages in Eastern Europe 
which is a natural tendency in less developed or peripheral economies when the production grows dynamically. 
Either the higher wages of foreign companies or the social policies of governments in time of prosperity give a 
rise to labour compensation in the whole economy. The new member states have played a leading role in the EU 
concerning the increase of mean earnings during the last decade and this tendency has continued after the onset 
of the crisis as well (Figure 8.). 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database 
142 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database 
143 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database 
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Figure 8: Mean hourly earnings in euro 
change in percentage point, 2002, 2006, 2010 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Labour market, Structure of earnings survey – 
main indicators144
 
 
 
Figure 9: Total earnings of a single person without children in the new member states as a per 
cent of the average of the EU15 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Labour market, Earnings145
Since 2004 wages and social benefits, consequently total earnings have increased faster in the EU10 than in the 
EU15, this trend was especially extensive until 2008. After that year the growth of total earnings of the EU10 as a 
percentage of the EU15 has slowed down, in half of the EU10 countries (in Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania 
and the Czech Republic) total earnings have even dropped. This decrease was the highest in Hungary. As Figure 
9 shows total earnings of a single person without children
 
 
146
                                                 
144 
 in the ten Central and Eastern European countries 
was 5.4–37.4 per cent of the average of the fifteen older member states in 2004, this difference  further increased 
to 11.4–42.8 per cent until 2012. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/database 
145 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/database 
146 According to Eurostat the total earnings of a person (or the total labour costs of the earner) equals with the gross earnings plus the 
employer's social security. 
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Measuring in purchasing power standards the rate of the average of the two highest net earnings147 in the EU27 
(i.e. the average of net earnings of Luxemburg and the United Kingdom) to the average of the two lowest net 
earnings (i.e. the average of net earnings of Bulgaria and Romania) halved, i.e. decreased from 8.4 to 4.2 
between 2001 and 2012. In the same period the average deviation from the average of net earnings decreased 
from 44.9 to 37.2 of the average earning of the EU27.148
 
 A convergence of earnings has taken place in the EU. 
Competitiveness, i.e. profitability decreases if wages increase at a larger pace than productivity because in this 
case unit labour cost (ULC) of the given country or region increases. This results in the loss of competitiveness of 
the given economy if the unit labour cost of its competitors increases less. In the past decades both in the EU10 
and the EU15 wages grew more than productivity. Both the wages and productivity of the EU10 increased more 
dynamically than the wages and productivity of the EU15. However the wages advanced more relative to the 
productivity in the EU10 than in the EU15. 
Before the crisis real unit labour cost of the majority of EU10 countries has decreased at a slower pace than in 
the old ones on average or even increased. This means that the majority of the EU10 countries has lost in 
competitiveness compared to the EU15 on average in the pre-crisis period. Poland, Bulgaria and Slovenia were 
the exceptions, as these countries could slightly improve their relative position to the EU15 average. The years of 
the crisis raised real unit labour cost in both the EU10 and EU15 countries for a while which was followed by a 
correction. Since 2009 real unit labour cost has fallen in Europe and in the majority of the EU10 the drop in ULC 
has been higher than the average of the EU15. Taking the whole decade between 2004 and 2013 the majority of 
the EU10 countries has lost their cost competitiveness compared to the average of the EU15 and only four of the 
ten countries, namely Romania, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary could improve their relative ULC-position to the 
EU15 by decreasing their ULC more than the EU15 on average (Figure 10.). 
 
Figure 10:  Growth of the real unit labour cost 
2004=100 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by theme, National accounts, Main tables, 
Annual national accounts, Real unit labour cost growth149
                                                 
147 Single person without children. 
148 Own calculations on the bases of the Eurostat data. Statistics by theme, Labour Market, Earnings, Annual net earnings. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/earnings/database 
 
 
 
149 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables 
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Social conditions, inequality 
Since employment, labour compensation and the minimal wages have increased – as for example in Hungary 
since 2002 – the rate of working poor has decreased in the new member states. The in-work at-risk-of-poverty 
rate150 for the 18-64 years old population on aggregate level of the NMS12 declined until 2008 and then, after 
some years of stagnation, began to rise again but did not reach the level of 2005 until 2012. The trend before the 
crisis was the opposite in case of EU15, where the in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate grew almost continuously 
between 2005 and 2012 with the exception of 2009 and 2010. Consequently the rate of working poor for the new 
member states was converging towards the level of EU15 (Table 1.). 
 
Table 1: In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate for the 18-64 years old employed persons 
2005-2012, percent 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU15 7.3 7.4 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.9 8.4 8.8 
NMS12 11.4 10.9 10.2 10.3 10.2 10.4 10.8 10.5 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income, Social Inclusion and Living conditions, Income distribution and monetary151 
t  I k t   
The extension of the social protection system has also been stronger in the EU10 as in the EU15 on average 
during the last decade. This is reflected in the development of the social protection expenditures of the EU10 
relative to the EU15. In 2004 total aggregated value of social protection benefits in the EU10 countries was equal 
with 3.8 per cent of the sum that the EU15 devoted to this goal and this rate increased to 5.4 per cent in 2011 (the 
latest year for what the Eurostat gives data in September 2014). 
Growing employment, increasing wages, extended social protection benefits usually result in improving well-being 
which is valid for the new member states of the EU after 2004 – at least until 2008 – and has been manifested in 
the easing of poverty. The number and rate of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion declined in the EU10 
countries until the outbreak of the crisis and have remained relatively stable afterwards. In the EU15, however, 
the development was the opposite: the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion did not change 
much before the crisis and subsequently started to rise. Consequently 34 per cent of the poor – as defined above 
– in the European Union lived in the EU10 countries in 2012 which is much less than in 2005, when their share 
was 51 per cent. 152
Similar results can be found also in case of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient before or after social 
transfer. Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income was meaningfully higher in the new member states 
than the average of the EU15 in 2004 and 2005. However, since 2010 this coefficient has been lower for the new 
member states (in this case: NMS12) than for the EU15. The crisis divided the last decade into two periods. While 
between 2004 and 2008 the inequality has increased in the EU15 on average, the EU10 countries could mitigate 
the inequality with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, where the Gini coefficient grew by 9.9 and 5 
percentage points respectively. After the outbreak of the crisis inequality has increased again in about half of the 
 
                                                 
150 According to the definition of the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty rate is “the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below 
the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers).” 
151 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/database 
152 Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/database 
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new member states. Between 2008 and 2012 the highest increase within the ten countries was recorded in 
Hungary where the Gini coefficient grew from 25.2 to 28 per cent (Figure 11.). 
 
Figure 11: Gini coefficient in the new member states  
change in percentage point 2005-2012 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the Eurostat, Statistics by theme, Income and living conditions, 
Distribution of income153
                                                 
153 
 
 
Conclusions 
The statistical data prove that the growth of employment, the absolute and relative level of wages, the 
improvement of social conditions are possible in time of economic expansion, i.e. in time of successful 
reproduction of capital. However, the high rate of economic growth cannot be maintained for a long time, after the 
advent of the inevitable crisis or recession the improvement of labour market and social conditions usually have 
to be halted and withdrawn at least partially. 
In capitalism, every country that aims to catch up with the more developed economies faces an enormous 
difficulty, namely that the increasing wages and social benefits during recovery become a burden on 
competitiveness of the capital in time inevitably. In this dilemma the basic requirement of the competitiveness, i.e. 
profit making, appears. According to this requirement unit labour cost both on company and national economic 
level has to be tendencially decreased, meaning that the share of labour in value added has to be decreased 
after recovery ends. 
The labour market and social conditions improved in the EU10 in the first half of the last decade, when an 
extensive growth has taken place in the region. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 this trend has been 
broken. The statistical data show some convergence between the more and less developed countries of the EU 
regarding wages and standard of living on average. The convergence is a result of the decrease of the wages 
relative to the GDP in the more developed countries and the increase of the wages per GDP in the less 
developed ones. The latter is the consequence of the extensive development that the international division of 
labour that is determined by the needs of the reproduction of capital results on the peripheral and semi-peripheral 
countries. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/data/database 
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Similarly, thanks to the increasing wages and social benefits inequality has been reduced in most of the EU10 
countries whereas it was on the rise in the majority of the developed EU-countries already in time of the boom 
before the crisis. The convergence in this respect does not mean improving distribution in all countries either. It 
means rather a convergence towards a mean value between the values of the two groups of countries (EU10, 
EU15). 
According to the logic of competitiveness, however, this pattern of convergence, where the higher indicators 
decrease and the lowers increase, cannot be maintained on the long run. On the long run the reproduction of 
capital requires decreasing unit labour costs, i.e. falling compensation of employees and social benefits in GDP 
everywhere. 
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Human capital in EU10 countries: Changes in education 
and research and development 
István Kőrösi 
 
In the 21st century, human capital, the quality of the human resources have become a significant element of 
development. In narrow sense the development of human capital means the training of high-performing and high 
skilled labor-potential, and also the creation and development in chain of the following territories: education – 
science-policy – research; development – invention – innovation. In wider sense it includes the shaping of the 
value-creating potential of the whole workforce, an important part of which is the development of skilled staff 
through training and education. The development of human capital with rational, perspective planning and 
adequate funding might play a decisive role in catching up with the global economy. At least two main areas must 
be rapidly developed to make use of human potential: education and research and development (R&D), because 
these are the basis of the development. The creation of human capital is first of all not a quantitative, but a 
qualitative process. Hungary for example was way ahead in the field of human resources for a long time (in the 
beginning of the 21st century, between the two world wars and beyond), skilled workers and inventions compared 
to its general economic development. In the second decade of the 21st century, EU10 countries - including 
Hungary - do not reach the requirements of our times, but they are far from exploiting their intellectual potential, 
due to the quality of their education and the lagging behind of scientific results in their economies. 
This study is primarily an investigative, analytical comparison. The reason for that is that R&D and educational 
expenditures are based on the economic and solvency situation of a country. Nevertheless the change of these 
shares is the result of economic policy decisions, that is how much one country spends on these areas. All 
countries are keen on spending more to develop these always important and recognized fields, but due to budget 
deficit, financial barriers set narrow limits. Also in the case of crises, the human capital-intensive areas like the 
healthcare system, education and R&D suffer. There are only a few historical exceptions like Hungary and 
Finland between the two world wars. They spent the most in world comparison – 15% of its GDP - on education 
and scientific research. (This is not directly comparable to today’s GDP figures, but it would be more than 10% of 
GDP in current prices). 
The human capital potential and scientific research are determined by long-term conditions and trends. We can 
only assess the present situation based on historical capabilities, and the impact of contemporary development in 
a long time horizon, at least 5-10-15 years later. (The now graduated student will get degree within 5-6 years, 
about 8-9 years for a PhD, and to become a scientific researcher plus 10-15 years.) 
Concerning R&D, the EU had to face major changes in this field from the millennium. It became increasingly 
apparent that the intensification of globalization (which was accompanied by continued market liberalization) 
sovereignty of the economic policy and the technology policy has declined and there is a gradual loss of national 
control. The EU member countries tried to balance it, instead of macroeconomy (the main element of which was 
also placed on the supranational level, due to EMU) they promote microeconomy and companies in the 
competition. The large number of TNCs in the EU encourage governments and the EU at the same time, to 
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support the innovation capacity of SMEs, who serve TNCs. This could be the new aspect of technology policy. 
With the enlargement of the EU the community’s R&D potential has significantly increased. The reason of this 
phenomenon is not the rise in governmental expenses, but the scientific capacities and the number of R&D area 
working staff within the EU10 countries. 
 
Table 1: Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, for all levels of education 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) : 4.95(e) 4.92(e) 5.41(e) 5.25(e) 
European Union (27 countries) 4.91(s) 4.95(e) 4.92(e) 5.41(e) 5.25(e) 
Bulgaria 3.88 4.40 4.25 4.10 3.82 
Czech Republic 3.83 4.20 4.08 4.25 4.51 
Estonia 5.57(i) 4.92 4.88 5.66 5.16 
Croatia : 3.87 3.98(d) 4.31(d) 4.21(d) 
Latvia 5.64 5.12 5.14 4.96 4.96 
Lithuania 5.63 5.17 4.88 5.36 5.17 
Hungary 4.50 5.44 5.46 4.90 4.71 
Poland 4.87(i) 5.41(d) 5.47(d) 5.17(d) 4.94 
Romania 2.88 3.28 3.48 3.53 3.07 
Slovenia : 5.74 5.73 5.68 5.68 
Slovakia 3.92(i) 4.19(d) 3.85(d) 4.22(d) 4.06(d) 
:=not available; e= estimated; s= Eurostat estimate; i= see metadata; d=definition differs; see metadata 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2: Total public expenditure on education  
Million Euro PPS 
 2000 2004 2005 2007 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) :(u) 534,765.1(e) 555,912.9(e) 610,557.3(e) 662,028.3(e) 663,029.3(e) 
European Union (27 countries) :(u) 532,677.2(e) 553,644.7(e) 607,854.9(e) 659,311.3(e) 660,293.4(e) 
Bulgaria 1,715.8 2,551.4 2,695.1 2,976.4 3,328.1 3,278.5 
Czech Republic 5,313.1 7,245.4 7,427.7 8,646.8 8,709.1 9,530.3 
Estonia 710.9(i) 825.2 908.6 1,107.2 1,183.9 1,200.3 
Croatia : 2,087.9(d) 2,268.1(d) 2,702.4(d) 2,717 2,735.9 
Latvia 904 1,164.9 1,279.6 1,597.3 1,401.9 1,534 
Lithuania 1,547.3 1,948.2 1,990.1 2,322.1 2,486 2,609.5 
Hungary 4,896 7,486.4 7,812.4 8,159.7 7,890.6 7,922.1 
Poland 17,517(i) 22,572.9 24,030.9 25,431.3 30,686.2 31,154.9 
Romania 3,242 5,246.6 5,907.4 9,484.1 8,846.2 7,970.6 
Slovenia : 2,146.5 2,249.2 2,297.2 2,397.1 2,469.7 
Slovakia 2,121(d) 2,780.9(d) 2,803.1(d) 3,306(d) 4,156.9 4,140 
:=not available; u=low reliability; e=estimated; i=see metadata; d=definition differs, see metadata 
Source: Eurostat154 
 
                                                 
154 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tps00158HTMLDesc_09a1da4a-f8f6-453e-90c5-
f53171b898ef.htm# 
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The spending on education and training as the ratio of GDP is the major indicator if we want to know how much 
attention the state pays to public education. From post-transition EU member states, Slovenia spends most on 
education relative to the GDP, even more than the EU average. Lithuania and Estonia spend permanently more 
than 5% of the GDP on education, their educational potential is developing. Poland and Hungary are in the 
middle level. Interestingly, the Czech Republic spends relatively little on public education. The catching up of 
Romania and Bulgaria is hindered by the low rate of public expenditure on this field. The extremely low ratio of 
these two countries has declined in comparison with the mid-2000s period. Only Estonia and the Czech Republic 
have increased the ratio of their public education expenditures if we compare 2000 to 2011, but in the other 
analyzed countries we observe decrease in the same timeframe (see Table 1). 
The total spending on public education differs from what we would expect based on the economic potential of 
countries and the number of students. Educational expenditure in absolute terms indicates the input size of 
performance. Based on the whole population, the number of students and the budget, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Romania and Hungary rank first in absolute value of expenses. The other EU10 countries have lower levels of 
expenditure, because of low student numbers. Between 2000 and 2011, the public education expenses rose in 
the region, in case of Hungary and the Czech Republic this happened during 2000-2004, but in the other 
analyzed countries generally after 2004.  In Hungary and in Romania, the governmental subventions declined 
due to the economic crisis in the period 2007-2011, but in all the other countries, subventions increased (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 3: Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions compared to GDP per 
capita 
By level of education - based on full-time equivalents (% - based on full-time equivalents) 
 2000 2004 2005 2006 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) : 24.6(e) 25.2(e) 25.1(e) 28(e) 26.9(e) 
European Union (27 countries) : 24.6(e) 25.2(e) 25.1(e) 28(e) 26.9(e) 
Bulgaria 23.4 24.2 23.7 23.6 24.6 23.2 
Czech Republic 19 21.7 21.3 23.3 23.6 25 
Estonia : : 20.4 20.4 27.2 25.5 
Croatia : :(u) :(u) :(u) 25.7 25.7 
Latvia 25.6 24 24.3 24.7 26.8 26.5 
Lithuania :(i) 21.1 19.9 20.2 25 24.3 
Hungary :(u) 26.7 26.7 26.8 :(z) :(z) 
Poland 21.8(i) 24.8(d) 26.6(d) 24.8(d) 29.1(d) 28.4(d) 
Romania : : 18.3 :(u) 18.7 17.5 
Slovenia : 29.5 30.5 30.4 32.4 32.3 
Slovakia 17.7 21(d) 19.9(d) 19.6(d) 23.3(d) 22.5(d) 
:=not available; e=estimated; i=see metadata; d=definition differs, see metadata; u=low reliability; z=not applicable; b=break in time 
series 
Source: Eurostat155 
 
                                                 
155 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tps00069HTMLDesc_fcdc8729-6816-4e8c-a682-
ef1259006ca8.htm# 
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Table 3 provides an overview of spending on public education from public and private resources in relative 
proportion of GDP per capita. It is based on the annual expenditure of educational institutions. Indeed it means 
how much of the GDP per capita will be invested in education. In 2004, the EU-28 spent 24,6% of its GDP on 
these aims, and by 2010, this  increased to 28%, but in 2011, it decreased to 26,9%. The rank of countries in 
2004 was the following: Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, in 2011 Slovenia was also the first, but Poland and the 
Baltic states caught up. Hungarian data for 2010-2011 are not available. In Romania and Bulgaria, educational 
expenditure declined compared to the 2005 GDP per capita ratio. 
 
Table 4: Annual expenditure on public and private educational institutions per pupil/student 
PPS based on full-time equivalents 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) : 5,455.2(e) 5,643.1(e) 6,908.9(e) 6,846.4(e) 
European Union (27 countries) : 5,476.8(e) 5,662(e) 6,933.9(e) 6,869.2(e) 
Bulgaria 1,266.9 1,806.4 1,948.5 2,655 2,713.4 
Czech Republic 2,571.9 3,663.6 3,790.5 4,600.4 5,032.2 
Estonia : : 2,818.8 4,242.6 4,426.1 
Croatia : :(u) :(u) 3,766.2 3,901.9 
Latvia 1,817.6 2,415 2,702.2 3,608.4 3,987.9 
Lithuania :(i) 2,354.7 2,446.1 3,738.3 4,044 
Hungary :(u) 3,635.1 3,793.4 :(z) :(z) 
Poland 1,970.5(i) 2,717.7(d) 3,061.5(d) 4,483.6(d) 4,640.6(d) 
Romania : : 1,437.2 2,132.5 2,074.6 
Slovenia : 5,526.5 5,995.5 6,676.7 6,781.7 
Slovakia 1,686 2,588.9(d) 2,689.1(d) 4,235(d) 4,262.2(d) 
:=not available; e=estimated; i=see metadata; d=definition differs, see metadata; u=low reliability; z=not applicable; b=break in time 
series 
Source: Eurostat156 
 
The data of Table 4 partially correlate with economic development, partly indicating educational expenditures of 
states. It is interesting to observe that in the EU10 countries, educational spending per student is deeply under 
the EU-average. (In Slovenia the situation is favorable.) The Baltic states, Poland and the Czech Republic made 
significant effort to improve their own educational area and the expenditure per student ratio since 2000 and from 
the EU accession. Regarding educational expenditure, the catching up will be hard, because of the deep gap 
between the EU-average and these countries. Data are available only until 2011, but the prominence of Slovenia 
and the Czech Republic is clear. The database of Slovakia and Poland are not comparable to the other countries 
data, because of definition differences. Bulgaria and Romania are at the end of the list in the EU, regarding this 
comparison. 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tps00067HTMLDesc_fe0f02d7-62fc-42d9-974b-
cd237bf7f82e.htm# 
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Table 5: Tertiary education participation 
Trends in the number of students (ISCED 5-6) (1 000) 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) : 18,359.2 18,664.8 19,991.1 20,283.3 20,245.9 
European Union (27 countries) 15,920.8 18,232.9 18,530.2 19,841.2 20,129.3 20,088.6 
Bulgaria 261.3 228.5 237.9 287.1 285.3 285.0 
Czech Republic 253.7 318.9 336.3 437.4 446.2 440.2 
Estonia 53.6 65.7 67.8 69.0 69.1 67.6 
Croatia : 126.3 134.7 149.9 154.0 157.3 
Latvia 91.2 127.7 130.7 112.6 103.9 97.0 
Lithuania 121.9 182.7 195.4 201.4 187.1 175.1 
Hungary 307.1 422.2 436.0 389.0 381.9 380.8 
Poland 1,579.6 2,044.3 2,118.1 2,148.7 2,080.3 2,007.2 
Romania 452.6(d) 685.7 738.8 999.5 871.8 705.3 
Slovenia 83.8(d) 104.4(d) 112.2 114.9 107.1 104.0 
Slovakia 135.9 164.7 181.4 234.5 226.3 221.2 
:=not available; d=definition differs; see metadata 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 6: Population with tertiary education attainment  
Percentage, ISCED97: First and second stage of tertiary education (levels 5 and 6) 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 
European Union (28 countries) : 19.1 19.6 22.7 23.6 24.5 25.3 
European Union (27 countries) 17.1 19.1 19.7 22.8 23.7 24.6 25.4 
Bulgaria 15.1 17.9 17.8 19.4 20.1 20.7 22.2 
Czech Republic 9.5 10.4 11.0 14.5 15.8 17.0 18.1 
Estonia 24.1(b) 25.6 27.7 30.0 31.3 32.1 33.2 
Croatia : 13.2 13.4 15.5 15.3 15.7 16.5 
Latvia 15.1 16.7 17.1 22.6 23.6(b) 25.2 27.0 
Lithuania 35.3(d) 21.6 22.4 26.9 27.9 28.6 29.8 
Hungary 11.7 14.2 14.5 17.2 18.1 19.0 19.5 
Poland 9.2(b) 12.8 13.9 19.4 20.3 21.5 22.6 
Romania 7.5 8.7 9.1 11.9 13.0 13.6 13.9 
Slovenia 12.9(b) 15.7 16.7 20.2 21.6 23.0 24.4 
Slovakia 8.2 10.4 11.4 15.1 16.4 17.0 17.7 
:=not available; b=break in time series; d=definition differs, see metadata 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The number of participants in higher education is the index of future human capital potential (Table 5). This 
indicator significantly correlates with the evolution of the given population, while forecasts the future high-skilled 
labor potential. Most of the young people study in higher education in Poland and Romania (in 2012, more than 2 
million, and 700 thousand students). Number of students in higher education increased dynamically during 2000-
2005 in each country. However, after the crisis, the number of students in higher education started declining 
except for Croatia and the Czech Republic, but in  2012 there was a decline in the Czech Republic too. The 
largest decline was reported in Romania, with nearly 300 thousand losses. In Hungary, the number of students in 
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higher education was lower by approximately 60 thousand from 2005 to 2012. The decrease is explained partly 
by demographical changes,  but the main reason was the reduction of state funded higher education  and the 
increase of tuition fees paid by the students. Due to the crisis, the financial capacities of poorer families were 
significantly reduced, which could  only be partly compensated with grants.  
 
In the transition countries, the ratio of tertiary educated people within the active population is very different (Table 
6). In the Baltic countries, especially in Estonia, the number of tertiary graduated citizens is higher than the EU-28 
average. Estonia had outstanding successful efforts in this area, it increased its higher educated population from 
one-fourth to one-third between 2004-2013. Slovenia is just a little under the EU- average, with Bulgaria and 
Poland, they are between 20-25%. The number of graduated citizens is less than 20% of the population in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The situation is the worst in Romania, with its 13,9%. 
 
Table 7: Tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1 000 inhabitants aged 20-29 years 
 2000 2001 2004 2005 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) : 12.4 13.2 15.4 : 17.1(d) 
European Union (27 countries) 10.6(e) 12.5(e) 13.2 15.4 17 17.1(d) 
Bulgaria 7.5 8.5 8.6 12.1 12.4 13.3 
Czech Republic 5.6 7.4 8.3 16.9 16.6 16.7 
Estonia 8(d) 8.9 12.2 12 12.7 13.2 
Croatia : 5.8 6.1 12.3 : 17.4 
Latvia 7.6 9.7 10.2 12.1 12.8 13.5 
Lithuania 14.8 18.1 19.8 21.8 22.6 23 
Hungary 3.7 5.1(d) 5.1 8.3 8.5 9.5 
Poland 7.6 9.4 11.1 15.8 17.5 17.9 
Romania 4.9(d) 10.4 11.1 18.8 19.3 18.7 
Slovenia 8.2 9.3 9.8 14.8 17.4 19.3 
Slovakia 7.5 9.3 10.2 18.7 18 17.9 
:=not available; d=definition differs, see metadata; e=estimated; u=low reliability 
Source: Eurostat157 
 
Table 7 shows how many from 1000 young people - aged 20-29 - get scientific, technical or mathematical 
education. Lithuania has the highest level, Romania, Poland, Slovakia follow it. Bulgaria and Hungary are at the 
end of the list regarding scientific and technical university degrees. Between 2001-2011, the EU-average of the 
number of science and engineering graduates increased by 70%, but in Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland the 
increase was even more pronounced than the EU-average. The same ratio doubled in Hungary from 3.7% to 
9.5%. 
 
 
 
                                                 
157 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tps00188HTMLDesc_985d9823-aab9-4ecf-bac1-
cbf2e09643dc.htm# 
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Table 8: Doctorate students in science and technology fields 
Percent of the population aged 20-29 years 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) : : : : : 
European Union (27 countries) : : : :(u) 0.49(e) 
Bulgaria 0.11 0.19 0.2 0.16 0.15 
Czech Republic 0.45 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.87 
Estonia 0.23 0.36 0.39 0.56 0.62 
Croatia : 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.28 
Latvia 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.28 
Lithuania 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.31 
Hungary 0.1 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Poland 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 
Romania : 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.31 
Slovenia : : 0.17 0.43 0.58 
Slovakia 0.32 0.4 0.43 0.5 0.55 
:=not available; u=low reliability; e=estimated 
Source: Eurostat158 
 
The proportion of scientific and engineering Ph.D students compared to the EU average in the 20-29 age group in 
2011 was 0.49%. Among the transition countries, this ratio is highest in the Czech Republic, between 2000-2011 
it almost doubled to 0.87%. Estonia has also increased the number of its Ph.D. students from 0.23% to 0.62%.  In 
Slovenia and Slovakia, the proportion of Ph.D students are above the EU-average, thanks to their special 
attention to doctoral programs. Compared to 2005, there is a significant increase of Ph.D student numbers except 
Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, where during this period there was further decline in the ratio. So in these 
countries are number of Ph.D students is the lowest (see Table 8). 
 
Table 9: Academic staff of tertiary education 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria 24,620 20,944 21,102 20,855 20,648 22,955 
Czech Republic 20,010 : 24,298 16,656 18,002 17,476 
Estonia 5,707 6,630 : : : : 
Croatia : 7,917 8,764 15,721 16,319 : 
Latvia 5,213 5,716 6,268 6,924 6,340 6,435 
Lithuania 12,726 13,415 13,157 14,116 13,926 13,923 
Hungary 21,249 24,708 25,413 24,596 22,697 24,279 
Poland 85,971 : 95,144 102,595 102,621 101,407 
Romania 26,977 30,137 30,857 31,103 29,746 28,365 
Slovenia 2,491 4,143 4,475 6,947 7,214 7,348 
Slovakia 12,211 12,635 12,709 13,333 13,080 12,887 
:=not available 
Source: Eurostat 
                                                 
158 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00028HTMLDesc_6a7112c7-f5cc-4f37-a320-
01759525547b.htm# 
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The effectiveness of higher education largely depends on the number and quality of academics (Table 9). The 
number of academic staff is the largest in Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Poland has more 
than 100 thousand academics, Romanian number is almost 30% and Hungarian figure is 24% of the Polish 
result. This indicator shows only the absolute potential, but the effectiveness depends on the quality of teachers, 
their teaching skills, the quality of the whole higher education, the level of organization in the higher education 
and the capacity of students. The changes of academic staff were largest in proportion in Slovenia, between 
2000-2012, from 2491 person to 7348 person. In the same period, there was a decline in teachers’ number in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. However, in Slovakia there was stagnation. There is no data available 
on Estonian academics since 2004. In Croatia the number of academics almost doubled from 7917 (2004) to 
16319 (2011). 
 
Table 10: Employed persons with attainment of tertiary education 
Employed persons, percentage, Age: From 15 to 64 years ISCED97: First and second stage of tertiary 
education (levels 5 and 6) 
 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 
European Union (28 countries) 24.7 : 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 
European Union (27 countries) 24.7 25.3 29.1 30.0 31.1 32.1 
Bulgaria 25.5 25.7 27.1 27.9 28.5 30.1 
Czech Republic 13.8 14.4 18.1 19.5 20.7 22.1 
Estonia 33.0 35.8 38.4 37.9 38.9 39.9 
Croatia 19.4 19.4 22.4 22.2 23.4 24.8 
Latvia 21.8 22.9 31.0 32.4 34.1 34.9 
Lithuania 28.4 30.7 39.9 40.4 40.1 40.9 
Hungary 20.5 21.1 24.2 25.5 26.1 26.3 
Poland 19.6 21.4 27.2 28.1 29.5 31.0 
Romania 12.4 13.2 16.7 18.3 18.6 19.0 
Slovenia 20.4 21.9 26.5 28.6 30.1 31.8 
Slovakia 15.0 16.4 20.0 21.2 21.3 22.1 
:=not available 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The number of people with tertiary education compared to the employed ones, indicates the quality of the 
workforce, and its value creation abilities (Table 10). This ratio rose in the EU between 2004-2013 from one-
fourth to almost one-third. Unfortunately the proportion of high-educated people does not show the quality, the 
creativity and value creation ability of the graduated. Despite this, it is worth analyzing the database, however the 
comparison is limited, because of trainings, which are qualified as higher education courses. In the Baltic 
countries the ratio of graduated people is extremely high, in Estonia and Lithuania 40%, in Latvia 35%, and these 
are higher than the EU-28 average. In these countries the proportion of graduates and post-secondary vocational 
trainings was relatively high before the transition. Regarding the latter information, the situation is similar in 
Bulgaria. The graduated employment level is high in Slovenia and also in Poland. Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Croatia are standing in the middle rank, with their 20-25%. In Romania, the ratio is less than one-
fifth, but this result could be achieved after a significant increase between 2005 and 2013. 
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Table 11: Research and development expenditure 
percent of GDP 
 2001 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) 1.86(e) 1.82 1.82 2(e) 2.04 2.07 
European Union (27 countries) 1.87(e) 1.83 1.82 2.01(e) 2.05 2.08 
Bulgaria 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.6 0.57 0.64(p) 
Czech Republic 1.16 1.2 1.22 1.4 1.64 1.88(p) 
Estonia 0.7 0.85 0.93 1.62 2.37 2.18(p) 
Croatia : 1.05 0.87 0.75 0.76 0.75 
Latvia 0.41 0.42 0.56 0.6 0.7 0.66(p) 
Lithuania 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.91 0.9(p) 
Hungary 0.93(d) 0.88(b) 0.94 1.17 1.22 1.3 
Poland 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.74 0.76 0.9 
Romania 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.5(b) 0.49 
Slovenia 1.49 1.39 1.44 2.1 2.47(b) 2.8(p) 
Slovakia 0.63 0.51 0.51 0.63 0.68 0.82 
:=not available; e=estimated; p=provisional; b=break in time series; d=definition differs, see metadata 
Source: Eurostat159 
 
The R&D expenditures of the EU member countries should achieve 3% of their GDP according to the Lisbon 
Strategy, created in 2000. Nowadays most of the EU member states are still far away from this goal (Table 11). 
The goal has been shifted to 2020 in the Europe 2020 Strategy. In 2012, the mentioned ratio was in the average 
of the EU-28 countries a little above 2%. R&D is one of the main pillars of the knowledge based society. At the 
turn of the millennium, the R&D expenditures/ GDP ratio was very low in post-transition countries. Only Slovenia 
reached 1.5% and the Czech Republic a bit above 1%. The post-transition countries have made significant efforts 
compared to their own data between 2001 and 2012. The most significant development in the field of R&D was 
achieved in Slovenia and Estonia , because both have R&D fundings above the EU-average (2,47% and 2,37%). 
The Czech Republic and Hungary also made progress, but with their 1,88%/ GDP and 1,3%/ GDP ratio, they are 
far from the EU-average. Since their accession to the EU - in 2004 and in 2007 respectively - their R&D 
expenses/ GDP ratio increased. The EU membership and also its R&D framework program offers important 
impulse to these countries. (Since 1999, Hungary is full member of those programs.) The lowest R&D levels are 
observed in Romania, Bulgaria and Latvia, but Poland’s and Slovakia’s results do not achieve the 1%/GDP ratio 
either. 
According to international experiences, those countries are the most successful in the field of R&D, in which the 
business world and the companies participate in the financing (especially Japan, South-Korea, Sweden and 
Finland). The EU also encourages the business sector to fund R&D activities. It is surprising that this ratio of the 
EU-28 average has not increased since the millennium, and even in 2011 the data is lower than it was in 2001. In 
2011, the participation of the corporate sector in the R&D finance was 54.9%. In this year, from the EU10 
countries only Slovenia and Estonia reached the EU-average. In Slovenia, the share of corporate sector in the 
financing was 61.2%, in Hungary the same figure was 47.5%. In other post-transition countries, the participation 
of the corporate sector is around 30%, but in Lithuania, it is less than 30%. Surprisingly, between 2004 and 2012, 
                                                 
159 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00001HTMLDesc_4d8342c4-194d-4c53-b37c-
61ae66af8032.htm# 
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in all the countries except for Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, the financial contribution of  companies in the R&D 
activities declined. Neither domestic, nor foreign companies provide enough power to stimulate R&D (see Table 
12). 
 
Table 12: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) by source of funds 
Business enterprise sector; % of total GERD 
 2001 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) 55.8(e) 54.2(e) 54.1 53.7(e) 54.9 : 
European Union (27 countries) 55.8(e) 54.2(e) 54.1 53.8(e) 54.9 : 
Bulgaria 27.1 28.2 27.8 16.7 16.9 : 
Czech Republic 52.5 52.8 48.2 40.8 37.7 36.4(p) 
Estonia 32.9 36.5 38.5 43.6 55 51.2(p) 
Croatia : 43 34.3 38.8 38.2 38.2 
Latvia 18.3 46.3 34.3 38.8 24.8 23.8(p) 
Lithuania 37.1 19.9 20.8 32.4 28.2 26.1(p) 
Hungary 34.8(d) 37.1(d) 39.4(d) 47.4 47.5 46.9 
Poland 30.8 30.5 33.4 24.4 28.1 32.3 
Romania 47.6 44 37.2 32.3 37.4(b) 34.4 
Slovenia 54.7 58.5 54.8 58.4 61.2(b) 62.8(p) 
Slovakia 56.1 38.3 36.6 35.1 33.9 37.7 
:=not available; e=estimated; p=provisional; b=break in time series; d=definition differs, see metadata 
Source: Eurostat160 
 
Table 13: Human resources in science and technology (HRST) 
Percent of active population 
 2002 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 
European Union (28 countries) : : : 40.3 42.3(b) 42.9 43.4 
European Union (27 countries) 35 37 37.8 40.5 42.4(b) 42.9 : 
Bulgaria 31.2 31.2 31.6 31.6 33(b) 32.6 33 
Czech Republic 31.6 32.8 34.5 37.8(b) 35.6(b) 36.5 36.9 
Estonia 40 41.5 44.8 45.2 47.3(b) 49.2 49.5 
Croatia 27.6 27.9 28.2 32.1(b) 30.9(b) 32.3 34.5 
Latvia 33.5(b) 31 32.7 38 38.2(b) 40.1 41.2 
Lithuania 32.3(b) 34.6 37.4 42.7 43.6(b) 43.9 45.6 
Hungary 29 31.8 31.6 33 34.6(b) 35.4 35.7 
Poland 25.6 28.3 29.6 35.9(b) 36.6(b) 37.7 39 
Romania 20.8(b) 21.2 22 24.4 25.8(b) 25.7 25.2 
Slovenia 32.3 35.8 37.3 40.8 42.4(b) 42.8 43.5 
Slovakia 28.5 28.8 30.7 33.5 33.9(b) 32.5 32.5 
:=not available; b=break in time series 
Source: Eurostat161 
                                                 
160 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00031HTMLDesc_89fb65fc-ed53-46f8-a242-
ca77e1ddda09.htm# 
161 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00025HTMLDesc_da99e3e2-c888-4c45-92ae-
72cb8952a0a8.htm# 
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The proportion of workers in scientific-technical fields in relation to the active population gives overview about the 
ratio of workers in the R&D sector, which is necessary for the development. (This number included the entire 
staff, not just R&D activists). In 2013, in the EU generally 43.4% of the labor forces worked in scientific-technical 
areas. Among EU10, this ratio is higher than the EU average in the Baltic countries and in Slovenia. Among V4 
countries, the ranking is Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The lowest level was measured in 
Romania. Thanks to economic development, this ratio has become higher, however, between 2002 and 2013 
only Slovenia and the Baltic states could improve their position significantly (Table 13). 
 
Table 14: Total researchers (FTE) 
All sectors; FTE: full-time equivalent 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) : 1,314,471(e) 1,374,849 1,607,004(e) 1,628,443 1,661,499(e) 
European Union (27 countries) 1,123,553(e) 1,307,331(e) 1,369,122 1,599,901(e) 1,621,596 1,654,812(e) 
Bulgaria 9,217 9,827 10,053 10,979 11,902 11,295(p) 
Czech Republic 14,987 16,300 24,169(b) 29,228 30,682 33,169(p) 
Estonia 2,681 3,369 3,331 4,077 4,511 4,570(p) 
Croatia : 7,140 5,727 7,104 6,847 6,688 
Latvia 3,497 3,324 3,282 3,896 3,947 3,904(p) 
Lithuania 8,075 7,356 7,637 8,599 8,390 8,023 
Hungary 14,666(d) 14,904(b) 15,878 21,342 23,019 23,837 
Poland 56,148 60,944 62,162 64,511 64,133 67,001 
Romania 19,726 21,257 22,958 19,780 16,080(b) 18,016 
Slovenia 4,498 4,030 5,253 7,703 8,774(b) 9,093(p) 
Slovakia 9,585 10,718 10,921 15,183 15,326 15,271 
:=not available; e=estimated; p=provisional; b=break in time series; d=definition differs, see metadata 
Source: Eurostat162 
 
Regarding the number of researchers, the EU has a strong potential, which grew even stronger after the 
millennium period (see Table 14). In 2001 1.12 million people worked in the EU as a researcher (full time 
employment), but in 2012 the number reached 1.65 million employees. Overall among the EU10, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary have the biggest researcher potential. In 2012 Poland had 67,000, the Czech 
Republic 33,000, and  Hungary 24,000 researchers. The number of researchers – except for Romania – 
increased between 2001 and 2012, which could serve as a basis for the improvement of R&D, if other factors and 
inputs are also getting better. The Baltic countries and Croatia have the lowest number of researchers. Due to 
financial and economic crises, the number of researchers in Croatia and Lithuania fell. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00004HTMLDesc_687c4708-d3c2-4b7f-9c3c-
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Table 15: European high-technology patents 
Per million inhabitants 
 2000 2004 2005 2010 2011 
European Union (28 countries) 24.543 22.067 21.299 18.773 9.951(p) 
European Union (27 countries) 24.771 22.259 21.483 18.93 10.036(p) 
Bulgaria 0.173 0.263 0.838 0.067 0.136(p) 
Czech Republic 0.482 1.317 1.492 1.496 1.753(p) 
Estonia 0.121 1.464 3.584 9.66 5.889(p) 
Croatia 0.073 0.325 0.425 0.504 : 
Latvia 0.369 : 0.889 0.825 : 
Lithuania 0.578 0.453 0.387 0.637 0.819(p) 
Hungary 3.378 2.906 2.248 4.728 2.361(p) 
Poland 0.117 0.545 0.603 1.621 0.829(p) 
Romania 0.089 0.118 0.274 0.39 0.338(p) 
Slovenia 2.148 1.503 1.952 4.621 1.868(p) 
Slovakia 0.256 0.573 0.443 0.798 1.159(p) 
:=not available; p=provisional 
Source: Eurostat163 
 
The achieved results in the field of high-tech patents indicate the performance of the EU member states in R&D 
area. The evaluation of the number of patents could be followed in Table 15. In 2000, for 1 million European 
people 24,543 European high-tech patent were referred. Between 2000-2011, there was a negative tendency in 
the number of new patents. In 2000, the largest number of high-tech patents for 1 million people came from 
Hungary and Slovenia, while in 2010, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia ranked first. Between 2000 and 2010, the 
Czech Republic and especially Poland had a significant patent activity in the high-tech field. Bulgaria, Romania 
and Lithuania have been the least active. It is important to emphasize that the Estonian, Hungarian, Slovenian 
and Czech researchers were able to connect effectively to international research programs, and to  EU R&D 
framework programs. The other EU10 countries could reach less success in international dimension of high-tech 
research. The reason of this is that their small economic power, their R&D potential and financial capability do not 
allow them to implement capital-intensive, big projects. FDI could improve the results, but it has been spent only  
marginally on R&D in these countries.  
The main instrument of the EU’s R&D policy is the so-called Framework Programs, that finance specific, common 
collaboration based researches. The current 7th Framework Program has several successful projects and results, 
but severe problems and criticism also arise against them. The recognition of deficiencies of the European R&D 
activities is that in Europe, new technology creation capability is needed, and also the rapid application of new 
technologies. Therefore the future oriented technical innovation needs cooperation between developers and 
users of the new technologies. 
The national research-development policy could cover only part of the innovation risks, therefore companies have 
to take part of the execution. In the EU, the main direction of technical-development policy is to secure more 
favorable frameworks, to improve the technical-economical development information supply, to promote the risk-
management, and to give accurate information about the technical and market opportunities related changes. 
                                                 
163 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/_download/Eurostat_Table_tsc00010HTMLDesc_2993954a-d89d-43ed-a86b-
59d167c51e3a.htm# 
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This is complemented by the encouragement of diffusion-oriented technical development. In this field the R&D 
framework programs of the EU play an important positive role.  
The economic policy analyses forecast the improvement of the EU technical development positions, 
strengthening competitiveness in the world market through the improvement of the European innovation activity 
framework conditions, and the political environment. To enhance the technical development, they are looking 
forward to stimulate competition and fiscal policy, which are regulated in this area. 
 
Conclusion 
Demographic problems, the economic impact of aging and problems of the large service systems threat the long 
term stability of the pension system. This is connected to the development of the human resources, and its role, 
which determines the growth and financial balance, or lack of them.  
In the EU10, among them in Hungary, large part of the human resources is well qualified, developed, but its 
effective utilization is far from the EU-average and from the consistent building of knowledge based society. The 
situation got worse with healthcare and educational problems. Due to these, the creation of knowledge based 
society, the realization of the Lisbon Strategy and its implementation is far. It can be worrying that many transition 
countries are affected by transitional crises dramatically. The R&D expenditures, their share to the GDP and to 
the budget has fallen significantly. The Lisbon Strategy envisages a 3% per GDP ratio for R&D expenditures. This 
is fulfilled only by the Scandinavian countries, the EU average is 1.8-1.9%, and there is not much progress. The 
same ratio in the USA is 3%, in Japan much more than 3%.  
The R&D expenditures in Europe are only one-fourth of the innovation expenditures. Innovation would be 
effective in the market, if three times more R&D expenditures were spent to innovation. This proves that R&D is 
significant part of our development, but not a sufficient factor. Within the innovation expenditures, the weight of 
R&D fell, but on the other hand, the technology-development and production were raised. In the EU10 countries, 
it is absolutely necessary to strengthen the R&D sector, expenditures and to improve the efficiency of its 
improvement and effectiveness at the same time. Our R&D results should become competitive, which requires 
the creation of developed innovation chains. 
The gap of the EU10 countries in the area of education, trainings are less than in their GDP per capita, they have 
advantages compared to the “old” member states. The strengthening of human capital in its quantitative and 
qualitative potential plays a major factor in economic recovery, therefore this area should be prioritized in the 
economic policy and expenditures. In general, increasing the length of education increases the productivity. 
Education, training of the human capital should play a key role in the recovery of the EU10 region and it should 
be the basis of growth together with the improvement of the workforce potential. However, for example in 
Hungary we can experience opposite tendencies. 
International analyses and experts of the European Commission found the European R&D policy non-effective, 
mature for reforms. The EU10 countries must also have their own reform strategy. 
The European Union has lagging development compared to the USA. The disadvantages of productivity and 
faster diffusion of innovation could be reduced by increasing the impact of information and communication 
technologies. The same is true for EU10 countries. The growth rate of investments in the EU10 states is 
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permanently higher than in the EU15 countries, but their structure should be corrected to converge towards the 
value added activities. 
It is important to note that in the developed EU countries, GDP growth comes from the extremely highly 
productive non-financial services, mainly from R&D related to innovation and its support activities. In the EU10 
countries, the economic policy promotion and the corporate strategies should also focus more on that. 
The improvement of R&D expenditures, and ensuring the human resources for R&D are necessary, but far from 
sufficient. The improvement of the utilization of R&D expenditures and rapid introduction of its results is essential 
also in the EU10 countries. The handicaps of EU10 states are based on the slow implication of innovations. The 
improvement of the investment environment, the consistent economic policy have significant role in the recovery 
of EU10 countries, and among them, Hungary. Finally, countries have to emphasise the social impact and 
acceptance of new technologies. 
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Mobility from the EU10 - some considerations as seen by 
these countries: Remarks to the brain drain, brain waste or 
brain gain debate 
Klára Fóti 
Introduction 
Whereas the impact of increased intra-EU mobility in the receiving countries has been high on the agenda since 
the two significant waves of enlargements (2004 and 2007), so far less attention has been paid to the 
perspectives of the sending countries. This happened despite the fact that some concerns have been raised also 
from their part. 
The concerns are related to the fact that among the emigrants, young people are overrepresented, which has 
implications both from demographic and economic perspectives. Similarly to most EU15 Member States, 
population of the sending countries is also ageing; the recent economic crisis affected their economies, with 
serious social consequences in most cases (slow growth, high unemployment, increasing poverty rates and 
inequalities). 
When the impact on the sending countries is analysed, it is important to distinguish between short-, medium and 
possible long-term effects. Whereas in principle short-term effects can be deducted from current developments, 
there is more uncertainty when either the medium or the long-term perspectives are assessed. 
It may, however, prove challenging even to analyse the current situation. Not only do shortcomings of basic data 
make cross-country comparison difficult, for a clearer picture counterfactual analysis would be needed. In order to 
give an objective, impartial assessment, it would be important to find the right balance between the positive and 
negative effects; for example, such important questions should be answered whether unemployment would be 
higher in the sending countries if emigration did not occur. 
The available data show that whereas the education level of mobile EU citizens tends to be high, the majority are 
employed in low-skilled occupation. This may suggest that the motivation behind emigration could not only be 
earning higher income, but possibly also to escape from unemployment. Related to the gap between educational 
attainment and occupation level, it is relevant to ask whether this could be a long-lasting phenomenon or there 
are signs for improvement. 
Despite the general tendency of EU10 migrants having low-skilled occupation, if certain professions are 
considered, such as health specialists (doctors), this is definitely not the case. As regards the emigration of highly 
specialised doctors and the ensuing shortages in that profession in the sending country (as demonstrated for 
example by Eurofound, 2013), even some signs of brain drain can be detected. In this case, the question is 
whether there could be a chance of their return in the future. The extent of potential return (and possible brain 
gain) depends to a large extent on economic perspectives of the sending countries. So far, return migration has 
not happened on a massive scale (Eurofound, 2012) presumably because the impact of the crisis could be felt 
strongly in most of the sending countries (Poland seems to be an exception as regards the strong effects of the 
crisis, but even here, scale of return migration is unknown due to deficiencies of the related data). Therefore, it is 
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not surprising, that currently there is hardly any evidence for brain gain. Some country variation can be observed, 
however, also in this regard. For example, in case of two small countries, Slovenia and Estonia, among the 
returnees, students constitute the largest group. If the majority of the members of this group stay in the country at 
least for some time, the countries could benefit from the knowledge the students acquired abroad. Even 
nowadays, however, an increased circularity (circular movement) can be observed in intra-EU mobility. This is 
likely to persist and expand in the future. 
The study analyses mainly the sending countries’ perspectives, focusing first on demographic data compared 
with those of the main destination countries. In order to get some idea about the issue of possible brain drain, 
brain gain or brain waste, the second section outlines some key characteristics of the EU10 mobile citizens, and 
the third is concerned with their current labour market performance. Finally, the conclusions focus on possible 
future perspectives. 
 
Demographic background – key features in the sending countries 
If perspectives of the sending countries are considered, potential of future work force and sustainability of the 
welfare system (especially pensions) should be analysed – both current age composition and fertility rates are 
certainly relevant from this point of view. 
As can be seen from Figure 1 below, it is precisely the sending countries, where share of the youngest age group 
(below 15 years of age) is usually the lowest. There are exceptions, however: among the sending countries these 
are Romania and Estonia (the share in both being about 16%) whereas among the traditional receiving countries 
Germany and Austria (the share being 13% and 14% respectively) as well as the new receiving countries, such 
as Italy and Spain (about 14% and 15%, respectively). 
 
Figure 1: Share of population below 15 years of age in EU28, EU10 plus Croatia and some key 
destination countries 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data 
 
It seems obvious that part of the explanation for the divide between the Member States lies in 
presence/dominance of third country nationals in certain countries. This may explain the relatively high share in 
the former colonial powers (such as the UK, France and the Netherlands), whereas in Denmark and Sweden high 
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number of refugees could be attributed to that. Ireland is a special case: as is well known, it has the youngest 
population in the EU. 
As regards the sending countries, however, even if the share of the youngest age group is higher in Slovakia or 
Romania than in some receiving countries (i.e. Germany, Italy, Austria or Spain), if the pace of current emigration 
continues, it is doubtful whether this relatively high share can be preserved. 
To some extent, a similar pattern is shown when the total fertility rates are examined. As can be seen from Table 
1, in none of the EU countries did the indicator reach such a level which would make the so called simple 
reproduction possible – as is known, this is 2.10 (the indicator shows the average rate of child birth per women of 
child-bearing age, i.e. 15-49 in a country in a given year) This is true even for those two EU Member States which 
are known as having relatively high fertility rates, i.e. Ireland and France. Fertility rates in EU10 are usually lower 
than in EU27/28 average, the exceptions being Lithuania (interestingly) and Slovenia in 2012. However, in neither 
of them is higher fertility rate a long-term pattern. It is rather Estonia, which could be regarded as a real 
exception, where even longer trends (between 2005 and 2011) show a more favourable perspective. At the same 
time, in most EU15 countries, the fertility rate is higher than the EU average. The exceptions again are Germany, 
Austria, Italy and Spain. In one of the most important destination country, in the UK, however, fertility trends have 
constantly improved, from 1, 70 to 1, 92. It may well be that the recent increased inflow from the East-European 
Member States has contributed to the improvement. 
As is clear from Table 1, however, there are fluctuations in many countries, and as regards demographic trends, 
straightforward conclusions could be drawn from a long-term perspective. The fluctuations during this short term 
period show that country-specific demographic features, such as age composition, are playing also an important 
role. This varies quite a large extent across the EU, which is reflected in Table 2. The data give quite a mixed 
picture even on the changes of share of prime working age groups in the total population. 
As can be seen, although at EU average level, the share of all the younger age groups decreased between 2004 
and 2013 (just the eldest one, 44-49 years, it increased), this did not happen in any of the countries listed in the 
table. It is only in France where a drop was experienced in case of all the age groups (although in the eldest one 
it was minimal).  Share of the two youngest age groups, however, declined in almost all EU10 countries (with the 
exception of Lithuania, but even here its absolute number decreased during the last two years compared to the 
previous period, and its share increased only because the total population dropped even more than the number of 
people in the age group of 20-24 years). 
Some countries experienced quite a large drop in share of certain age groups: for example even in Estonia, 
where both the share of the population below 15 years and the fertility rate show a favourable pattern, the decline 
in the youngest working age group (15-19 years) is very high and this is a result of a continuous decrease since 
joining the EU. This may not reflect, however, high number of Estonian workers abroad, rather the fact that large 
numbers of students studying mainly in Finland. 
Among the EU10 countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic experienced a large drop in case of the age group 
of 25-29 years (regarded in many statistics as young people). The difference is, however, that whereas in the 
Czech Republic this is a result of a gradual decrease (with an annual decline of around 20 thousand or less), in 
case of Hungary a sudden, large drop of almost 70 thousand could be witnessed. Since, as mentioned, natural 
demographic trends are reflected in long-term developments; this sudden decrease could hardly be attributed to 
natural trends, rather to high emigration of the age cohort. 
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Table 1: Change of share of the prime working age groups in the total population of the 
respective countries between 2004 and 2013 (percentage points) 
 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
European Union (28 countries) -0.83 -0.49 -0.51 -0.56 -0.74 -0.12 0.39 
European Union (27 countries) -0.83 -0.49 -0.51 -0.57 -0.75 -0.12 0.40 
Belgium -0.17 0.12 0.07 -0.41 -1.09 -0.74 0.06 
Bulgaria -2.12 -0.79 -0.84 -0.17 1.05 0.39 -0.55 
Czech Republic -1.60 -0.93 -2.12 0.20 2.13 0.77 -0.47 
Denmark 0.93 0.89 -0.86 -1.26 -1.22 -0.31 0.79 
Germany  -0.78 0.04 0.47 -0.70 -2.86 -1.09 1.40 
Estonia -2.67 -0.23 0.28 -0.27 0.25 -0.35 -0.72 
Ireland -1.46 -2.60 -0.89 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.38 
Spain -0.92 -1.96 -2.54 -0.62 0.46 0.64 1.16 
France -0.55 -0.40 -0.20 -0.89 -0.89 -0.24 -0.02 
Croatia -0.46 -0.75 -0.03 0.47 -0.29 -0.84 -0.65 
Italy -0.22 -0.43 -1.55 -1.72 -0.76 0.45 1.38 
Latvia -3.17 -0.18 0.58 -0.39 -0.07 -0.60 -0.24 
Lithuania -1.51 0.28 0.00 -1.21 -0.93 -0.84 0.43 
Hungary -0.60 -0.72 -2.34 0.11 2.05 1.12 -1.50 
Netherlands -0.06 0.34 -0.11 -1.70 -1.96 -0.39 0.42 
Austria -0.25 0.10 0.28 -0.94 -2.20 -0.62 1.37 
Poland -2.37 -1.56 0.33 1.51 1.40 -0.66 -2.04 
Romania -2.32 -0.88 -1.20 -0.54 0.55 2.09 -1.29 
Slovenia -1.66 -1.63 -0.83 0.39 -0.23 -0.62 -0.31 
Slovakia -2.08 -1.32 -0.74 1.07 1.47 -0.30 -0.90 
Sweden -0.26 1.19 0.18 -0.60 -0.96 0.58 0.57 
United Kingdom -0.32 0.44 0.59 -0.57 -1.60 -0.36 0.79 
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data 
 
Among the receiving countries, large drop is not observed in case of the younger age groups. There are two 
exceptions: Ireland and Spain, two EU15 countries, which are known of not only having large inflow of EU mobile 
citizens, but also large emigration of young people from there. In Ireland although the decline of the youngest age 
group reflects a continuous decrease, the large drop in the share of the next age group (20-24) is most likely to 
be attributed to the effects of the crisis: there was a continuous increase in their absolute number until 2008 (from 
336 thousand to 373 thousand), in 2009 their number declined by almost 14 thousand, and during the whole 
period the decrease amounted to 73 thousand. Apart from the effects of possible natural demographic 
developments, the large drop can certainly be traced back to high emigration of native young people due to 
deteriorating labour market conditions in the wake of the crisis. The same seems to apply to the next age group 
(25-29 years) in Spain, the drop of which was similarly high as that of the previous age group in Ireland. Although 
the number of people of the age group did fluctuate between 2004 and 2007, from 2008 on, there has been a 
clear trend of an annual decrease of more than 100 thousand. Apparently, in none of these two countries could 
the inflow of EU mobile citizens compensate for the large decrease in share of the respective age groups (all the 
less so since this inflow slowed down precisely during this period, i.e. after 2008).From the above changes, 
similar developments seemed to happen in Italy, though to a lesser extent and in case of older age groups. 
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Despite these exceptions and the mixed picture, there seems to be a division between the EU15 and EU10 
countries also in recent changes of prime working age composition of the population. Even if natural demographic 
developments (natural decrease/increase related to fertility and mortality rates, average life expectancy at birth 
within the respective countries) certainly influence the age composition, it can be assumed that large decline in 
the share of the younger age groups is due to high emigration of young people from these countries. This is 
reflected in the fact that the largest drops in share of the youngest age groups are experienced precisely mainly in 
those countries, from which the emigration is particularly high: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland and 
Slovakia. For example in case of Latvia (where the drop of the share of the youngest age group is the highest 
being 3,17 percentage points), between the two last censuses (2000 and 2011) the country’s population 
decreased by 13%, and out of this, 63% “was due to negative net migration over the last decade” (Eurofound, 
2014, p. 26) Similarly, outflow from Lithuania was also high, experiencing negative net migration of more than 38 
thousand and 21 thousand in 2011 and 2012, respectively (Statistics Lithuania, quoted in Eurofound, 2014.) – in 
country with a population of about 3 million people, this can be regarded as a considerable loss. Although in 
Bulgaria, a much lower share of the loss of its population was attributed to emigration than in Latvia, the loss itself 
between the two censuses (i.e. during the first decade of 2000s) was very large, being 564 thousand – out of this 
about one third is estimated to be due to emigration, whereas the rest, two thirds is attributed to natural decrease 
(ibid, p. 27). The latter is, however, obviously related to previous large emigration waves which accelerated aging 
of the population in the country. Undoubtedly, however, the two largest sending countries are Romania and 
Poland. According to the latest estimates, about 2,1 million Romanians work in other EU countries in 2013, 
whereas the number of Polish citizens staying abroad was about 2,06 million in 2011 (ibid, source for Polish data: 
OECD 2013). 
 
Some key characteristics of the EU10 mobile citizens 
Various findings from research on the main characteristics of EU10 mobile citizens in the destination countries 
confirm what table 3 suggests from the sending countries’ perspectives, namely that those EU mobile citizens 
tend to be young and there is evidence for the strong presence (dominance) of the prime working age population.   
This is a common feature characterising the EU10 mobile citizens across all destination countries compared not 
only with natives, but also other migrant groups. In the UK for example, a research project, covering new arrivals 
during quite a long period (2000-2012), concluded that the average age of the EU10 mobile citizens stood at 30.4 
years, whereas for the natives, this was much higher, being 40.8 and in case of the other EEA (European 
Economic Area164) countries the difference was not as high but their average age was still higher: 31 years. As 
regards the non-EEA arrivals, their average age stood at 32,2 years (Frattini, 2014). Supposedly, even this 
finding underestimates the average age of more recent arrivals from EU10 (i.e. after the accession, 2004 and 
2007), as evidenced by other research covering the period since the accession only and/or showing more recent 
data. They pointed to average even below 30 years.165
Research covering the period of the first decade of the new Millennium revealed that the EU10 mobile citizens 
were well-educated and had no family (as yet). It was found that in fact, education level of the EU10 mobile 
 
                                                 
164 They include the EU28 plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway. 
165 Even the same research showed that, when later arrivals (2008-09) were examined, their average age stood at lower level, being 29,5. 
Although due to data problems, different immigrant groups could not be distinguished among them, it can be assumed that since EU10 
migrants dominated the group of immigrants arriving to the UKat that time, this figure reflects their younger age. In addition, preliminary 
finding of a more recent research covering the latest data (also from 2013) also found an average of the EU10 citizens below 30 years 
(Eurofound, 2015, forthcoming). 
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citizens is higher than that of the host population in EU15: the share of EU10 migrants with high educational 
attainment stood at 26.9% in 2009 (whereas the respective share within the total EU10 population was 15.5% 
only, and the corresponding figure for the total EU15 population was also lower, 21.7% - Kahanec, 2012, p. 29). 
Despite this, however, the EU12 migrants work in less-skilled occupations than natives. (2010 Labour Force 
Survey-data, Kahanec, ibid, p. 22.) 
Preliminary findings of a more recent research (Eurofound 2015, forthcoming) revealed that EU10 mobile citizens 
increasingly had families, though this change is very gradual. This is the case for example, in one of the host 
countries, in Denmark. Similarly, research in the UK found that among the various welfare benefits, EU10 citizens 
are mostly recipients of family related and child benefits. At the same time, in many destination countries related 
to younger age of EU10 mobile citizens, their share of unmarried persons is still higher than that of natives, 
although this is not everywhere the case. 
When gender composition is examined, various research findings showed a balanced gender pattern, although 
the most recent research by Eurofound pointed out  in case of some nationalities and in some host countries, 
women’s share is higher (e.g. in Austria, that of Bulgarian and Romanian women), and they tend not to have 
families as yet. 
Although more recent research confirmed previous findings of higher educational attainment of EU10 mobile 
citizens than natives, it also showed that for example in the UK, their qualification level is lower than that of the 
other immigrant groups: share of highly educated EU10 citizens was 37% (vis-à-vis 16% for natives), but this 
proportion stood at 49% for other EEA citizens and in the case of the non-EEA citizens it was higher, being 42% 
(Frattini 2014). Recent research by Eurofound (2015 – forthcoming) shows that educational attainment of the 
EU10 citizens seems to vary both by the destination countries and countries of origin. 
 As regards the occupational pattern, a more straightforward picture is shown: most EU10 citizens are occupied in 
low-skilled jobs: they “were far more likely to perform unskilled work {than other immigrant groups and natives – 
KF}: a full half of the 2009 cohort who were employed a year after arrival were in the lowest-skilled jobs…” 
Bevelander et al. 2014). The study continued to conclude that EU10-origin “workers who entered after EU 
enlargement were more likely to be employed in elementary occupations than their compatriots who emigrated 
earlier, because these later cohorts were not subject to selection criteria.166
 
 But over time, immigrants did appear 
able to move out of the lowest-skilled work. Those who arrived in 2001 saw their employment in the lowest-skilled 
jobs fall by almost 10% after a decade, although the share remained around 5 percent higher than natives. Post-
enlargement cohorts also saw improvement over time, although from a much higher base.”(Emphases – italics – 
are mines, KF – Bevelander et al., 2014) 
In some countries agriculture as a recipient sector seems important, in others it is rather construction and 
services (such as tourism, catering, domestic help and cleaning) which are dominant. (Eurofound, 2014) 
 
 
                                                 
166 This is certainly true from the demand side. But as regards labour supply (i.e. from the perspective of the EU10 citizens), as mentioned, 
one of their motivations for emigration to achieve higher income, which could be (even much) higher than if they were employed in a 
higher-skilled job in their home country. Many of them want to accumulate sufficient financial resources to start a business or 
buy/build/refurbish a property in their home countries when they return, or they hope to be able to get a better job over time in the host 
country, if they want to stay. 
Klára Fóti: Mobility from the EU10 - some considerations as seen by these countries: Remarks to the brain ... 
 
 
140 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 
 
Current trends in labour market performance of recent EU immigrants 
It is well known that main motivation of EU10 mobile citizens behind their emigration is to achieve higher income 
level, therefore their main objective is to work in the destination country selected (apart from their age pattern 
mentioned above, this is reflected by their high participation rate in all destination countries, confirmed by 
evidence). After the crisis, however, due to their vulnerable labour market position (low-skilled jobs, high 
concentration in sectors which were particularly hard hit by the economic downturn, such as construction and 
manufacturing), many of them lost their jobs and it was either difficult to find a new permanent one, or others had 
to take up more than one part-time jobs in order to make ends meet. Within this context, trends in their 
employment rates vis-à-vis the natives are worthwhile to examine. 
As can be seen from Table 3, at EU level (EU27/28), the average employment rate of the EU12 mobile citizens167
 
 
was always the highest compared to the total and that of the natives. The effect of the crisis is very clear: 
employment rates of all the three groups (total, natives, and EU12 mobile citizens) started to fall in 2009. 
Whereas the decline, however, seems to have stopped in 2011 for the former two groups, this did not happen for 
the EU12 mobile workers. Moreover, as a consequence of the crisis, the employment rate of the EU12 mobile 
citizens decreased more dramatically than that of the other two groups, so the gap between that of the first group 
on the one hand and employment rates of the latter two groups narrowed down: whereas the employment rate of 
the EU12 mobile citizens was close to 7 percentage points higher than that of the total or the natives in 2007, the 
difference halved, having dropped to a bit more than 3 percentage points. 
If the individual countries are considered, it is remarkable that despite the (seemingly still) favourable (although 
deteriorating) situation at EU level, the data reflect vulnerable labour market position of the EU12 mobile citizens 
in many of the individual destination countries. Even during the pre-crisis period (i.e. in 2007), in 6 out of the 10 
key host countries examined (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands), employment 
rate of the EU12 mobile citizens was lower than that of the natives. Although, not surprisingly, this situation has 
not changed since then in most destination countries, Belgium is the only exception where this turned reversed.   
However, in Spain, which is among the countries suffered most from the crisis and its labour market deteriorated 
to a considerable extent, employment rate of EU12 mobile citizens worsened even more, by their rate having 
dropped to a level below that of the natives by 2010 and a further deterioration occurred in 2011. It is interesting 
to see, however, that in Italy, where employment rate of natives is the lowest among all the countries examined in 
Table 3, this has not happened. Previous research results confirmed that in Italy the EU10 citizens did not suffer 
from such a huge job loss than in Spain, where the flourishing construction industry (due to previous property 
market bubble) all of a sudden collapsed. – This did not happen in Italy (or at least not to such an extent), instead, 
there was a higher demand there for those skills the new EU migrants could offer). Even if in some crisis-stricken 
countries (besides Italy also in Ireland) the employment rate of the EU10 mobile citizens remained higher, the 
difference diminished: this is most notable in the case of Ireland, where it declined from more than 15 percentage 
points to less than 7 percentage points. 
Trends in employment rates obviously reflect the labour market and economic situation within a certain country. 
For example in Germany, which was not affected by the crisis seriously, the employment rate of the EU10 mobile 
workers increased and the difference diminished to some extent. 
                                                 
167 Eurostat data contain not only the EU10 citizens but include those from Malta and Cyprus respectively, the two countries which joined 
the EU at the same time when EU8 did, i.e. in 2004. 
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Table 2: Total employment rates, those of natives (N) and EU12 mobile citizens in the EU and 
selected key destination countries (%) 
 2007 20008 2009 2010 2011 
 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 
EU28 65.3 65.5 72.1 65.7 65.9 71.1 64.5 64.8 68.5 64.0 64.4 68.1 64.1 64.5 67.6 
EU27 65.3 65.5 72.1 65.8 66.0 71.1 64.5 64.9 68.5 64.1 64.5 68.1 64.2 64.6 67.6 
EU15 66.8 67.3 72.0 67.1 67.5 71.0 65.8 66.3 68.3 65.4 66.0 67.9 65.5 66.1 67.5 
BE 62.0 62.9 61.9 62.4 63.1 60.9 61.6 62.5 63.1 62.0 62.8 66.2 61.9 63.0 66.1 
DK 77.0 78.1 72.2 77.9 78.7 77.5 75.3 76.0 78.8 73.3 74.1 71.3 73.1 74.1 66.9 
DE 69.0 70.5 61.8 70.1 71.7 64.0 70.3 71.9 65.9 71.1 72.7 65.1 72.5 74.0 68.4 
IE 69.2 68.3 83.9 67.6 66.9 79.3 61.9 61.7 67.4 59.6 59.6 63.8 58.9 58.7 65.0 
ES 65.6 65.1 72.7 64.3 64.2 68.1 59.8 60.3 61.3 58.6 59.0 58.8 57.7 58.4 54.8 
IT 58.7 58.1 71.7 58.7 58.1 70.1 57.5 56.9 69.5 56.9 56.3 69.2 56.9 56.4 66.9 
NL 76.0 76.7 67.3 77.2 77.8 76.2 77.0 77.6 66.1 74.7 75.3 68.0 74.9 75.6 72.0 
AT 71.4 72.4 70.0 72.1 73.2 67.4 71.6 72.8 63.5 71.7 72.8 64.9 72.1 73.2 66.9 
SE 74.2 75.0 60.8 74.3 75.1 68.4 72.2 73.0 67.3 72.1 73.1 65.2 73.6 74.8 65.0 
UK 71.5 71.9 80.9 71.5 71.8 81.7 69.9 70.2 81.0 69.5 69.8 80.6 69.5 69.7 80.3 
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data. 
 
Of course, the average employment rate masks the differences of that of various nationalities. In Sweden labour 
market outcomes of earlier arrivals (in 1993-97) were examined. It was found that by 2011, employment rate of 
Polish citizens has reached almost the same level, as that of citizens from the other Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland and Norway). It’s interesting to see that even the trend was similar, especially between 2002 
and 2011 (in 1997 the Poles’ employment rate was much lower, being just above 20%, although even then this 
was higher than those of other immigrants (e.g. Bosnia, rest of former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, but 
whereas immigrants from the former two managed to exceed the native employment rate of 81% by 2011, other 
citizens from third countries could not catch up - Bevelander et al., 2014, p. 12) 
 
Conclusions: possible future perspectives 
Considering the current situation, it is difficult to give a clear answer to the question formulated in the title. The 
reason is that ongoing developments do not reflect in a straightforward way whether there is a brain drain, brain 
gain or brain waste. According to the available data, the majority of East-European mobile citizens are 
overqualified for the job they have in the host countries.  Therefore at present signs of brain waste seem to 
prevail. A well-known Polish migration expert, Pawel Kaczmarczyk, asks whether brain waste is something which 
cannot be avoided.168
                                                 
168 This was asked also in his presentation, entitled ‘Well-educated migrants on the European labour market: between brain gain and brain 
waste’, which was held in Brussels, September 2014. 
 From his research, he concluded that return to human capital is generally low for EU8 
citizens, especially for Poles, where it is very low (his research pointed out a wage penalty in their case). As 
assumed reasons, he identified the shortcomings of skill transferability, lack of language knowledge and possible 
cohort effects Kaczmarczyk (2014). He quotes some researchers (Mattoo et al.), who conclude that there is a 
“common brain waste”, which is likely to persist because as a consequence of the aforementioned low return, 
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there are “low incentives to invest in human capital”. The fact that “many migrants do not get a good return on 
their education in the local labor market” is confirmed also by Benton et al., 2014. 
Previous research on long-term labour market perspectives of immigrants has, however, provided evidence of 
many foreign workers being able to “climb up the occupational ladder” over time (see for example: Bevelander et 
al, 2014). There are even some signs of this happening also in the case of the EU10 mobile citizens. According to 
these experiences, migrants could have strong incentive to invest in host country-specific human capital, such as 
learning the language and attending such training courses which enable them to get the jobs they aspire for. 
As regards brain drain, its definition, as provided by Kaczmarczyk (2014), is a “selective outflow of highly skilled 
persons”. Within the context of post-enlargement migration of the EU10 citizens, he and Okolski (Kaczmarczyk 
and Okolski, 2008) introduced the term “brain overflow” – (as an alternative to brain drain). Indeed, if the gap 
between educational attainment of EU10 citizens and their labour market outcomes (in terms of not only their 
employment level but their occupation as well) is considered, this seems to be a more appropriate term for 
describing the current situation than that of the brain drain. The phenomenon of “brain overflow”, however, could 
provide a good base for their better labour market performance. 
The aforementioned Polish experts seem quite pessimistic when they attempt to draw a balance between the 
costs and benefits of mobility. They say169 that “while countries of destination, on average, benefit from 
immigration, countries of origin tend to bear relatively high costs of the outflow”. Indeed, it seems that the intra-EU 
mobility has substantial social consequences on the sending countries, which are apparent not only in changes of 
demographic pattern in these countries (e.g. age composition of the population), but also in lives of individual 
families. This could have far-reaching consequences also for some social services in the future in these countries 
as well.170
                                                 
169 See Kaczmarczyk’s presentation, mentioned before 
170 Let alone those long-term psycho-social consequences the children who are left behind, would suffer from the absence of their parents. 
This should be considered when possible perspectives are assessed, even if there is no hard evidence on this as yet, and detailed 
analysis of the topic is beyond the scope of this study. 
 For example, impacts on family members left behind, or the effects of outflow on regions/small 
areas/villages, impacts are already significant. This situation may result in an expansion of long-term care 
services in the future, not only due to demographic changes but also due to more (payable) demand for these 
from the part of EU mobile citizens (in the form of remittances to their family members left behind). 
Even nowadays, however, an increased circularity (circular movement) can be observed in intra-EU mobility. This 
is likely to persist and expand in the future. If, as part of circularity, return migration will occur on a larger scale 
than today, the issue of brain drain and brain gain may not be as high on the agenda as today. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Total fertility rates in EU27/28, EU10 plus Croatia and in some key destination 
countries 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
European Union (28 countries) 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56* 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.58* 1.58* 
European Union (27 countries) 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56* 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.58* 1.58* 
Belgium 1.67 1.72 1.76 1.80 1.82 1.85 1.84 1.86 1.81* 1.79 
Bulgaria 1.23 1.29 1.32 1.38 1.49* 1.56 1.66 1.57 1.51 1.50 
Czech Republic 1.18 1.23 1.29 1.34 1.45 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.43 1.45 
Denmark 1.76 1.78 1.80 1.85 1.84 1.89 1.84 1.87 1.75 1.73 
Germany 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.38 
Estonia 1.37 1.47 1.52 1.58 1.69 1.72 1.70 1.72 1.61 1.56 
Ireland 1.96 1.93 1.86 1.91 2.01 2.06 2.06 2.05 2.03 2.01 
Spain 1.30 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.38 1.45 1.38 1.37 1.34 1.32 
France 1.89 1.92 1.94 2.00 1.98 2.01 2.00 2.03 2.01 2.01 
Croatia 1.41 1.43 1.50 1.47 1.48 1.55 1.58 1.55 1.48 1.51 
Italy 1.29 1.34 1.34 1.37 1.40 1.45 1.45 1.46 1.44 1.43 
Latvia 1.32 1.29 1.39 1.46 1.54 1.58 1.46 1.36 1.33 1.44 
Lithuania 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.36 1.45 1.50 1.50 1.55 1.60 
Hungary 1.27 1.28 1.31 1.34 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.26 1.34 
Netherlands 1.75 1.72 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.77 1.79 1.79 1.76 1.72 
Austria 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.38 1.42 1.39 1.44 1.43 1.44 
Poland 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.27 1.31 1.39 1.40 1.38 1.30* 1.30 
Romania 1.31 1.35 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.53 1.57 1.54 1.46 1.53 
Slovenia 1.20 1.25 1.26 1.31 1.38 1.53 1.53 1.57 1.56 1.58 
Slovakia 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.25 1.27 1.34 1.44 1.43 1.45 1.34 
Sweden 1.71 1.75 1.77 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.94 1.98 1.90 1.91 
United Kingdom 1.70 1.75 1.76 1.82 1.86 1.91 1.89 1.92 1.91 1.92 
Note: *Break in series 
Source: Eurostat 
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